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Preface

Abstract: This paper aims to outline the existing policies aimed at providing protection for sexual
abuse survivors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In an attempt to provide justice for the
survivors of sexual abuse, an analysis of the 1992-1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina post-conflict
reconstruction is included. In particular, prosecution of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of
war will be provided in order to weigh the benefits and weaknesses of international criminal law.
The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo witnesses widespread and systematic
sexual violence abuses. With over 60 armed groups at any given day, identifying the perpetrators
of the crimes are challenging. Perpetrators go unpunished, which adds to the air of impunity seen
throughout the country. There is an urgency to incorporate sexual violence into prosecution of all
war criminals. It is imperative that the government of Democratic Republic of Congo, and the
international community realize the destructive nature of disregarding the voices of the people
who have suffered during the conflict. In addition to improving the prosecution of alleged war
criminals, civil societies and survivors of conflict need to be incorporated into the peace talks
and post-conflict reconstruction.
Key words: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, transitional justice,
sexual violence, rape as a weapon of war, human security
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Preface
Positionality and Subjectivity Statement
The main objective of this paper is to study pre-existing policies on transitional justice and
prosecution of wartime criminals in order to determine areas that are imperative to be addressed
during the post-conflict transitional justice phase in DRC. Specifically, it researches how to
address rape as a weapon of war and sexual violence. It is aimed towards policymakers and
academics. One might ask: What do I benefit from researching this topic? Why should anyone
listen to my concluding remarks? While I might not be Congolese, or speak any languages
spoken in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I am a woman. I am a human rights defender,
and understand the intricacies of international human rights law, international humanitarian law
and the international justice system and conflict. I am currently a senior, double majoring in
Political Science and International Development and Social Change. My specializations within
each department are International Relations, and Gender Equality and Human Rights. While I
might not understand every aspect of culture in DRC, I understand the need to promote women’s
rights and gender equality. I consider myself an ally, and want to use my privilege- coming from
the United States and Sweden, being a Caucasian woman, and being able to receive a Bachelor’s
Degree at a higher institution- to defend the rights of others during conflict. I do not argue
(within this piece) that all human rights are universal and inalienable. I view human rights,
human security and freedom from sexual violence during conflict, an inalienable human right.
Disregarding this human security aspect shows a failure of the state, and emphasizes the need to
incorporate this human right into universal human rights discourses around the globe.
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Nonetheless, it is equally as important in realizing how history, structural adjustment policies
and colonization has contributed to the inability of the state to provide protection of a person
human security.
Some of this research is selfish on my part. My undergraduate honors thesis is part of my
application to Clark University’s Graduate School so I can continue studying International
Development and Social Change. While writing this research paper started from the desire to
receive an accelerated master’s degree, learning the complexities of conflict, gender, sexual
violence and prosecution has made me realize the need to further expand this discourse. In the
future, I want to be able to conduct primary research on gender roles during conflict and
gendered reactions towards sexual violence during conflict. Nevertheless, this was not possible
given the scope of this research paper and my availability in conducting primary research given
the time frame. As a result, I use other investigations to provide the influential voice of victims
from conflict.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Brief History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Located in the heart of the African continent, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth
DRC) is one of the most resource rich countries in the world. It is estimated that DRC holds sixty
percent of the world’s coltan (abbreviation for columbite–tantalite), along with other natural
resources such as gold, tin and tungsten (Diggs 2012, 37). Over $1 million worth of coltan is
exported out of the country every day (Meger 2010, 118). Coltan is necessary for the production
of electronics, smart phones, etc. While DRC is wealthy in various aspects of society, it has been
plagued by colonization and therefore the decolonization process (Central Intelligence Agency:
The World FactBook, 2016). Originally established as a private colony of King Leopold II of
Belgium, DRC (then Zaire) received colonial independence in 1960s (Diggs 2012, 25-36). The
First Congolese War started in 1996. The Second Congolese War (1998-2003) is often referred
to as Africa’s World War. These two conflicts claimed over 5 million lives (Diggs 2012, 25-36).
Active fighting in the eastern regions of the country has been prevalent since 2004. The conflicts
in eastern DRC have become known as the Kivu Conflicts. While there have been reoccurring
ceasefires and peace treaties, fighting has essentially been continuous since the First Congolese
War in 1996. The recent encounters in the eastern regions of DRC are the bloodiest battles seen
since World War II (Diggs 2012, 25-36; ITUC International Trade Union Confederation 2011,
8). The competition for resources contributes to the constant warfare. Political instability, the
central government’s complacency in human rights violations and its inability to control rebel
groups, contribute to the instability seen in the eastern regions of the country and has eternalized
the fighting (Diggs 2012).

Chapter 1: Introduction
Rape is widespread within the Congolese society and is used as a weapon of war. It has
been stated that DRC is the “worst place in the world to be a woman or child” (Sawyer and Van
Woudenberg 2009, 10). It has also been labeled “the rape capital of the world” (Loko Roko, et
al. 2014, 2). Gender-based violence and rape as a weapon of war is a violation of a person’s
human security and human rights. Furthermore, rape as a weapon of war is a violation of
international humanitarian law (Rule 93 ICRC), as well as the Congolese Domestic Criminal
Code (Article 170) (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). Rape rates go severely
underreported as a result of stigma and lack of access to hospitals and judicial proceedings. In
2009, the United Nations announced estimates that over 200,000 women and girls had been
assaulted in the past twelve years in DRC (Kelly 2010, 2). The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documented 1,244 women as victims of sexual assault in
the first three months of 2010 (Kelly 2010, 2). Organizations fluctuate in their reported rape and
sexual assault cases, but data shows an overwhelming prevalence of reported sexual violence and
assault towards women and children. The politics of numbers as it relates to rape rates and the
conflict in DRC will be discussed in depth towards the end of this chapter.
The types of rape seen in DRC are extremely violent and can lead to death. Due to the
presences of rape as a weapon of war in conflicts such as Bosnian and Herzegovina, Sierra
Leone and the Rwandan genocide, the international community has begun to recognize the
implications of this form of human rights violation on the individual level, as well as the societal
level. It is imperative that the international and domestic communities, as well as individuals
begin to address the implications of rape in DRC. Perpetrators who violate this form of human
security are not being prosecuted. Impunity is widespread. The state is implicit in immortalizing
this tactic of war. As Van Woundenberg states, “[t]he culture of impunity for sexual violence and
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other serious crimes is at the heart of why rape continues... Military commanders are powerful
figures in Congo, [and are] perceived as being untouchable” (Van Woudenberg 2012, 133-134).
Until women and men’s rights are restored and justice is seen for victims, the people of DRC
will not receive complete justice or an end to the conflicts. A more comprehensive analysis of
the history and conflict in DRC is given in Chapter Three. The use of rape as a weapon of war in
DRC is also addressed in Chapter Three. The history of rape as a weapon of war on the
international level is discussed later in this chapter.
This work will aim to answer the primary research question: Given the challenges present
in prosecuting sexual violence after the conflict in Bosnia, what can the Democratic Republic of
the Congo learn, and what are the existing policies aimed at prosecuting alleged war criminals
for sexual violence? Additional research questions were asked and addressed throughout the
paper. These include: How can impunity be reduced and justice achieved? What aspects of
society need to be included and addressed in the transitional justice system during the future
post-conflict period in DRC? Chapter One outlines the research process, methodology, and
literature collected throughout the research process of this paper. Important definitions and
policies are given in this chapter to assist the reader for the future chapters. Chapter Two
provides a literature review of common themes present in previous research and how it
contributes to this paper, as well as limitations from these individual’s research and papers.
Chapter Three focuses on the history of the conflicts in DRC by providing an important timeline.
It also outlines the actors involved in the conflict. Chapter Three highlights the extent to which
rape as a weapon of war is seen in DRC. It provides some perspectives of perpetrators, as well as
victims of wartime rape.
Chapter Four gives an important analysis of the conflict of Bosnia, the use of rape as a
3
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weapon of war during this conflict, the creation of the ethnic cleansing, and the post-conflict
restorative justice procedures. The motivation towards electing to analyze Bosnia in this research
project is due to the nature of the conflict, as it is commonly depicted as an ethnic conflict where
sexual violence was widespread. After the Bosnian conflict, the international community
acknowledged the extent to which rape had been used as a weapon of war and incorporated rape
into the definition of crimes against humanity and a violation of human rights law. Preexisting
International humanitarian laws were also expanded upon as a result of this conflict. Prior to the
conflict in Bosnia, individuals discerned rape as an inevitable consequence of war. The landmark
cases during the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) changed
this perspective. The justice process in Bosnia is given in-depth analysis in order to determine
what policies should be applied to DRC and the limitations of the peace process.
Chapter Five outlines existing international policies regarding sexual violence, gender,
international human rights laws, international humanitarian laws, ethnic cleansing, justice and
prosecutions. Chapter Five looks at human rights treaties and the status of the treaties. It pulls
articles from the treaties to emphasize the need to address women’s rights in conflict settings.
Chapter Five reiterates the international community’s affirmation towards addressing sexual
violence during conflict. Chapter Six focuses on the policies within the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in order to understand what policies are missing, what is enforced and what needs to
be enforced. This chapter analyzes the change in policies addressing sexual violence within the
Congolese context. Chapter Six investigates domestic court cases that have provided justice as
well as failed justice for victims of human rights violations. The conclusion asks what the DRC
can learn from these policies. It weighs the pros and cons iterated throughout the entire thesis. It
asks questions for future research and address the limitations seen. Recommendations towards
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the international community, Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and African
Union will be discussed in the final chapter.
While no specific chapter is dedicated towards the efforts of either non-governmental or
international organizations, the work these groups do is referenced throughout the chapters. The
work these advocacy groups do is important to incorporate into the text throughout in an effort to
raise awareness for the issues seen in DRC. International organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can hold a significant amount of power in applying pressure
to the governments (national and international) in enforcing policies or implicating individuals
involved in human rights violations. Including the voice of the international organizations is
important as it is often unbiased (or biased in a different way) and provides a different
perspective than the one provided by the governments.
Overall, this study emphasizes why research within the field of sexual violence during
conflict and post-conflict reconstruction is important. This paper adds to the greater literature on
rape as a weapon of war, the conflict in DRC and international human rights law in general.
Peace will not be achieved without listening to the voices of victims during any and all conflicts.
Incorporating women into the decision-making and peace process is imperative for a successful
post-conflict transition. Reintegration techniques for soldiers returning from conflict need to be
improved, as well as reintegration for victims of conflict and sexual violence.
The use of rape as a weapon of war targets women (and men) for their bodies during
times of conflict. This tactic is becoming increasingly present in contemporary wartime. As Sara
Meger states, “[i]n order to deter the use of sexual violence as an instrument of resource warfare,
the international community must hold the chain of individuals, corporations and industries that
fund resource-driven conflicts accountable for their role in incentivizing sexual violence” (Meger
5
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2011, 126). This form of violence needs to be acknowledged and stopped. Action taken to
protect and prosecute the individuals involved needs to be seen within the context of the conflict
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, there is an issue within the context of
framing human rights violations in regards to rape as a weapon of war, human rights security
during conflict, and ‘normalized’ rape. While these phrases represent the same violation of one’s
body and human security, they appeal to different audiences. Some are deemed more important
(rape as a weapon of war) and others are seen as inevitable (‘normalized’ rape or “lust rape” as
discussed below).
This chapter begins by discussing the scope of the investigation, what will be addressed
and the timeline researched. After discussing the scope and methodology, the research process
will be discussed. The methodology section discusses how research was conducted, what type of
sources were used, and the importance of understanding representation in discussing numbers
and statistics as they are presented throughout the paper. The final section outlines necessary
definitions and distinctions. Providing the definitions at the beginning of the paper is important
as the definitions present the fundamental backbone to understand the complexities of the
situation and the framing of my argument. A conclusion section is given to deliver a summary
and link this chapter to the next, the Literature Review.
Scope of Investigation
Rape has been present in conflict since the beginning of time. Prior to the conflict in Bosnia,
researchers, politicians, civilians, etc. perceived rape to be an inevitable consequence of war and
conflict (Meger 2011, 102-108). The modern international criminal and human rights institutions
were created following World War II and the Nuremberg War Crime Trials. Nonetheless, during
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these trials, sexual violence was overlooked and not addressed. At the Tokyo Tribunals, “rape”
was only mentioned once, in passing, despite the widely acknowledged presence of “comfort
women” and in other conflict instances, i.e. Nanking (Aydelott 1993, 585-631). The lack of
addressing sexual violence during conflict in these tribunals has contributed to the lag in
acknowledging individual’s bodies can be targeted during conflict. Between 1991 and 2003,
Jennifer Green conducted research identifying the widespread and systematic use of rape as a
weapon of war around the world. She found that this violation of human rights was employed in
twenty-four conflicts (Maedl 2011, 129-130). Rape has been present in the three contemporary
conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, this project focuses on sexual
violence in the eastern regions of DRC. These violent outbreaks have become known as the Kivu
Conflicts. The reason for limiting the scope of research and time frame is not because the rapes
that occurred during the First Congolese War and Second Congolese Wars are not important.
Rather, the current conflict has witnessed “widespread” and “systematic” rape rates.
Furthermore, amnesties and pardons were granted for the first two conflicts. As the conflict in
eastern DRC is active, there is a higher likelihood that restorative justice aimed towards the
victims of conflict and sexual violence will be effective if implemented from a gender-central
approach.
Since the 1990s, the world has seen a change in the way conflicts are being fought. This
created a new phrase: “new wars” was coined by Mary Kaldor (Kaldor 1999).1 Historically,
fighting occurred between official state armed groups, and not non-state actor groups or guerilla

1

Kaldor’s theory of “new wars” versus “old wars” has seen some criticism in recent years. Stathis Kalyvas argues
the labeling of “new” and “old wars” is rooted in a misunderstanding of the historical research on “new wars” and
how there is no significant difference between these types of conflicts (Kalyvas 2001, 99-108). However, Kaldor’s
perspective of “new” versus “old wars” is still used in the paper to highlight the difference in protecting versus
targeting civilians throughout the history of conflicts.
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groups. There were designated battlefields, and fighting did not occur within the neighborhoods
and civilians were not targeted. Old wars are rooted in jus in bello which aims to provide
protection of non-combatants. Non-combatants are usually women, as historically women are
excluded from fighting. New wars, however, have seen a change in how they are fought. They
are fought by non-state actor groups, rebel groups, local warlords, etc. One of the main goals is
to receive political control of the territory or state, rather than physical control of the land. New
wars increase the rates of refugees and internally displaced persons as people flee from their
homes. The conflicts tend to be rooted in identity-based politics and are financed by the black
market and shadow networks. Furthermore, active fighting occurs within civilian territory
(Kaldor 1999). New wars are significantly more destructive than old wars as casualties are
higher, infrastructure is destroyed and there is a disregard for international humanitarian law.
WWII was fought between multiple states and official armed groups. Yet, compared to WWII,
the conflict in DRC has seen similar death rates. The conflicts in DRC are fought in large part by
non-state actor groups. Civilians are intentionally targeted as a tactic of war for intimidation and
torture. The shift in where and how conflict is being fought affects civilians and peacekeepers. It
has foregrounded the need to reform international policies. The international community has
created an abundance of resolutions and treaties aimed at protecting civilians and peace in an
effort to end the conflicts. These policies are constantly reaffirming the need to protect the rights
of civilians, usually women and children, during conflict. Furthermore, there is a focus on
granting amnesties to end fighting and reintegrate combatants.
There are many factors that have contributed in my choosing to investigate post-conflict
justice in the former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992) (henceforth
Bosnia). As mentioned above, the types of crimes seen in Bosnia established an international
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precedence that included rape as a weapon of war as a form of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the
conflict in Bosnia created the ad hoc international criminal justice court, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) (ICTY). The ICTY enhanced upon the
global precedence set during the Nuremburg Trials on the prosecution of individuals for war
crimes. The ICTY also paved the way for the Rome Statute (1998), and the formation of the
International Criminal Court (2002). The conflict in Bosnia expanded the discourse on sexual
violence as it provided a much needed distinction between the definitions of rape and genocidal
rape.
Another motivation in choosing to examine the conflict in Bosnia is due to the type of
transitional justice that was present during the post-conflict process. Prosecution of individuals
charged with war crimes occurred at the international courts, and then merged into the national
courts. While this structure has many limitations, analyzing the successes and weaknesses is
important when trying to decide the best process for the victims of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. One might inquire why the Rwandan Genocide was not chosen to act as
the other case study. The reasoning for this is because many Rwandan génocidaires are
responsible for the conflict in eastern DRC and are active in the rebel non-state actor groups.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo was chosen for this thesis because the conflict is
ongoing. As a result, post-conflict reconstruction and prosecution of alleged sexual abusers can
potentially have more of an impact, as there is room for improvement. Rather than analyzing the
failures of past conflicts, the best way to improve the situation for survivors of sexual violence is
approach wartime sexual violence as a violation of one’s human right and human security in
order to improve their future. Gender-central policies need to be incorporated into the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. Moreover, the extensive use of
9
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individuals (mostly women’s) bodies as a weapon of war is destructive to many aspects of
society. It is crucial that the ongoing conflict comes to a timely end. Women and men must be
incorporated into the peace talks. The question remains: which women and which men should be
incorporated into the peace talks? All women and all women (especially civilians) should be
incorporated into the peace talks. Every individual has a different perspective of conflict, and it
is important to have civil society involvement in peace talks. One of the aims of this report is to
show the deficits of the incorporation women in the Bosnian peace process and the ultimate
failure at achieving complete justice for all victims of sexual violence from conflict. There has
been an overall lack of incorporating women into the peace process in conflict around the world.
Prior tribunals, mandates and post-conflict reconstruction have been gender blind. But the
deliberate targeting of women reemphasizes the need to incorporate gender dialogues into peace
negotiations. Hopefully, when peace occurs in DRC, other states can use the model of
incorporating gender and women into the greater parts of society.
Methodology
This research work has been collected and gathered exclusively from secondary sources. The aim
was to provide historical evidence of the conflicts and understanding of the gender roles and
implications of wartime rape from a theoretical standpoint. The use of secondary sources assists
in removing my own personal biases. The majority of the research used to support the argument
and expand upon literature came from previous research conducted by others. The documents
used are found either in research books or periodicals. Websites were consulted when addressing
current statistics or official newspaper articles from the United Nations. Official government
documents were analyzed to look at current policies addressing the tactical use of rape as a
weapon of war. Analyzing government documents will allow for an understanding of how the
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government of DRC views the security threats and rape rates. Other states’ policies are also
addressed in order to understand their response to the conflict in DRC and the widespread sexual
violence. These policies highlight the states’ reactions to the ongoing security threats. This is
significant as it allows for an understanding of the areas of improvement, the gaps in legislation,
and implementation of the legislation.
In some instances, the research cited was based on primary research and was
ethnographic in nature. This has allowed for some personal perspective of sexual violence. The
personal perspectives are used to support arguments, as well as allow the reader an
understanding of the people and their involvement in the conflicts. It is imperative that people
are listened to when constructing peace and post-conflict transitional justice as they are the ones
who are affected most by the conflict. It is important to note that while these personal
perspectives are included, they are not used to generalize experiences of everyone within the
DRC or other contexts. Every individual, man/woman/child, experiences life in different ways.
While some women might be victims of rape, not all are victims of rape. Some men might not be
victims of rape, while other men might be. It is exceptionally important not to create and
perpetuate these generalizations. Maintaining these overviews do not allow for a development in
the understanding of implications of sexual violence within the community and greater society.
Furthermore, the information collected is based on various documents published by
international organizations and local organizations. Works by organizations such as the United
Nations, various UN departments, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, SIDA, etc. were
consulted. Publications from non-governmental organizations are able to provide unbiased
statistics and reports of ongoing security concerns. Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch send examiners to investigate ongoing abuses and as such have an international reputation
11
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of being trustworthy, groundbreaking and factual. Organizations based in the DRC have also
been consulted as they provide local perspectives as to obstacles that need to be overcome.
Politics of Numbers
Numbers are not always reliable. As will be noticed throughout the thesis, it has been
hard to find reliable numbers. Not everyone reports their rape or sexual violations. As such, most
rape rates are significantly under-reported. This has to do with the stigma towards
acknowledging that you have been raped. Furthermore, within the context of DRC, the rural
locations of rapes contribute to the underreporting of the crimes. The notion that the national
justice institutions is ineffective also contributes to the lack of reporting human rights violations.
Moreover, research projects on the rates of rape in DRC are not continuously ongoing. This
means there will not be automatic updates as to rape rates. Statistics will only be published when
the organization or researcher publishes the statistics.
Numbers are often used for political gain. People interpret numbers and rely upon
numbers in order to determine policies and objectives. When the international community is
deciding whether or not an act constitutes genocide, they look at the numbers. Focusing on the
statistical numbers, rather than the experiences places a hierarchy of importance on crimes and
incidents seen during conflict. Additionally, not all numbers are accurate. Often times, the
original numbers reported will stick and remain as the ‘label’ of the conflict, even if they have
been proven inaccurate (Andreas 2010, 1-22). As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the rape rates
during the Bosnian conflict are estimated to be severely underreported. Skjelsbæk states the
number of victims of sexual violence is significantly higher than 20,000 as the estimates
originate from the beginning of the conflict and do not incorporate violations that occurred after
1992. However, this is the number that has been emphasized by the international community.
12
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This contributes to the “stickiness” of numbers, as Andreas claims (Andreas 2010, 1-22). Despite
the international community’s realization that this number is most likely inaccurate, the number
will not be changed. The statistical numbers given throughout the thesis represent the most
recent, and reliable, numbers regarding the subject matter.
As such, it is critical that as a reader, you realize the likely inaccuracy of these numbers.
When statistics are given, it is important to ask who reported those statistics and the political
motivation the agency might have had for those exact numbers. Additionally, asking questions
such as: Which individuals reported the crimes? How did they report the crimes? Where did they
report the crimes? Did they get approval from the male in their family? These questions are
pertinent to be asked and will promote developments on the discourse on justice in DRC. If
individuals are uneducated or unaware of the resources accessible to them, they will likely not
report the crimes. This links to the discussions of prosecutions and accountability. This is
because individuals might not fully comprehend the amendments to the Congolese Constitution
in regards to rape prosecutions (discussed in depth in Chapter 6).
Important definitions and distinctions
Fundamental definitions
Social constructs of gender, masculinity, femininity, rape, hegemonic masculinity, conflict, etc.
all contribute to perceptions of rape and women. Sex is defined as the biological characteristics
of an individual. Words that correlate with sex are male and female. Gender, on the other hand,
is how an individual chooses to identify. Gender does not necessarily have to correlate with
one’s biological sex. Gender has to do with one’s personal identity and expression. Gender
determines the “roles, responsibilities, opportunities, privileges, expectations and limitations for
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males and for females of any culture” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2003,
19). Words that correlate with gender include woman, man, transgender, etc. There are important
distinctions between man and male, along with woman and female. These tend to be used
synonymously, but have different meanings.
There is an inherent association when individuals discuss rape, to automatically assume
rape can only occur between a male and a female. However, as will be discussed in future
chapters, this perception needs to be amended. Rape does not have to occur between a male and
female. Furthermore, rape does not necessarily need to include penetration from a sexual organ
to another sexual organ. An individual can be raped with other objects, i.e. guns, knives, bottles,
etc.
The language present when discussing rape and sexual violence also needs to be
addressed. Rape is associated with penetration, and can often exclude other forms of sexual
violence or the structural inequalities that have allowed for an imbalance of gender dynamics.
Sexual violence can still occur without penile-vaginal penetration and without consent. While
wartime rape and wartime sexual violence have varying academic and legal definitions, they are
used interchangeably throughout the paper but do not reinforce the phallo-centric/gender-specific
meaning behind the words (Henry 2011, 131). Instead they are used to show the violations of
one’s agency and body, regardless of the gender perpetrating the crime, or the gender of the
victim.
Gender-based Violence (GBV) has been defined by the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Committee as “violence that is directed
at a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual
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harm or suffering, threat of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty” (United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees 2003, 10). Violence against women is considered “any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual and psychological
harm to women and girls, whether occurring in private or in public” (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees 2003, 10). Sexual violence is defined as “any act, attempt or threat
of a sexual nature that results, or is likely to result, in physical, psychological and emotional
harm. Sexual violence is a form of gender-based violence” (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees 2003, 10). Sexual and Gender-based violence (SGBV) are rooted in unequal power
relationship, hegemonic masculinity and power structures.
The distinction between peace-time sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence
is important to note. Congolese domestic law, as well as international human rights and
humanitarian law differentiates between these two forms of human rights abuses. While sexual
violence is a violation of one’s human right, during times of peace it is not used as a weapon of
war, or as a form of crime against humanity. Sexual violence during periods of ‘peace’ is seen as
a crime against the state. The crime is then prosecuted by the national courts (Zongwe 2012, 46).
Sexual violence as a form of crime against humanity or ethnic cleansing is “widespread” and
“systematic.” This systematic widespread targeting of individuals is a concern for the
international community as well as the domestic community. It is then a concern of the national
courts as well as the international courts (Zongwe 2012, 47). While it is particularly important to
provide a distinction between systematic sexual violence and sexual violence not during conflict,
it is important to understand the structural inequalities that have allowed sexual violence to
persist. Zongwe cites Breton-Le Goff in a claim to realize the importance of understanding the
“social, economic and cultural discriminations that nurture sexual violence when conflict breaks
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out” in order to grasp the factors that have fueled in the conflict in DRC, especially its use of
sexual violence (Zongwe, 2012, 47). While sexual violence is present in the conflict in DRC,
there are underlying inequalities that have allowed this human security abuse to persist. As
present day rapes in DRC are classified as widespread and systematic, we can categorize the
sexual violence as a form of ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity. The conflict in DRC is
not solely an ethnic conflict. However, the Hutu génocidaires from the Rwandan genocide are
still actively targeting Tutsis in DRC and inciting fear into the civilian populations. Therefore,
the prosecution of perpetrators of this crime can occur in international courts and domestic
courts.
Gender-Mainstreaming versus Gender-Centrality
Gender-mainstreaming is the mode of action of “assessing the implications for women
and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at
all levels” (Ní Aoliáin, et al. 2011, 11-15). Gender-mainstreaming aims to ensure women are
included in all conversations. Gender-mainstreaming is used in producing conversations in
attempts to understand the structural inequalities that have lead to discrimination/abuse in
attempts to add more women to active roles within the society. The best example of gendermainstreaming is seen in UN Security Council Resolution 1325. One of the biggest critiques of
gender-mainstreaming is the “add women and stir” approach to incorporation of gender in
society (Ní Aoliáin, et al. 2011, 11-15).
While women need to be incorporated into policies, programs and legislation, I take the
gender-centrality approach in this paper. Gender-centrality addresses the need to provide equal
opportunity for women, as well as emphasizing overall equality, in order to advance society.
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Gender-centrality emphasizes the importance of gender to be central to any, and all, discussions.
Ní Aoláin, et al. state that there are two important aspects of gender-centrality to ensure that
transformation is most effective for society. The first strategy is: “relying on external actors who
may promulgate mandatory or voluntary standards” (i.e. quotas) (Ní Aoliáin, et al. 2011, 15).
The second strategy is: “relying on internal actors, such as nongovernmental organizations… or
voters or pressure through the legal system” (Ní Aoliáin, et al. 2011, 15). For gender-centrality,
gender must be incorporated into the hard (political, civil) and soft (social, cultural and
economic) rights in order to ensure that equality is reached in all aspects of society. As
mentioned above, gender-centrality is the approach I take throughout the paper in regards to
sexual violence. Until male victims of sexual violence can feel comfortable coming forward and
acknowledging their rape, or involvement in rape, equality will not be reached. While special
attention needs to be paid towards women who are victims of sexual violence, we cannot ignore
the experiences of men in raising awareness for women.
Hegemonic Masculinity
As Sara Banwell defines it, hegemonic masculinity as the “aggressive, ruthless and
competitive” reinforcement of society’s perceptions of the social position of males. Hegemonic
construction of masculinity reaffirms the need for male heterosexuality and occasional
aggression. In Western societies, white heterosexual men hold the most amount of power,
followed by a ladder of intersectional identities, where people who do not fit the norm of society
progressively have less and less power and privilege. R. W. Connell and James Messerschmidt
state that hegemonic masculinity requires men to position themselves in relation to other men
who are considered to be most powerful, in order to legitimate the marginalization of women
within society (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 829-859). They argue that hegemony is most
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powerful when men passively use their position within patriarchy but inherently receive the
benefits of the patriarchy. Connell and Messerschmidt argue that in order to understand social
struggles, society needs to stop treating gender and masculinity as a “one-dimensional treatment
of hierarch[ies],” and shift to a more complex understanding of gender hierarchies and
masculinity studies (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 829-859). Addressing power
relationships within masculinity and femininity is imperative in understanding While my
research did not include determining which groups of men in DRC control the most amount of
power, along with the hierarchy of power and the construction of the power ladder, it is
important to note that not all men have the same amount of power. This is essential to determine
in the future as it then translates back into who is involved in the conflict. What groups do they
belong to? Which men are involved in initiating sexual violence? Which men are being violated?
How does this relate back to the concept of masculine hierarchies and hegemonic masculinities?
These questions all relate back to hegemonic masculinity, and provide questions for future
research, outside the scope of this paper.
In the construction of this hierarchy of masculinities and femininities, men will almost
always rank higher than women on the ladder and use (and abuse) their power over women. It is
this power over women that constructs power-dynamics imperative to address when discussing
conflict and rape as a weapon of war. Men are expected to have high physical, economic and
social power as a result of society’s preconceived perspective of someone due to their sex
(Banwell 2014, 3-7). But what happens when this is not the case? Where do they fall on the
ladder? Banwell and Kitharidis argue that understanding hegemonic masculinity is imperative in
understanding the gender dynamics of the conflict in DRC. Both articles quote the same
researcher, who states that hegemonic masculinity is tied to phallo-centricsm (Banwell 2014, 53;
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Kitharidis 2015, 463). Hegemonic masculinity, in DRC, is reinforced within the framework of
the national armed forces. Men who are ranked highest on the masculinity ladder, are able to
maintain this societal power over others through dominance (Banwell 2014, 53). Hegemonic
masculinity addresses the power structure of men and women, but emphasizes that not all men
have the same power.
Victimization
The victimization discourse perpetuates the ‘men as perpetrators, women as victims’
stereotype. Victimization, for the context of this paper, blames the victim for their involvement
in the crime, rather than the structure that has allowed the crime to persist, or the individual
complacent in the crime. One of the goals of this paper is to deconstruct ‘victimization,’ in
regards to sexual violence during the conflict in DRC. Hopefully, by deconstructing the
victimization discourse, stigma around sexual violence will disappear. This will hopefully lead to
an increase in reporting when these crimes occur, for both men and women. One important
aspect in victimization is the reference as victims of sexual violence, rather than survivors of
sexual violence. While ‘victims of sexual violence’ is used throughout, it is not used to enforce
their involvement in the crime. Rather, it enforces the concept that there can be multiple victims
of sexual violence- the perpetrator, the individual who was abused, as well as the community in
general; a survivor is perceived to solely be the individual whose rights were violated. The
reason for the use of this word is the extent to which the community is affected by rape, as rape
is used as a weapon to target the community, as well as the individual. In order to shift the
discourse on victimization and rape as a weapon of war, the international community needs to
stop targeting local communities through women’s (and men’s) bodies.
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Policy Definitions- Refugee versus Internally Displaced Persons
The definition of a refugee is also important to provide, as it relates to conflict and
justice. A refugee is a person:
owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UN General
Assembly 1951, Article 1.2)
A refugee is an individual who has been recognized by international law. States are supposed to
ensure the individual is given protection. They are not allowed to send a refugee home
(refoulement). Non-Refoulement is defined as:
[n]o contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a
particular social group or political opinion (UN General Assembly 1951, Article
33.1)
The United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees is the international body in control of
processing refugee applications and providing protection for the vulnerable populations.
Internally Displaced Person are:
[p]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human right or natural or human- made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 1998)
This definition was originally given by Francis Deng within the United Nations. The distinction
between refugees and internally displaced persons are important to understand when discussing
civil wars and how they affect populations. Each conflict takes on a different approach, and
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civilians are targeted in various ways. As a result, people might leave the country and cross an
international border, or they might not have access to leave the country, and as such are
considered internally displaced. Internal displacement is an area of international aid and research
that needs more attention. There is no specific organization dedicated to assisting those who are
most vulnerable from conflict or disaster, but IDP protection is being unofficially incorporated
into the UNHCR mandate.
Intra-State Wars versus Inter-State Wars
Furthermore, understanding the distinction between types of conflicts that can be fought
is important to understand, especially when discussing the conflicts in Bosnia and DRC. Intrastate wars are fought between various groups within the same state. They are typically defined as
a form of civil war, as the armed actor groups originate from the state. Fighting occurs within the
territories of the state. Inter-state wars are fought by two or more member states of the inter-state
system (Sarkees, Wayman and Singer 2003). The type of war fought affects international aid and
whether states are violating multiple national laws.
Transitional Justice and the Six Aspects of Justice
Transitional justice is a phrase defined by Moghalu within Klosterboer and HartmannMahmud’s work that refers to “the phenomenon and process by which a society utilizes legal and
quasi-legal institutions to facilitate fundamental change from one political order to another or the
construction of a new reality against the background of a profound historical memory”
(Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 57). Transitional justice aims to “promote
accountability, (trials, truth commissions, and lustration policies), methods of victim-oriented
restoration (reparations, memorials, and public memory projects), and processes for promoting
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peace and stability (amnesties, pardons, and governmental reform)” (Klosterboer and HartmannMahmud 2013, 57). The justice cascade, as coined by Sikkink and Kim, is the global trend of
international criminal justice aimed at holding political leaders liable for the human rights
violations that have occurred through international and domestic prosecutions. This ‘cascade of
justice’ has resulted in an increased occurrence of human rights violators being held accountable
for the crimes they have committed (Sikkink and Kim 2013). In order to effectively allow for
domestic prosecutions, countries in transition must make significant structural changes to their
legal system, which can be seen within the context of DRC.
There are six themes of transitional justice, as presented by Phil Clark. While these
themes are presented through discussing the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, they are applicable to the
future transitional justice framework needed in DRC. The six forms of justice are: truth, peace,
justice, healing, forgiveness and reconciliation (Clark 2010, 31-46). The first theme, truth, is
needed in order to understand what happened and why. Within the context of sexual violence,
truth can be used to deconstruct why rape was used, and who used these tactics. Truth is often
used within three truth processes: truth-telling, truth-hearing and truth-shaping. These three
processes should be employed within DRC. Truth is also often used within truth and
reconciliation commissions (TRC), and are used for the purpose of seeking the truth, not for
holding individuals legally responsible for the crimes committed. The most notable TRC
occurred in South Africa after the end of the Apartheid rule.
Peace is needed when talking about transitional justice. If peace is not achieved and
maintained, conflict is likely to erupt again. The lack of peacebuilding and peacekeeping in DRC
is a major reason why conflict has been ongoing since the 1996 First Congolese War. Peace must
be maintained and incorporated into the transitional justice framework. Justice, the third theme,
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has three modes: retributive justice, deterrent justice and restorative justice. Retributive justice
states that perpetrators of war crimes must be held accountable. Deterrent justice says that while
perpetrators must be held accountable, the accountability should be used to stop the same crimes
from occurring in the future. Unlike retributive and deterrent justice, restorative justice states
punishment is needed, in addition to the community attempting to allow for relationships
between the perpetrators and victims to be established. Reparations are usually incorporated into
restorative justice (Clark 2010, 31-46). Throughout the paper, while the phrase justice is used,
the type of justice I advocate for is deterrent justice in regards to sexual violence and the DRC.
The fourth aspect of transitional justice is healing. As the name suggests, healing
addressing the emotional, psychological and physical toll conflict can take on a person (Clark
2010, 31-46). The need to incorporate healing into transitional justice is especially crucial within
the DRC as communities and individuals have been greatly affected by violence and human
rights violations. Healing is also needed to deconstruct the concept of victimization, an aspect
that is prevalent when discussing conflict and sexual violence (Clark 2010, 31-46). The fifth
aspect of transitional justice, as presented by Clark, is forgiveness. In order for the society to
move past the conflict, forgiveness and understanding of the crimes is needed. However, it is
important to note that forgiveness and reconciliation are different. Forgiveness is needed for the
society to move past and understand the events that transpired during conflict (Clark 2010, 3146). Understanding why rape was used as a weapon of war, and (potentially) forgiving the
perpetrator is different then becoming friends having a relationship with the perpetrator.
Someone can forgive someone for the crimes committed but not want to be involved or
communicate with them. Forgiveness can be difficult in conflicts similar to DRC, where sexual
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violence is widespread. I am not necessarily proposing survivors forgive their abusers, but
proposing forgiveness be incorporated into the transitional justice to a certain extent.
The final aspect of transitional justice is reconciliation. Reconciliation tends to be the
main aspect of transitional justice, as it involves “the rebuilding of fractured individual and
communal relationships after conflict” (Clark 2010, 44). Reconciliation involves active
involvement, acceptance and forgiveness of people and the crimes they have committed. It aims
to provide a society where former combatants and civilians interact peacefully with one another.
Another important feature of reconciliation is the need to address the root cause of the conflict in
order to honestly and truthfully provide a space for future development and an understanding of
the crimes committed (Clark 2010, 45). Reconciliation differs from peace and healing, as peace
and healing are prerequisites for reconciliation to occur.
These six themes of transitional justice were outlined in order to provide an
understanding of the complexities of transitional justice. In an attempt to achieve long lasting
peace, but also hold individuals accountable for the crimes committed, all six forms of
transitional justice must be utilized and incorporated into the post-conflict resolution and
reconstruction of DRC. While these themes of justice are presented in regards to the Gacaca
Courts, they are also applicable to the context of the DRC. Similarly, as the conflict in DRC has
its roots in the Rwandan genocide (as discussed in-depth in Chapter 3), a similar form of
community understanding and justice could be applied to justice in the DRC.
Another important aspect of post-conflict reconstruction is the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process (DDR). DDR processes are particularly important in
order to maintain peace and the stabilization of the state. DDR processes must be incorporated
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into the reconstruction in order to ensure long-term development of the state, people and
economy. The United Nations defines disarmament as “the collection, documentation, control
and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from
combatants and often from the civilian population” (United Nations 2016b). Demobilization is
defined as “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and
groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to excombatants” (United Nations 2016b). Reintegration is “the process by which ex-combatants
acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and
economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local
level” (United Nations 2016b). Overall, DDR techniques aim to improve stability of the state
after conflict and ensure peace is maintained. DDR can sometimes be abbreviated as DDRRR,
which also includes repatriation and resettlement.
Human Rights Law and Policies
In addition to definitions and important distinctions of words and phrases, it is important
to outline international treaties that are relevant to the topic and will be discussed in greater detail
throughout the paper. Human Rights Law consists of a series of international treaties that outline
the international human rights norms and standards states must provide. The principal human
rights doctrine is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), established by the United
Nations in 1949. While the UDHR is not a legally binding doctrine, all states must have ratified
the Declaration before becoming member states of the United Nations. The UDHR outlines the
inalienable rights all individuals have, and the need to protect these rights. In addition to the
UDHR, there are seven conventions that have created standard international human rights laws.
Ratifying the conventions causes states to incorporate protectionary measures into their own
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constitutions in order to ensure security for all citizens. The seven core international human
rights treaties are as follows: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) (1965), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
(1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966),
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
(1979), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) (1984), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989), International
Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
(ICMRW) (1990) (United Nations Population Fund, 2004). These treaties outlined above provide
important provisions and mandates that nation states must provide in protecting their citizens.
The DRC has ratified all documents except ICMRW. Bosnia and Herzegovina has ratified all
documents listed above.
Conclusion
This chapter was formulated to provide an understanding of the greater context of the thesis and
the roadmap for the future chapters. It provided valuable definitions that will be expanded upon
throughout. The next chapter addresses the common themes seen in the literature used to
formulate the findings present in the thesis. It will address the strengths and weaknesses of the
arguments presented in the different articles, along with how I expand upon the research.
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When analyzing the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through preexisting
literature, it is important to synthesize common themes seen throughout the works. Moreover, the
fundamental sources that are constantly referenced throughout the project will be analyzed and
their importance in formulating the final result. Literature on gender roles during conflict specific
to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Bosnia will be presented. Research and literature on
general information of how hegemonic masculinity is reinforced through conflict, affecting
power dynamics and hierarchies, will also be referenced throughout the paper. While most
authors approach the subject matter by emphasizing the need for gender-mainstreaming,2 the
researchers are still not asking which women and which men are involved. What roles do people
play? How do they play them? Who is in charged? How do they take these positions? In trying to
formulate a peace process, it is important to have these questions answered, as it will shape
which women will be incorporated in peace. Furthermore, these questions are imperative in
understanding the hierarchies of power and authority, an aspect one needs to understand in
deconstructing the hegemonic masculinity concept seen during conflict. Not all individuals have
the same motives, so perpetuating generalizations that support society’s preconceived gender
roles and norms do not allow for these societal changes to occur. For the purpose of this
literature review, overarching themes across the research will be discussed pointed out, with
subthemes from the individual works discussed in depth.

2

Gender-mainstreaming was defined under Important Definitions and Distinctions in Chapter 1.
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Deconstructing Rape as a Weapon of War and Victimization
Complacency and the Normalization of Sexual Violence. Maria Eriksson Baaz and
Maria Stern are two human rights researchers who have investigated sexual violence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern conducted primary
research within DRC as a result of their positionality and relationship with the national army and
their language skills. As the authors state, in conflicts such as the one in the DRC, there is little
attention paid to understand why perpetrators involve themselves in violent crimes, as well as a
lack of understanding on behalf of the researchers about motives of the crimes (Baaz and Stern
2009, 296). Understanding the soldier’s involvement in the crime is exceptionally crucial
because it helps to ultimately deconstruct the concept of victimization of survivors of sexual
violence. The report outlines how the soldier differentiates between “lust rape” and “evil rape”
(Baaz and Stern 2009, 495). Another strength of this article and their interviews is the soldier’s
understandings of the complexities of “evil rape” during the conflict. Labeling rape as a weapon
of war simplified the gendered dynamics and power hierarchies that have allowed for this form
of violence to persist. Furthermore, this study concluded soldier’s understanding that “lust rape”
is a result of needing to satisfy a soldier’s sexual needs. This form of rape has become “ethically
palatable” and society is beginning to normalize this human rights violation.
One limitation of this study was the sole perspectives of FARDC members. The study
was unable to incorporate soldiers from rebel groups. It is important to understand how rebel
forces view rape, and how it may or may not be similar to the perspectives of FARDC members.
As rebel forces are not recognized by the state, and may have different motivations as to their
involvement in conflict, they might also have different motivations towards why they are
involved in violent crimes, such as rape.
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Victim’s Perspective. Research conducted by Anna Maedl contrasts some of the findings
by Baaz and Stern. In “Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC? The Victim’s Perspective,”
Maedl interviews twenty-five survivors of rape. The survivors supported the claim by Baaz and
Stern that labeling rape as a weapon of war oversimplified the structural inequalities that have
allowed for this act to occur. However, they felt as though rape has become a key factor of the
conflict, and there is no longer a differentiation between “lust rapes” and “evil rapes” (Maedl
2011, 128-147). One limitation of this article and the interviews contained within were the lack
of using gender explicit terms. The author explains how the women involved in the survey were
selected after receiving medical assistance at Panzi hospital. The result of selecting victims from
a hospital will skew the data in attempting to understand the victim’s perspective.
Male victims of sexual violence might have a very different perspective as to the use of
rape as a weapon of war in DRC. Excluding this voice will only perpetuate the women as
victims, men as perpetrators, stereotype seen around the world. Furthermore, selecting a sample
of women from the hospital only reaches a certain demographic of sexual violence victims. Not
all victims are able to access the hospital. Individuals living in more rural parts of eastern Congo
might have different perspectives as they might not be able to access healthcare. The author
addresses these limitations, but this data is still relevant in determining how to prosecute
perpetrators of human rights violations and the needs of the victims. Not all women and/or men
will need or want the same type of justice.
Combatant’s Perspective. Providing a place to publish the voices of combatants
involved in sexual violence is imperative. This is crucial to include in analyze the most effective
way to deconstruct the victimization stereotype. “Former Combatants on Sexual Violence During
Warfare: A Comparative Study of the Perspectives of Perpetrators, Victims and Witnesses” by
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Roos Haer, Tobias Hecker and Anna Maedl addresses combatants and their perspective.
Comprehending the thought process an individual has when being told to participate in rape as a
weapon of war is especially important when trying to determine how to resolve the conflict. It is
also imperative to understand who should be held accountable. One must recognize the
perspective and thought process in an attempt to create effective and lasting measurements
towards identification of perpetrators. If policymakers and peacekeepers are able to understand
why rape is used, and who instructs others to use rape within the context of DRC, it will be
beneficial when determining who is responsible for committing these crimes. The international
community has been struggling with how to prosecute war criminals and the difficulty of
determining who is to be held culpable for all acts committed.
While soldiers may employ sexual violence, one can wonder if they should be held
responsible, or if their commanding officer who instructed this form of torture should be held
accountable? And who is more responsible? While these articles do not link the perspectives
with the need for justice and prosecution the articles build off other articles in determining who
should be held responsible for the crimes committed. Weakness of the study include the gender
dynamics and distributions of combatants interviewed. Out of 224 combatants, only two were
women (Haer et al. 2015, 619). It is important to have more perspectives of women who have
been involved with armed groups, as well as been involved in violence during conflict,
specifically GBV. This significantly improves the ability for a paradigm shift in terms of
addressing victimization and understanding of the conflict. Most of the interviews were
conducted at UN demobilization camps. Conducting interviews at the formal camps will exclude
individuals who have not gone through official demobilization processes. This type of study asks
questions as to who has access or understanding of the demobilization camps, and the
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implications it will have on the findings from the study. Furthermore, most combatants were
from Mai Mai groups, with only 5 percent of the combatants were FARDC members (Haer et al.
2015, 619). The gender dynamic, location of interviews and insurgent group dynamic could have
implications of the findings.
Women and Peacebuilding. When constructing post-conflict institutions and peace, it is
critical to include the voices of women and their involvement during conflict. Anne Jenichen’s
article on “Women and Peace in a Divided Society: Peace-building Potentials of Feminist
Struggles and Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina” addresses Bosnian women’s
involvement, feminism versus women advocacy and promotion of women’s rights through
effective advocacy on behalf of women’s groups. This article addresses women’s unofficial
involvement during the peace process in Bosnia. Jenichen found an interesting dynamic within
women’s groups in Bosnia. The author frames her argument that feminist groups, not women’s
advocacy groups have been successful in promoting peace and integration into post-conflict
society (Jenichen 2010). However, Jenichen’s scope did not address whether or not men’s
advocacy groups existed in promoting women’s rights. While women’s rights groups have been
applauded for their ability to cross ethnic divides (as enforced throughout the conflict), excluding
men’s advocacy groups promoting women’s rights perpetuates the discourse of ‘men as
perpetrators, women as victims.’ Moreover, Jenichen reflects on the advancement women have
made to society, but does not address limitations to their work, or areas that still need significant
amounts of development.
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Institutional Responsibilities
International Community’s Complicity. In her analysis of gender-based violence from
the macro-level, meso-level and micro-level, Stacy Banwell addresses the need to incorporate
these power hierarchies into the discussion of rape as a weapon of war in DRC. Banwell adds a
vital understanding of the implications of rape as a weapon of war on various levels of society in
her article “Rape and sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a case study of
gender-based violence” (Banwell 2014). While individuals are directly affected by this form of
human security violation, there are additional implications. The international community and
national community are affected by this epidemic. Despite the creation of international policies
aimed at protecting humanitarian law, women’s rights and sexual violence during conflict, there
is a lack of active participation from the international community at ending the conflict in DRC.
Banwell addresses how rape in DRC needs to be stopped, but the most successful way of ending
violence is by listening to the people (Banwell 2014, 45). This is fundamental in improving
equality between men and women in a gender-centralized aim towards improving the roles of
women and the need to incorporate them into peace talks.
Fight Over Natural Resources. Sara Meger’s article on “Rape in Contemporary
Warfare: The Role of Globalization in Wartime Sexual Violence,” links the rates of sexual
violence in DRC to globalization and the need for natural resources. The article addresses themes
such as the involvement of shadow network in mining and the conflict in DRC, the shift from
just to unjust wars, and globalization’s contributions towards allowing rape to persist during
conflict. The author links these themes to the context of the conflict in DRC, the abundance of
coltan and the prevalence of violent crimes, such as sexual violence. Meger provides crucial
information in realizing the international community’s involvement in the conflict. There is an
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overall lack of aggressive measure and realization that coltan has contributed to the preservation
of the conflict and human rights abuses. While action has been taken to stop the illegal trade of
coltan, assertive and proactive measures have not been initiated to the extent they needed. The
article also highlights the involvement on behalf of the government of DRC in not actively
stopping the exportation of coltan through shadow networks.
Considering the widespread human rights abuses exhibited by the FARDC forces, one
questions how they might be benefiting from the sale of coltan? While FARDC soldiers might
not participate in shadow networks within their official capacity as armed service members, they
still represent government forces, and might use the power over others to get what they want.
Addressing this power dynamic FARDC soldiers have is critical when discussing the extraction
of natural minerals and human rights abuses associated with this exploitation. This is an aspect
that is not addressed throughout the literature, but could affect armed groups involvement in
commodity exchanges.
Politics of International Justice. Jelena Subotić’s book Hijacked Justice: Dealing with
the Past in the Balkan, provides an in-depth understanding of the transitional justice phase seen
post-conflict within Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. Subotić’s overall thesis is that the influence the
international political system has over the criminal justice system led to a failure of justice in the
former Yugoslavia. This (extreme) international involvement in the former Yugoslavia allowed
for political instability. It emphasized arresting alleged war criminals, rather than addressing
social institutions and the structural inequalities present in the post-conflict societies. Subotić
provides a very comprehensive analysis of complex issues prevalent in the post-conflict structure
of Bosnia. This text acted as an important foundation in understanding and outlining transitional
justice in Bosnia.
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One important limitation exists throughout Subotić’s work. Subotić claims that everyone
in the former Yugoslavia felt as though the justice system in the ICTY was flawed. However,
this is a generalization, and there are differing views present on the effectiveness of the ICTY.
Eric Stover’s The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague provides a
different perspective on the ability of a local court in achieving justice. Subotić argues justice
failed because it was at the international level and excluded the needs and voices of people
affected by conflict. Witnesses who were interview in Stover’s book and participated at the
ICTY argue justice would have failed if it occurred at the local/national level (Stover 2007, 114115). Understanding the positionality of Subotić and her claims is important when referencing
her and her work. Not everyone has the same perspective of the success or failure of the DPA
and the ICTY. Subotić’s claims, however, support my thesis that justice was not entirely served
in Bosnia as a result of not listening to the people (and women’s) needs.
Construction of Gender and Gender Roles
Hegemonic Masculinity. It is important to unpack the relationship that hegemonic
masculinity has with the responsibility of the international community when addressing GBV
during conflict. We cannot expect structural inequalities to be resolved in the DRC when
structural inequalities regarding gender relations exist throughout the globe. Nevertheless, this
only emphasizes the need for gender relations and society’s preconceived concepts on
masculinity, femininity and gender roles to be deconstructed. One limitation of Banwell’s
argument is not addressing how masculinity and hyper-masculinity affect men who are victims
of rape. Banwell’s article makes the reader infer that only women are victims of rape, when this
is not the case. Hyper-masculinity can have the same impact on victims who are men, as they
could be reluctant to acknowledge this form of violation has occurred towards them. Addressing
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men and women who have been victims (and survivors) of rape is exceptionally important in the
stance this paper takes. Rape will continue to be stigmatized until communities realize it can
occur to anyone, regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, income, etc. An understanding of the
gender hierarchies/power ladder is needed for future discussions on conflict in DRC. Which men
hold power? Which men are involved in active conflict? Which women hold power? Which
women are involved in active conflict? Which men and women are excluded and marginalized?
Furthermore, a gap in the literature exists in understanding the specific impact hegemonic
masculinity has on women in the DRC who are combatants and potentially involved in initiating
acts of sexual violence. How is hyper-masculinity translated when women involve themselves in
sexual abuse as the abuser? What are the reasons why women might engage in sexual violence?
Who are they engaging with?
Legal Themes and Prosecution
Constitutional Amendments. Dunia Prince Zongwe’s article on “The New Sexual
Violence Legislation in the Congo: Dressing Indelible Scars on Human Dignity” outlines the
strengths and weaknesses of the amendments to the Penal Code of DRC and their sexual
violence policies. This article emphasizes the need to hold the government accountable for
sexual violence. The article addresses the legal development and legal ramifications of the sexual
violence policy while being aimed at non-legal scholars. The article helps to deconstruct the
barrier to understanding legal policies and understanding the rights Congolese citizens have in
regards to sexual violence.
Gender-Blind Approaches towards Justice. Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud
outline how transitional justice needs to be seen in DRC, but through an African Model in order
to ensure effective justice is achieved. “‘Difficult to Repair’: Applying African Models for
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Transitional Justice to Peace and Restoration Prospects in the Democratic Republic of Congo”
compares the restorative justice seen in Rwanda and Sierra Leone to what is needed in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 56). Themes
discussed throughout the text include needing to listen to the cultural approaches in applying
justice, educating civilians on justice and improving their accessibility to the court. The authors
of this article emphasize the need to inform civil society of the justice process, an aspect that is
often overlooked during transitional justice. One of the strengths of this article is its application
of justice in DRC from the justice systems seen post-conflict in Rwanda and Sierra Leone.
Critics comment on how Western concepts are applied to non-Western countries, which is why
certain development projects are seen as failures. Understanding how justice was received postconflict in Rwanda and Sierra Leone makes it easier to apply theories to the context in DRC. The
authors’ overall thesis statement is the need to prioritize local voices and their experiences during
conflict within local, national and international institutions aimed at transitional justice and
government (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 59).
A serious limitation within this text is the exclusion of any discussion of gender and
gendered experiences during conflict. “Rape” is only mentioned three times throughout the text
and “gender-based violence” is mentioned a couple times in passing (Klosterboer and HartmannMahmud 2013, 59). Furthermore, when contrasting the justice system in Rwanda post-genocide,
it is important to analyze the restorative justice aimed at sexual violence survivors. The authors
overlook this aspect of justice. While overlooking gendered experiences during conflict might
not be intentional, this article further supports the need to incorporate gender-centralization into
conversations regarding post-conflict justice. In an attempt to be gender neutral, the lack of
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explicitly discussing gender makes one a bystander in perpetuating gender inequality and a lack
of incorporation into dialogues and institutions.
Limitations of the Research
While the research is effective in providing an overview of conflict, legislation, gaps in
legislation, experiences during conflict, etc. there are still chasms in the research. The biggest
limitation is the lack of voice from all types of victims. As a result of using secondary data,
certain questions were not asked and could not be included within this research. Articles based
on other individuals’ research are inherently biased as the authors have the ability to determine
which data to include and which to exclude. In spite of this limitation, it was important to
incorporate these articles as it provides an understanding from a perspective that is often
overlooked. Listening to the voices of the victims as well as the voices of the perpetrators assists
in understanding why sexual violence is used, and the consequences of these actions. Another
limitation is the lack of accurate statistics on prevalence and rates of rape, for both men and
women. There are social and cultural stigmas surrounding men admitting to being raped, and
until recently they were not allowed to prosecute their perpetrators in the courts of DRC
(Zongwe 2012, 41-45).
The aim of this paper is to fill this void, in emphasizing the need to incorporate sexual
violence during conflict into everyday language, in an effort to de-stigmatize this crime. Another
aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of including sexual violence and experiences of
women during conflict into conversations on peace. Moreover, none of the research has linked
the criminal procedure in post-conflict Bosnia, to the present conflict in eastern DRC, the
prevalence of sexual violence and the national and international policies aimed at providing
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protection for the civilians. This lack of research is what has been compiled into this project and
created the final document. The researchers and articles applied to this project were validated
through other research. In most articles, previous articles had been referenced that interwove the
arguments and provided the foundation in their original article(s).
Additional questions arose from conducting this research, and there are questions that
were not included in regards to women’s active involvement within the conflicts in the DRC.
How are women assisting in security of other women? Which members of society act as hosts for
IDPs when they are forced to flee? What type of medical assistance do men who have been raped
receive? How can this be de-stigmatized? These questions were not answered in other’s research,
nor were they discussed throughout this research. Nonetheless, understanding these aspects of
society are equally as important when discussing post-conflict reconstruction. While it is
imperative to incorporate sexual violence into the reconstruction process, it cannot be the only
consequence of conflict addressed.
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In order to comprehend the current conflicts in eastern DRC, it is essential to have an
understanding of the history of the two prior conflicts in DRC. Explicitly, it is imperative to
grasp the connection the conflicts in DRC have had to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Furthermore,
prior to September 1997, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was known as Zaire. As such,
until the official name change in the timeline of events, the country will be referred to as Zaire.
This chapter starts of by providing a historical background to the conflicts in the DRC. After a
brief explanation of the two Congolese wars, an analysis of the Kivu Conflicts will be given. The
Kivu Conflicts are the ongoing conflicts and instability seen in eastern DRC. It is these conflicts
where rape is currently being used as a weapon of war, and where people’s human security are
constantly being violated. The next section of the chapter is an understanding of the human
security violations being seen. This section provides empirical evidence for the widespread
displacement and security concerns seen, as well as an understanding of the type of displacement
present in DRC. After discussing displacement, a shift to discussing how soldiers abuse their
power over others is present. This section is important as many individuals in DRC have
commented how there is no security, and the people who are supposed to be protecting them (the
government and national army) are not protecting them, and contributing to the fear seen within
society. The last section of the chapter discussing rape as a weapon of war and sexual violence.
This section provides an analysis of the perception of rape in Congolese society, as well as the
rates of rape. Understanding the current situation of rape and how it is used as a weapon is
important before discussing the policies and holding perpetrators accountable. The policies will
be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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Conflicts in DRC
Academics, policymakers and global citizens have diverging perspectives as to why the conflict
in Rwanda erupted. The most noted hypothesis is the concept behind the “fear of small
numbers,” which resulted in ethnic tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis. Fearing ethnic
marginalization, conflict eventually erupted. Others trace the conflicts to factors such as: the
population density for such a small country, the collapse of its biggest export (coffee), or the
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) placed on the
state (Diggs 2012, 20-24). While stipulating which factor ultimately caused the Rwandan
genocide, the ruthlessness of the 100-day conflict has left lasting implication on Rwanda and the
international community. It is estimated that 800,000 to 1,000,000 Hutus and 200,000 Tutsis
were brutally murdered between April 1994 and July 1994. Between 250,000 and 500,000
women were raped as a form of ethnic cleansing and weapon of war (Survivors-Fund 2016).
The political and human instability seen in Rwanda caused a drastic influx of refugees to
Zaire. Within a matter of days, over one million people fleeing the genocide crossed into the
North Kivu region and were placed in one of four UNHCR camps in Goma and/or Bakuva.
Disguised as refugees, many Hutu génocidaires fled to camps in Zaire as well, hoping to avoid
accountability for the crimes they committed (Diggs 2012, 25- 27). It is estimated that six
percent of the refugees that escaped to Zaire were génocidaires (fifty to sixty-five thousand
people) (Diggs 2012, 27). The inability to address the crimes these génocidaires committed
allowed tensions to rise in the eastern regions of Zaire. In particular, the Kivu regions were prone
to violence as forms of intimidation and control. To further complicate matters, there were
already 700,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Shaba region and 500,000 refugees
from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. These numbers, coupled with the massive
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influx of Rwandan refugees, added an exorbitant amount of instability within the eastern region
and further strained the government’s resources (Diggs 2012, 26-36). Political instability and
attempts at improving stability in DRC after the Rwandan genocide occurred between 19941996, but specific analysis of this time period is not important to the overall discussion of the
Congolese Wars and ongoing conflict.
The First Congolese War began in 1996. This conflict was strategically planned between
the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Zaire (AFDL). The AFDL, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, wanted to overthrow the Mobutu
regime. Mobutu was the current leader of Zaire; most citizens and international states perceived
him to be a military dictator. Rwanda and Uganda wanted to provide protection for the Tutsis (an
already marginalized group) in North and South Kivu. Rwanda and Uganda also sought control
over the natural resources found in the eastern regions of Zaire. After a period of conflict, these
forces managed to overthrow the Mobutu regime. On May 17, 1997, Lauren-Desire Kabila
declared himself President. He later renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Diggs 2012, 26-36; Reyntjens 2007, 307-3011). It is important to note this is an extreme
oversimplification of the First Congolese War. The main scope of the paper is not to analyze the
First or Second Congolese War, but the current conflict in the eastern regions of the country.
Nevertheless, it is critical to provide limited understanding of the first two conflicts as they have
played important roles in the ongoing conflict. This background is vital to include in order to
provide an accurate portrayal of the role génocidaires have played, and continue to play, in the
conflict in DRC (Diggs 2012, 13-36; Reyntjens 2007, 307-3011).
On August 2, 1998, a rebellion was sparked in Goma, North Kivu. The governments of
Uganda and Rwanda felt as thought they had gained the right to access DRC’s natural resources
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because they assisted with overthrowing Mobutu. President Kabila, on the other hand,
proclaimed that all armed groups return to their countries of origin, forcing Ugandan and
Rwandan troops out of the country. The Rally for Congolese Defense (RCD) and the Movement
for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) were formed as a result of these disputes. In response to the
increased violence and instability in Goma, Kabila gathered forces to target the Tutsis from the
MLC and RCD.3 Kabila received further assistance from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. As a
result of the success of the MLC and RCD in escalating the violence, the United Nations
deployed peacekeeping troops. This created the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) through United Nations Security Council Resolution
1279 (UNSCR)4 (Diggs 2012, 30).
In January 2001, President Laurent-Desire Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph
Kabila, became interim President. He has remained President since 2001. The international
community has stated that the elections since have been fair and free overall (Reyntjens 2007,
308-309). Eventually, President Kabila agreed to participate in the inter-Congolese Dialogues.
The peace talks ultimately led to the Lusaka Peace Accord (LPA). The Second Congolese War
lasted from August 1998 until July 2003. Over four million people were killed during the Second
Congolese War. It is estimated that over five million people have been killed from the combined
Congolese Wars. Most of the people killed have been civilians (Diggs 2012, 36; ITUC
International Trade Union Confederation 2011, 8). After the signing of the LPA, DRC was made
a de facto international trusteeship in order to prevent the state from collapse (Reyntjens 2007,

3

DRC has a similar ethnic history as Rwanda and similar ethnic groups, the Hutus and Tutsis, Diggs states that the
similarities between the two states provides evidence that the Rwandan Genocide is rooted in more than just ethnic
hatred, as the genocide did not also occur in DRC (Diggs 13-26, 2012).
4
On May 28, 2010 UNSCR 1925 was passed and MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
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310).
International relations scholars have labeled DRC a “failed state” (Trautman 2, 2013).
They claim the state is unable to function as a result of the fragmentation, the geographic
structure of the country, the differing political structures and the lack of addressing
reconstruction after two large conflicts (Trautman 45-56, 2013; Meger 2011, 115-124). Fighting
in the eastern region of DRC has been ongoing since 2004. The civilian’s personal desire for
natural resources and wealth is a contributing factor as to why peace has been unattainable
(ITUC International Trade Union Confederation 2011, 8-10; Meger 2011, 115-124).
Additionally, the geographical distance between the capital and the eastern parts of DRC
contribute to the instability and abundance of violence. This is due to the lack of infrastructure
throughout the country and lack of communication between the different parts of the country.
The ongoing conflicts in eastern DRC have allowed for the use of rape as a weapon of war and
sexual violence as a form of terror and torture (Baaz and Stern 2009). Therefore, this is the time
frame that has been investigated within this paper in regards to human security risks and rape as
a weapon of war. Since these conflicts began in 1996, civilians have been disproportionately
marginalized and vulnerable to human rights abuses. Individuals have been internally displaced
as well as having sought refuge in other countries. In October 2015, it was estimated that over
1.6 million people are still classified as IDPs. Over 1 million IDPs are located in North and
South Kivu (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2015). These
are the provinces that are located in the eastern regions, and also have the highest rates of rape.
Approximately 900,000 IDPs have returned home as of October 2015. Over ninety percent of
IDPs flee due to conflict and seventy-five percent of IDPs live with host families as a result of
displacement. (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2015). A
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map of eastern DRC with provinces is available in Appendix A.
Kivu Conflicts
Conflict in the Kivu regions of eastern DRC erupted shortly after the peace agreements in 2003.
The conflicts are not rooted in any one aspect of society. Factors that have allowed the conflict to
flourish include: corruption, the distance between the eastern regions and the capital, ethnic
tensions due to the previous conflicts, as well as the desire to control the natural resources
located in the area (Diggs 2012, 118-124; Meger 2011, 115-124). One undeniable aspect about
the conflict is that it is fought with complete disregard to international humanitarian law.
Civilians have no security and safety. Civilians (men, women and children) are being raped,
abducted, killed and tortured by the rebel groups, as well as the Congolese Armed Forces
(Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo; henceforth FARDC) (Amnesty
International 2008). A compiled list of active participants in the conflict can be found in
Appendix B. Children are forcibly recruited to join armed insurgent groups. The use of child in
conflict reached an all time high when approximately 30,000 children were being used by
various insurgent groups. UNICEF reports DRC as the country with the highest use of children
in combat. The CNDP, FDLR, FARD and Mai Mai forces all have reported using children as
combatants (Diggs 2012, 75). Not all children involved in insurgent groups act as soldiers. Some
may be trafficked and become sexual slaves, wives or husbands. Children who are forcibly
recruited are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and are easily manipulated (Diggs 2012, 75-103).
Children’s involvement in conflict is a violation of international human rights law and is
discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.
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While conflict in the Kivu Regions had been ongoing since 2004, the resurgence of
fighting in August 2007 between FARDC and CNDP caused severe human rights abuses
(Amnesty International 2008, 2-4). The National Congress for the Defense of the People
(Congrès national pour la défense du people; henceforth CNDP) is commanded by Laurent
Nkunda. This rebel group has been the driving force behind the Kivu Conflicts. The CNDP’s
main goal has been to defend the Banyamulenge (ethnic groups, also referred to as Tutsi
Congolese) in eastern DRC. The CNDP has been protesting the requested integration into the
FARDC army, as commanded by President Kabila. Nkunda has stated his desire to overthrow
Kabila as the country’s leader and rejects the current government (Diggs 2012, 25-36). The MaiMai military group5 and the FDLR actively fight in opposition to the CNDP and their desired
mandate.
During the 2007 conflict, MONUC peacekeepers were deployed to the regions, but were
unable to assist in protecting civilians and end the fighting (Amnesty International 2008, 2). The
FDLR, a Rwandan based insurgent group was dismantled in March 2008 after the passing of a
UNSCR which dictated the need for the soldiers to disarm and return to Rwanda.
In 2008, the Conference on Peace, Security and Development was convened in Goma,
North Kivu. The conference was held in an attempt to bring national reconstruction and
development to the eastern regions (Amnesty International 2008, 4). A ceasefire was signed by
the armed insurgent groups in North and South Kivu. It called for an immediate end in fighting,

5

Mai-Mai is a phrase used to describe a community-based insurgent group. The Mai-Mai differentiate depending on
their location as they are formed to defend the local territory against the other insurgent groups (Amnesty
International 2007, 24-28; Amnesty International 2008, 3; Diggs 2012, 136). As such, the Mai Mai’s allegiances
shift depending on who is fighting and what their ultimate goal is (Diggs 2012, 136; Kelly 2010). The constant
shifting of the Mai Mai’s allegiance can impact whether or not people perceive them as allies or as enemies and fear
their presence. This adds another dimension to the difficulties in ending the conflict, as all Mai Mai groups have
different desires, and there is no united goal.
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as well as the compulsory demobilization of the battalions. Furthermore, it emphasized the need
to observe humanitarian law and refrain from any continued violations of civilians’ human
rights. By signing the ceasefire, the Congolese government granted blanket amnesties towards
combatants for any crime committed, excluding war crimes, genocide or crimes against
humanity (Amnesty International 2008, 4). This conference also created the Amani Programme,
which is a government-led program “for security, pacification, stabilization and reconstruction of
the Kivus” (Amnesty International 2008, 4). The Amani Programme:
aims to negotiate and secure the demobilization of the armed groups and their
integration into the national army, establish accountability for violations against
human rights and humanitarian law, including violence against women and
children, resort state authority in the Kivus, and assure the return of the internally
displaced and refugees, community reconciliation and the rehabilitation of
essential social services, including health centres and schools (Amnesty
International 2008, 4)
While the ceasefire was eventually signed, conflict has not concluded. Rape and sexual violence
are widespread in the eastern regions. Individuals are fleeing their homes in hopes to find safety
elsewhere. Civilians are still being killed and/or tortured. International humanitarian law is
continuously being violated. The international community needs to assist when human rights are
being violated to the extent that they are. This is usually done through the presence of
peacekeeping troops.
In addition to the presence of the rebel groups and FARDC, the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has had an active
presence in DRC. MONUC is mandated by the UN to protect civilians, provide security and
prevent violations of humanitarian law by “using any means necessary” (Amnesty International
2008, 5). As dictated by their mandate, MONUC’s main objective is to promote human rights
and investigate claims of human rights violations. Their authorization emphasizes the need to
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protect women and children, as well as other vulnerable groups of individuals in DRC (Amnesty
International 2008, 5). Many critics claim MONUC is unsuccessful in providing protection to the
people of DRC. There have been multiple allegations and reports that MONUC peacekeepers
have been collaborating with the CNDP. Reports have also been filed that argue that
peacekeepers have been complicit in the raping women and children (Diggs 2012, 56).
Furthermore, the operation costs for peacekeeping missions are substantial for the
international community. MONUC is strained financially, so, providing the necessary protection
and promoting peace are challenging objectives. In a strategy presented to the UN Security
Council in December 2007, MONUC outlined the difficulty it was having at ensuring protection,
peace and stability are reached. Overall, the mandate was not being achieved (Amnesty
International 2008, 5). On July 1, 2010 MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) after the original
mandate lapsed. The name was adjusted in an effort to focus on the stabilization of the state and
actively promote an end to the conflict (United Nations News Center, 2016).
Human Security Risks
During the 2007 conflict in Goma, North Kivu, over 500,000 people were forced to flee their
home due to the lack of security. Being an IDP during conflict adds substantial insecurity and
individuals are at enlarged risk of vulnerability and human rights/human security violations. The
IDP population reached its high at 3,400,000 in 2008 during the height of the conflict. Since
then, numbers have been slowly decreasing as some individuals have perceived it to be safe to
return home. In a report published May 2014, there were over 2.9 million IDPs in DRC
(International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). However, by December 2015, the
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number decreased to 2,658,000 internally displaced persons in (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). As of September 2015, 900,000 IDPs have been reported to
have returned home in the last 18 months (United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs 2015). While the numbers are decreasing, a substantial amount of the
population remains internally displaced. Research has shown displacement, sexual violence
rates, poverty, political instability, structural inequalities and discrimination all factor into one
another. These aspects of society are visibly present within the context of DRC. It is hard to
determine which of these human security factors has allowed for the other violations of one’s
human rights. Therefore, it is important to ensure all these obstacles are addressed during postconflict reconstruction in an attempt to guarantee conflict does not relapse.
In 2013, over 65 percent of IDPs in DRC are located in the North and South Kivu
Provinces, with 1.9 million people displaced in North and South Kivu, Orientale Katanga and
Equateur Provinces (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013).
There is a strong correlation between conflict and people fleeing due to security threats. Eightyseven percent of the individuals globally displaced in 2013 were displaced as a result of armed
conflict (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013). The
International Displacement Monitoring Centre stipulates over four percent of the population of
DRC faces displacement (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).
In a report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) entitled: “Always on the Run: The
Vicious Cycle of Displacement in Eastern Congo,” the leading human rights organization
analyzed causes of displacement in DRC between late-2008 and mid-2010 in North and South
Kivu. Contained in this report report were interviews with many individuals who gave personal
narratives as to why they fled their homes. One woman told HRW “she fled her village in
48

Breaking the Legacy
September 2008 because the FDLR soldiers were raping women in the fields during the day and
in the houses at night. She fled from place to place, escaping the shifting front line” (Simpson
2010, 25). This woman feared for her safety and security. For her, fleeing was the best
alternative. The state and MONUC were not successful in their obligations to protect her safety,
so she was forced to take her own personal initiative. Another woman reports:
My older sister was raped in her house that month [September 2008]. We fled to
the fields, but the FDLR followed us there and so we fled to Kirumba. We went
back in November but the same thing happened again and we fled again in
January, to Bingi. We tried to go back in March [2009] but then we heard the
Congolese army was coming and we were afraid the FDLR would punish us so
we fled again, back to Kirumba (Simpson 2010, 25).
As these quotes portray, along with others in the report, there is a direct causation between
people fearing their human security and the resulting displacement in the DRC. As women (and
men) fear they might be raped or taken advantage of, they leave their homes. In the quote
directly above, the woman felt compelled to flee multiple times, after her sister was raped.
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) has identified three varying
degrees of displacement as witnessed in DRC: short-term and short-distance; long-term and long
distance; and pendular (Lauten and Kesmaecker-Wissing 2015, 8). Pendular displacement occurs
when an individual returns home during the day in order to maintain their livelihood. As a result
of the insecurity and threats their home face during the night, these individuals will flee to a
temporary residence (Lauten and Kesmaecker-Wissing 2015, 8-15). This form of displacement is
highly prevalent in DRC. The constant movement of IDPs in eastern DRC contributes to the high
rates of sexual violence. As IDMC has reported, women and girls are especially vulnerable to
sexual violence when they collect water or firewood, or when they use the bathroom
(International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014; Diggs, 2012). The type of pendular
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displacement seen in DRC is seen to have a correlation to the high sexual violence rates.
Furthermore, the frequent lull in fighting seen in eastern DRC provide individuals with a false
sense of security and perception that the conflict is over. When they observe fighting to have
ceased, they might return home, only to have fighting erupt once again. One consequence is that
individuals get stuck in the poverty cycle, where systematic violence and human rights abuses
are perpetuated (Simpson 2010, 24).
According to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), the DRC is mandated to address
the root causes of displacement (African Union 2009). The convention also obliges the state to
assist individuals in reducing the possibility of displacement reoccurring. The DRC has signed
but not ratified the document (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2014). The
government is not doing an adequate job at addressing the root causes of displacement, ensuring
and promoting the rights individuals have to return to their homes, and be free from violence and
other safety-threats. In addressing root causes of displacement, it is important to understand the
power-dynamics seen within Congolese societies. Power’s connection to displacement and rape,
and will be discussed in more depth below.
Power Relationships
Implicit power relationships present during conflict are imperative to discuss. Hegemonic
masculinity examines these unequal gender power dynamics seen during conflict, which men
have power, and which women have power. Hegemonic masculinity was discussed more in
Chapter 1 and proposed additional questions of research to conduct to determine which men have
the power, and what they do with the power. When discussing sexual violence during conflict, it
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is imperative to figure out who is being abused, and who is doing the abuse. These questions
often link back to hierarchies of power and masculinity, but were unable to be answered within
the scope of this paper.
According to Banwell, men in Congolese societies are supposed to have hyperactive sex
drives, economic power and social status. “The man” fulfills “the mans” role and is allowed to
use force and violence over women. By using this power over others, and the perception of the
hegemonic masculinity and cultural perspectives have created “conditions where rape and sexual
violence [have] become permissible and justified within the conflict zone” (Banwell 2012, 53).
These assessments allow for the perception that human rights abuses can perpetuate. The armed
groups in DRC hold a substantial amount of power over the civilians. These groups control
aspects of society that they should have no authority to regulate. They dictate when to attack,
where to attack and who to attack. This fear is translated as people flee their homes for their
protection. As women and children tend to encompass the largest percentage of civilians, and are
at greatest risk of abuse. Furthermore, the insurgent groups abuse their power by violating
women’s and men’s rights through sexual violence. One woman who was fleeing her home
expressed the power relations the FARDC abuses. She said:
The Congolese army stopped us on the road near NyabIondo and said, “Why are
you fleeing? We are coming to save you.” Then they stole all our things. —A 30year-old woman who lost everything as she fled her village in April 2009
(Simpson 2010, 35)
IDPs should be able to maintain power and authority in controlling their actions and safety. They
need to have the ability to dictate when they want to leave and/or return. However, they are still
not able to do so. Power dynamics are furthermore important to analyze within this context, as
they directly affect gender dynamics during conflict and post-conflict. Yet, power discussions are
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often overlooked when discussing displacement and consequences of conflict. The internally
displaced populations will not be successfully integrated until power dynamics are addressed and
the experiences of women and men during conflict and displacement are publically addressed
and de-stigmatized.

Rape as a Weapon of War
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, two in five women are victims of sexual violence. One in
four men are victims of sexual violence (Melhado 2010, 210). It is perceived that estimates are
conservative and actual rates are higher, but remain low as a result of underreporting. Social
stigma and fear of being ostracized by the community and/or family members also contribute to
an individual’s reluctance to report these crimes. Seventy-six percent of female victims are raped
in broad daylight (Diggs 2012, 118). Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness that sexual
violence is a violation of one’s human rights and human security, as well as a violation of the
Congolese Constitution (Zongwe 2012, 52). Some important factors that contribute to the
underreporting of these crimes include: the weak justice systems, the lack of access to health
centers, the location of the crimes and the social stigma attached towards the crime (ITUC
International Trade Union Confederation 2011, 26). These elements contribute considerably to
the low statistics from men who are victims. As AI points out, when men and young boys are
raped, it is used as a means to attack and threaten the family or community (Amnesty
International 2008). Fear of being labeled a homosexual and community perceptions make men
less inclined to report rape than women in DRC. Men are more vulnerable to being forced into
recruitment (Baaz and Stern 2013, 35). There have been reports of men being raped by other
men, as well as being raped by women in DRC (Baaz and Stern 2013; Haer, Hecker and Maedl
2015).
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While sexual violence exists in almost all conflict, the prevalence rates seen in the DRC
are significantly higher than in other conflicts. The International Rescue Committee (IRC)
reported over 40,000 cases of gender-based violence in DRC between 2003 and 2006 (Banwell,
2014). The UN estimated that 100,000 women were raped between 2004 and 2005 in eastern
DRC (Meger 2011, 116). The numbers have continued to rise. More than 30,000 cases of sexual
violence and rape were reported to have occurred between 2005 and October 2007 solely in
South Kivu (Meger 2011, 117). The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reported 5,485
cases of sexual violence in North Kivu and 2,928 in South Kivu in 2010. There were over 8,000
cases reported between 2009 and 2010 in eastern DRC (ITUC International Trade Union
Confederation 2011, 26). One report states there have been over 1.7 to 1.8 million women
affected by sexual violence in DRC and over 400,000 new cases each year with 760,000 men
reporting claims of sexual violence (Loko Roka et al. 2014, 2).
Individuals as young as six months and old as eighty-nine have been reported to be
victims of rape (Meger 2010, 116; Diggs 2012, 67). In a study conducted by Ohambe et al., the
group of researchers found that gang rape is the most common form of rape in South Kivu. An
average of 4.5 attackers were present for each victim of rape interviewed in the study (Meger
2011, 117). Many women were re-raped or assaulted in order to ensure that they would not
inform others of their rape. Ohambe, et al. also reported that over seventy percent of the
individuals interviewed believed their rape had been planned in order to assert dominance and
fear. Seventy percent of the respondents experienced some form of torture, mutilation, beating,
and/or insertions of objects “such as sticks, bottles and rifle barrels into their genitals” (Meger
2011, 117). Furthermore, AI reports that victims of rape are often threatened with death. Some
have had a “rifle, a knife, a sharpened piece of wood, glass or rusty nails, stones, sand or peppers
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inserted into their vaginas. Others have been shot during or after rape, sometimes in their
genitals” (Amnesty International 2004, 31). Ninety-eight percent of rape victims in the Kivu’s
have had some form of vaginal trauma caused by the rape (Diggs 2012, 66). Estimates as to the
extent of people affected by sexual violence during conflict varies extensively.
In a 2010 study conducted by K. Johnson, et al., 74 percent of women interviewed said
they were sexually assaulted as a result of the conflict. In contrast to that, 65 percent of men
involved in the study said their assault was related to the conflict. Victims who were women said
their assaulters were 59 percent male and 41 percent female. Males, in contrast, stated 91 percent
of their perpetrators were male. Fifty-one percent of female victims were raped as the form of
assault, while 21 percent of males were raped (Melhado 2010, 210). Other forms of sexual
violence found in this study included “molestation, sexual slavery and being forced to undress”
(Melhado 2010, 210). The study conducted by Johnson, et al. was the first study documenting
the widespread implications of sexual violence and human rights abuses seen in the eastern
territories of DRC.
In addition to the widespread occurrence of rape and other forms of sexual violence,
additional health implications and trauma can affect victims. Most victims of sexual violence
were abused in the rural areas of DRC (Diggs 2012, 66-67). This translates towards further
obstacles the individual must overcome when they seek medical treatment. Less than 30 percent
of the Congolese population have access to basic healthcare. Reaching health centers in the
eastern regions of the country is considerably demanding as a result of the poor infrastructure.
Many of the women who experience debilitating injuries after their rape are unable to access
health care, which can be life threatening. Some of the health complications that can arise from
rape, other than vaginal trauma associated with forceful insertion, include: STI and/or HIV
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infections, uterine prolapse, injuries to the rectum or uterus, broken bones, infertility,
psychological trauma, pregnancy, difficult pregnancy and birth, internal or external bleeding, and
fistula (Amnesty International 2004, 31). All of these health risks can have serious effects on the
individual’s emotional and physical state. Health implications are seeing a surge in their presence
and cause greater concern for those who suffer from fistulas. These health implications have
further weight on whether or not the victim’s community will accept or them (Benfield et al.
2015; Diggs 2012, 70-75).
In a study conducted by Verelst et al., the researchers concluded individuals who did not
labeled their experiences as “rape” suffered from higher rates of PTSD and mental health issues
than the individuals who acknowledged it as rape (Verelst et al. 2014b). This association shows
the relationship between sexual violence and mental health, along with the role stigmatization of
rape has on the society of DRC. In another article written by Verelst et al., the researchers
concluded that victims of sexual assault face obstacles of mental health as a result from the
stigmatization of the assault, not the abuse itself (Verelst et al. 2014). This correlation
emphasizes the need to deconstruct this social stigma in order for successful reintegration of
victims into the community, assisting in dealing with the trauma and accepting that it happened.
At Panzi Hospital, in South Kivu, girls three years of age and women eighty-nine years of
age have sought medical assistance after being raped by different insurgent groups. Panzi
Hospital is one of two hospitals in eastern DRC with the ability to provide assistance and
surgeries to victims of sexual violence. The other hospital is located in North Kivu and is a
Doctors on Call for Service/Heal Africa (DOCS) Hospital (Maedl 2011, 133). Dr. Mukwege,
who founded Panzi Hospital, performs approximately ten reconstructive surgeries to victims of
rape each day (Diggs 2012, 68). He has stated:
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[I]mpunity is the worst factor because militias know they will not be identified or
judged. That is one of the main reasons why they keep loitering, raping and
killing. In addition, the aggressors know that the more violent the crime is, the
more shameful and scared the victims are, the less willing they are to talk about it.
Many of these rapes are not inflicted upon these women because of a sexual
desire, but with the purpose of showing them that they are nothing (Diggs 2012,
68).
This perspective is further supported by Vénantie in an interview by AI. Vénantie, 56, was raped
on January 25 2008 in the Beni territory. She stated:
I was at home when a young FARDC soldier came to the house. He pushed me
into the bedroom and started to hit me. He strangled me so that I could not cry
out, then he raped me. When the rape was over, the soldier was so drunk that he
stayed on the bed and didn’t move. I got up and started to scream. My neighbours
went to the military camp to report the attack. The commander came to my house
with three soldiers, and took the man away. I was told later that he was whipped
as punishment, but the soldier is still at the camp and I see him regularly. When I
see him, he tries to joke with me. He frightens me. I feel very anxious and
depressed. I would like to press charges, but what could I really do to a soldier?
(Amnesty International 2008, 9)
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is high among victims of sexual violence (Diggs 2012,
72). Diggs interviewed one woman who killed her baby after it was born, so she would not have
to be forced to relive the rape every time she saw her child (Diggs 2012, 64). Another woman
who was interviewed by AI stated:
It would be better if I died with the baby in my womb- Sanguina, (Amnesty
International 2004, 31)
The stories of the experiences of the victims are infinite and powerful. But, perpetuating
the victim stereotype needs to be terminated. There needs to be a paradigm shift in how we view
victims. We should no longer call them victims, but survivors. They have survived heinous acts,
violations of their human rights, violations of their bodies and their human security. By calling
them victims, we do not allow for their personal development and growth of what has occurred.
Calling them survivors might allow for more individuals to speak up, and acknowledge what has
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happened to the individual person, as well as to the community. Prosecution of these crimes must
be achieved and perpetrators must be held accountable. Survivors should receive reparations and
discrimination against women needs to be tackled.
Conclusion
When women are raped, it is seen as an attack on the entire community (Banwell 2014, 52).
When a woman is raped or assaulted, it shows the husband and community that they failed at
protecting her. Furthermore, any assault on a woman has a direct impact on her physical and
mental health, and not just the community (Banwell 2014, 52). “Rape is not inevitable in war,”
(Wood 2009, 131) but the impunity and lack of addressing power relations seen in DRC have
perpetuated this weapon of war. In a study conducted by Anna Maedl, the victim’s perspective of
sexual violence stated rape is the war, not a consequence of the war (Maedl 2011, 56).
The next chapter will discuss the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will provide an
understanding of the emergence of addressing sexual violence as a form of ethnic cleansing and
a weapon of war on the international level, and domestic level. It will also point out the
limitations of the post-conflict reconstruction process in Bosnia in regards towards addressing
women’s rights and sexual violence in conflict. These limitations will then be applied in the final
chapter in determining the best alternative for DRC.
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The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia) and throughout the former
Yugoslavia were the last wars seen in Europe during the twentieth century.6 Analyzing the global
precedence of rape as a weapon of war during and after the conflict in Bosnia (1992-1995) is
critical. This was the first conflict that established international recognition of sexual violence as
a weapon of war, specifically as a tactic of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing and sexual
violence occurred prior to Bosnia, and continues to occur after the conflict of Bosnia. But
comprehending how sexual violence became incorporated into international discussions and
policies is integral. This can only be done by dissecting the conflict and post-conflict situation of
Bosnia. The use of sexual violence is widespread in DRC and understanding past and present
international responses to sexual violence are imperative for improving the security of
individuals during the conflict and post-conflict periods. The transitional justice structure and
criminal justice hybrid system constructed during the post-conflict period in Bosnia will be
addressed, as well as the international policies that have resulted from this conflict. Overall,
academics, policymakers and individuals can learn a substantial amount from Bosnia in a postconflict analysis of rape as a weapon of war.
The international community and domestic post-conflict community has made progress
and improvements in addressing women’s rights and rape as a weapon of war, but failed in other
areas. As researcher Jelena Subotić advocates in her book Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the
Past in the Balkans, the best way to learn how to address post-conflict reconstruction is to learn
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about the mistakes seen in Bosnia and the former states of Yugoslavia. Understanding the flaws
in partitioning Bosnia is important in guaranteeing that the same mistakes do not occur again.
This will ensure better reconstruction, reintegration and guarantee that prosecution is applied to
other conflicts. This chapter will provide an analysis on the partition and post-conflict tribunals
in Bosnia, as well as policies that have been created to address rape as a weapon of war and
human security. The next chapter will apply these policies, what has worked and what did not
work, what needs to be promoted, addressed, etc. to the context of DRC.
Understanding the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Republic of Yugoslavia was founded after World War I. Under Josip Broz Tito’s communist
control, between 1945-1980, the multi-ethnic state had six republics Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, along with two autonomous provinces,
Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina (Mojzes 2011). Tito’s motto was “brotherhood and unity”
(bratstvo i jedinstvo) and strived for a state without nationalist sentiments and was fully unified
as Yugoslavia. Tito’s death in 1980, coupled with the fall of the Soviet Union, sparked the drive
for independence from the different republics. The first independence movement started in 1991,
with the Republic of Slovenia (Mojzes 2011). As the different republics were declaring their
independence, conflicts of different degrees of intensity and gruesomeness were instigated. One
of the longest, and most violent, was the conflict in Bosnia.
The Republic of Bosnia within Yugoslavia had the most complex mix of ethnicities.
Forty-four percent of the population was Muslim/Bosniak, 33 percent of the population was
Serbian, 18 percent Croat, and 5 percent considered themselves Yugoslav or other (Mojzes
2011). The Bosniaks, Serbs and Croat ethnic groups comprised the major factions in Bosnia and
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were in dispute over the future state of Bosnia. The Croats and Bosniaks wanted to hold a
referendum to determine the future, while the Serbs wanted to claim Bosnia as a part of Serbia.
When the referendum was held, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the results that Bosnia would
become an independent country. The Serbs in the region felt as though they had been victimized
and threatened by the Bosniaks and Croats, and were thus entitled to this claim (Mojzes 2011;
Moodie 1995, 107-110). The war in Bosnia began in April 1992 after the country officially
declared its independence from Yugoslavia. It lasted until December 14, 1995 with the signing of
the “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” also referred to as
the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) (Jenichen 2010, 141-143). As the combating ethnic groups
sought to gain control over the territory of Bosnia, a new phrase was coined that described their
weapons tactic: ethnic cleansing.
The conflict in Bosnia was also highly gendered, involving tactics that were used in
combination with the targeting of people’s ethnicities. Women (and men) were targeted because
of their bodies and became sexualized weapons of war (Jenichen 2010, 141-143). Originally,
women’s bodies were targeted to dilute the bloodlines and ensure Serbian dominance and ethnic
homogeneity. The use of “rape camps” suggests that individuals (mostly women) were held
because of their ethnic identity, not because of their political identity (Skjelsbæk 2011, 67-70).
These rape camps became essential components as to why the international community deemed
rape to be a form of ethnic cleansing and as a weapon of war during the conflict in Bosnia.
Women were put into camps, imprisoned during their pregnancy and forced to carry their babies
to full term. The exact number of children born as a result of rape will never be known. The
Serbian militants believed rape, pregnancy and subsequent births would result in mixed
ethnicities. This would increase the majority of Serbian individuals. However, rape and ethnic
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cleansing was used on behalf of all participants. While people often discuss the Serbian tactics
and the gruesome techniques employed by the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats
used the same weapons of war and crimes against humanity. The Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats
often claimed they only participated in acts of genocide and crimes against humanity because
they were being targeted and were being threatened. However, genocide and crimes against
humanity cannot be considered self-defense and are never excusable. The Bosniaks and Bosnian
Croats need to be and should be held accountable to the same extent as the Bosnian Serbs for the
crimes committed and the sexual violence seen throughout the war.
The three and a half years of fighting resulted in approximately 100,000 casualties. Over
2.2 million individuals from Bosnia were internally displaced or sought refugee in neighboring
Balkan countries (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009, 6). The exact number of victims of sexual
violence during this conflict will never be known. Estimates of the number of victims of rape
vary, ranging from 10,000 to 60,000. However, most individuals, organizations, governments,
etc. have agreed that there were approximately 20,000 victims of rape (Skjelsbæk 2011, 69).7
While the targeting of women’s bodies was a factor of war during this conflict, women
were not the only victims of sexualized violence. Men were also victims. Addressing the needs
of men who were abused is equally as important in post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration.
Nonetheless, as seen in DRC, men tend to not report these rapes. It is therefore difficult to have a
comprehensive understanding of men who are raped, and the motives behind those rapes.
Historically, women have not been actively involved in wars as soldiers, and tend to comprise
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The typical number cited of victims of sexual violence in Bosnia tends to be around 20,000. This number was
reached after an investigation was launched by the European Commission at the beginning of the conflict. As
Skjelsbæk suggests, using this number suggests that rapes only happened at the beginning of the conflict, and
stopped after the first year. The likelihood of this is slim, and estimates of rape are significantly higher.
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the largest percentage of civilians.8 As a result, they are disproportionately more affected by the
post-conflict reconstruction of states than their male counterparts (Cohn and Jacobson 2013,
105). In the conflict in Bosnia, women were more than passive victims of sexual violence.
Within the context of Bosnia, many women crossed ethnic lines in order to provide assistant to
female victims of sexual violence (Jenichen 143-146; Kaufman and Williams 2010, 67). It is
important to actively deconstruct the victimization stereotype and highlight that women were
involved in combat and conflict in Bosnia. Their involvement was in an attempt to break these
gender boundaries and generalizations. The levels of activism seen are important to highlight
when attempting to discuss gender roles during conflict and how gender was addressed during
post-conflict reconstruction.
The conflict in Bosnia was the preliminary stage where the international community took
action focusing on women’s bodies being targeted and the use of rape as a weapon. Numerous
policies have been established at the international level to ensure this tactic is not used again.
Examples of policies include the involvement of women directly in peacekeeping operations and
post-conflict rebuilding (Raven-Roberts 2005, 44-48; Keaney-Mischel 2010, 112-114). Another
important outcome of the conflict in Bosnia is the inclusion of rape as a weapon of war and
ethnic cleansing into the mandate of the Rome Statute, and therefore under the control of the
International Criminal Court. The first individuals prosecuted for ethnic cleansing and the use of
women’s bodies as weapons of war were men involved in the conflict in Bosnia (Akhaven 1998).
Dayton Peace Accords and Post-Conflict Bosnia
The flaws in post-conflict reintegration and development began at the creation and signing of the
8

There are examples of women being involved as soldiers and actively fighting for the cause. However, historically,
women tend to be excluded from active involvement.
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Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). The DPA reinforced the ethnic boundaries that were being fought
over by creating two separate republics within the states’ boundaries. The country is comprised
of two ethnically defined entities, Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (FBiH). Republika Srpska is comprised of almost 100 percent Bosnian Serbs while
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is shared between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian
Croats. One critique of the DPA is its acknowledgement of land gain during the conflict by the
Serbs as it became incorporated into the peace document as well as the constitution (Subotić
2009, 123-125). Furthermore, heavy criticism has been aimed at the DPA because it reinforces
the ethnic identities that were at the roots of the conflict and the displacement seen throughout
the conflict (Subotić 2009, 123-131). RS and FBiH have separate constitutions, citizenships,
police, armies, political parties, presidents, etc. while still remaining within the same state
(Cockburn 2013, 27; Subotić 2009, 123-131). The division of these two entities to the extent
present in Bosnia have proven to be also extremely costly. The official separation of these two
entities has reinforced the ethnic divisions the war was grounded on, especially that of the
patriarchal, nationalistic institution (Cockburn 2013, 27). Separating these two entities to the
extent present in Bosnia is also remarkably damaging. The World Bank claims over 50 percent
of Bosnia’s GDP goes towards financing this government hybrid (Subotić 2009, 125).
Another characteristic of the DPA that affected Bosnia’s post-conflict reconstruction is
the level of international involvement. Bosnia became an International Protectorate under the
control of the United Nations Office for High Representative (OHR) (Subotić 2009, 125). As an
International Protectorate, the OHR was granted unconditional control in organizing almost all
aspects in creating a newly independent state and constitutions, including but not limited to
designing the flag, elections, the police force, the license plates, human rights monitoring, etc.
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(Subotić 2009, 125). OHR had so much authority and control over the state of Bosnia that the
domestic government and state institutions were essentially nonexistent. The Bosnian elites took
advantage of this lack of power, and “political irresponsibility” has continually contributed to the
ineffective government structure and power seen currently (Subotić 2009, 125). The international
participation, failures and successes were all used to further personal political careers in Bosnia.
Power structures and relationships are important in analyzing the post-conflict structure of
Bosnia. Individuals are continuously using the ICTY failures, as well as the international
involvement in the Bosnian state, to further their own political agendas (Subotić 2009, 125).
The demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR) processes implemented in
post-conflict Bosnia affected the structure of the new Bosnia.9 The DPA did not address any
specific provisions in the post-conflict Bosnian society for the use of these mass rapes and the
gender-based crimes. The DPA overlooked the issues of gender-based crimes as well as the
ramifications of children born as a result of rape in the reconstruction process of post- conflict
Bosnia (Djurić, Drezgić and Žarkov 2008, 282-284). This omission has led to ongoing
international pressure to continue criminal war tribunals in order to restore some sense of justice
(Djurić, Drezgić and Žarkov 2008, 282-284). At one point during the post-conflict period, there
were talks of holding a Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC).10 The law that was
proposed would have addressed the human rights violations that occurred between November
1990 and December 1995 (Subotić 2009, 146-149). While a draft law was proposed to the
Bosnian constitution, it never passed. Most advocacy groups in Bosnia were against the idea of
the TRC as they felt it would be used for individual political gain and personal agendas. It would
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not provide any closure (Subotić 2009, 146-149).
Transitional Justice: What is Justice for Bosnia?
The transitional justice structure of post-conflict Bosnia was seen as a hybrid system where
prosecutions and court cases were tried on the international level as well as the domestic level.
Originally, the international community created an ad hoc criminal tribunal, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which will be addressed below. After it was
perceived that the criminal tribunal was not providing enough justice, cases were transferred to
the domestic level, and the War Crimes Chamber was established. At the same time as these
international court proceedings, domestic and local courts were prosecuting low-ranking
individuals. Another obstacle seen in the Bosnian case was the involvement of the international
community. After the signing of the DPA, various international actors were involved in
peacekeeping missions, including but not limited to OHR, UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, UNHCR, OSCE and an abundant number of NGOs (Subotić 2009, 126).
Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Development Program are examples of
organizations that are becoming increasingly worried about the future of the state of Bosnia.
They are warning the international community that the country is developing a “two-tiered warcrimes justice system” where an impunity gap is being created and individuals are not being held
accountable and responsible for the crimes they committed. High-ranking officials are being
tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the War Crimes
Chamber while low-ranking individuals are being tried at the domestic/local levels. However,
there is a lack of efficiency and in reality, no one is being tried. The transitional justice efforts
are ineffective and political instability is left in a continuous cycle (Subotić 2009, 132-136).
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The OHR was also given authority over supervising Bosnia's involvement with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY was the first international war
crimes court held after World War II. In May 1993, the ICTY was established at the passing of
UN Security Council Resolution 827 (Skjelsbæk 2011, 72-76). Located in The Hague, the
mandate of the ICTY includes “bring[ing] justice [to] those responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and thus
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the region” (United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2016). The ICTY established and
enacted Rules of Procedure and Evidence which help to defend the rights of witnesses during
prosecution of rape trials, including Rule 96 (Niarchos 2006, 304-309). Specifically, Rule 96
states:
i. No corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be required’
ii. consent shall not be allowed as a defense if the victim
a. has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence,
duress, detention or psychological oppression, or
b. reasonable believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so
subjected, threatened or put in fear;
iii. before evidence of the victim’s consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy
the Trail Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible;
iv. prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence (Niarchos
2006, 306)
The tribunal consists of eleven judges, only two of which were women (Niarchos 2006,
300-305). An individual can be investigated and tried under the ICTY if they are seen to have
violated various offenses, including: “grave breaches of breaches of the 1949 Geneva
conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity”
(United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2016). The ICTY has
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the authority to investigate any claims of violations that have occurred in Yugoslavia since 1991.
It does not focus its investigations individualized to Bosnia, but to any territory that comprised
the former Yugoslavia. Yet, Bosnia was the country where most of the ICTY cases originated
from as a result of the ruthlessness of the crimes committed (Subotić 2009, 126-127). The ICTY
was the first international tribunal where rape was included within the mandate as a weapon of
war and a form of crime against humanity. This created an international precedence in how to
prosecute perpetrators of rape and sexual violence.
The first shortcoming of the ICTY is in how it was structured. As mentioned above, the
DPA created two different republics within Bosnia, each with their own police force and
government infrastructures. The two republics had differing perspectives on cooperation with the
ICTY and their investigation. RS was very reluctant to assist the ICTY in any form, while the
FBiH wanted to assist the ICTY. This was because they felt the international community was
going to solely punish the Bosnian Serbs for the crimes they committed. RS publically denied
any acknowledgement as to where individuals accused of war crimes were located and openly
impeded ICTY investigations of these war crimes. As Subotić states, the ICTY actively worked
to undermine its own authority and findings (Subotić 2009, 127-128). Another factor that
influenced RS and their involvement in the ICTY was the collaboration between RS and Serbia.
Individuals originating from Serbia hiding from the ICTY would go to RS, while individuals
originating from RS hiding from the ICTY would go to Serbia (Subotić 2009, 127-128). These
two entities collaborated greatly in aiding suspected fugitives in order to avoid exposing
potential ramifications of any crimes committed including prosecution as war criminals. Despite
a law passed in September 2001 that ensured RS would cooperate with the ICTY, assistance was
not seen until 2005. In 2005, RS eventually began arresting individuals charged with war crimes
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and transferring them to The Hague (Subotić 2009, 127-128). The only reason RS officials
started to cooperate was because OHR threatened to halt international reconstruction aid to the
region. OHR also fired many “extreme nationalists” employed in the RS government, as they
were hindering these investigations.
The interaction between the international community and RS demonstrates the power the
international community has over the state of Bosnia and RS. RS realized the bargaining power
they held, and how they could “commercialize” assistance with reconciliation and the Tribunal
(Subotić 2009, 127-128). Many of the individuals involved in the military and armed forces
during the conflict have become members of the police force and government. Tensions between
individuals in RS still exist as many individuals who committed war crimes walk freely on the
streets (Subotić 2009, 127-128). The people responsible for making arrests need to be arrested
themselves, but are protected by the government. This has created a level of intimidation and
fear within the people of Bosnia and RS.
The FBiH felt Serbs should be the main and only focus of the ICTY. This was due in
large part to the aggression employed by the Serbs onto the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. There
was also a lack of assistance from the international community in providing protection and
security. The first individual arrested under ICTY jurisdiction was a Bosniak commander which
made the people of FBiH unsatisfied with the structure of the prosecutions of war criminals
under the ICTY. They felt that they were once again being targeted and the ICTY was creating a
“false ethnic balance” of individuals being prosecuted to appease RS (Subotić 2009, 129-130).
Unlike RS, the FBiH allowed for international presence in investigating individuals potentially
involved in war crimes. NATO troops and UN peacekeepers assisted in arresting and transferring
individuals to The Hague.
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The ICTY has been highly criticized in how the legal structure was set up in trying and
prosecuting suspected war criminals. The people of Bosnia were not educated as to the Western
structure of the legal system. Education of western law and prosecution was not seen as a priority
for the international community from the beginning. It took several years for the ICTY mandate
to be translated into the languages in Bosnia. As a result, most people in Bosnia did not
understand the proceeding and what was needed to hold the trials. There was a constant
misinterpretation of events, as no one completely understood the process. Most people relied on
the media to get their information, and the majority of events were misinterpreted, which
perpetuated the ethnic tensions and biases (Subotić 2009, 131-136).
The concept of a plea deal was troubling to individuals who did not understand how a
time-frame could be given to pay for the types of crimes committed. The victims of Bosnia felt
as though they were not receiving adequate justice. Their rapists and criminals would get plea
deals and only go to prison for a short period of time. One interviewee stated, “we really do not
expect justice from them [the ICTY]” (Subotić 2009, 133). The same views are echoed in
Stover’s The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague where witnesses
from the ICTY trials discuss their involvement with the court and the process of testifying. The
advocates and activists in Bosnia had given up on the international justice system. Many citizens
of Bosnia were frustrated that the ICTY held the trials in The Hague and only prosecuted highranking perpetrators. The time frame has also been a barrier to successful post-conflict
development. Many victims gave up hope that they were going to receive reconciliation and
closure for the acts they witnessed and endured. Subotić states that “Bosnian sociologists have
argued that the popular disillusionment with the ICTY has contributed to further retraumatization of the population, who are continuing to be prey to nationalist ideologists that are
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in abundant supply” (Subotić 2009, 134-135).
The ICTY was so too political and gave too much attention in ensuring that the process
ran smoothly, rather than the greater goal of focusing on the needs of victims and the crimes that
were committed. The justice system was orchestrated by the international community to a certain
extent. The people of Bosnia and the voices of the victims were overlooked. There can never be
sufficient punishment for the crimes committed in Bosnia, but the ICTY put time limits on the
prison sentences of war criminals. There was a general lack of addressing civil society
organizations, and the process did not incorporate women’s groups and women’s needs in
rebuilding of the society (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009, 27-28). As the International Center
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) states, the “international community was not concerned with
bringing the war criminals to justice, but rather with bringing them to the negotiating table”
(Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009, 11). The reintegration needs of combatants and civilians
were not addressed and the reconstruction process and prosecution of those committed war
crimes has been extremely lackluster.
Another disappointment of the ICTY was in its mandate to only investigate high- ranking
officials and not the lower-ranking individuals. These individuals were to be investigated by the
lower ranking domestic courts. It was these failures of the ICTY, along with the financial
expense, that allowed for the establishment of the War Crimes Chamber, which also prosecuted
individuals in Bosnia. The War Crimes Chamber will be addressed below.
Despite its obstacles, the ICTY established some landmark cases for international human
rights law and international humanitarian law in regards to sexual violence’s incorporation into
the legal sphere. Duško Tadić was the first person ever tried for sexual violence against men;
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Mucić et al. concluded that rape constitutes torture; Furundžija was the first person to be charged
solely of sexual violence and no other crime; Kunarac et al. concluded that certain acts can be
construed as sexual enslavement and that rape can be considered a crime against humanity; the
Krstić́ case was an important international criminal justice landmark, which established the link
between rape and ethnic cleansing (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia 2015b). These international trials and convictions have helped to incorporate
sexual violence within the mandate of the International Criminal Court and as a crime against
humanity.
War Crimes Chamber
Prior to the official establishment of the 2005 special War Crimes Chamber (WCC), domestic
trials for war crimes in Bosnia were flawed. There was an overall lack of security as many
lawyers were killed, or displaced, witnesses were not protected, ethnic biases were severe,
witnesses were intimidated, and other obstacles were present. There was a lack of cooperation
between the two republics, as well as an underutilization of evidence from the ICTY trials
(Subotić 2009, 140). Furthermore, the constitutional framework was not conducive to trials of
these magnitudes and complexity. Conviction rates in RS were exceptionally low; twelve years
after the end of the conflict only 18 indictments had been issued with 7 verdicts reached (Subotić
2009, 141). The domestic trials in FBiH did not have as many ethnic tensions as in RS.
Individuals were prosecuted with less bias and at a higher frequency. In the same time period,
over 144 verdicts had been reached (Subotić 2009, 141). The domestic courts were tasked with
the investigation and prosecution of individuals involved in lower-ranking crimes and suspects.
In 2005, the OHR and ICTY established the WCC.
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The WCC was designed to try to phase out the ICTY to address these institutional
deficiencies (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009, 19-20). It was the first of its kind, and it created
a hybrid court between an international tribunal and a domestic court. Initially, the WCC was to
be staffed by both the international community and local judges and prosecutors to help ease the
transition (Subotić 2009, 141). At present, the WCC is primarily staffed by the local judges and
lawyers. It is located within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a guiding principle
of “accountability for war crimes [as the ultimate] responsibility of the Bosnian people” (Subotić
2009, 141). The international community had hoped that the creation of the WCC would appeal
to the victims of the conflict. The WCC would not only investigate claims of high-ranking
officials, but also lower and middle-ranking officials (Subotić 2009, 141).
While WCC tried to appeal to the citizens of Bosnia, there was a lot of criticism as to
how the WCC was constructed. AI asserted the WCC was designed based on budgetary
constraints as well as constructed on a short-term plan (Subotić 2009, 142-143). Presently, there
is also still a lack of civil-society involvement as it was not incorporated into the original
mandate of the WCC. Many of the criticisms that were levied at the ICTY were also directed at
the WCC (Subotić 2009, 143). Plea bargains are used, which upsets individuals in Bosnia. The
WCC was established by international players, not domestic actors, just like the ICTY. There
had also been a concerns that the WCC would use all the financial resources and no money
would not be available to support the district and cantonal courts that are designated with
prosecuting “sensitive” cases (Subotić 2009, 143). The lack of education and communication
between the people of Bosnia and the WCC’s work was also problematic. Furthermore, and
arguably most importantly, there was a lack of suitably trained lawyers who specialize in warcrimes legislation. There was also poor communication between the different republics (Subotić
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2009, 144). Basically, all the problems that were present at the ICTY have also been present at
the WCC.
The creation of the WCC has allowed for the incorporation of sexual violence during
conflict into the Bosnian Criminal Code. The ICTY had a statue of limitations and could only try
people who violated humanitarian laws between 1991 and 1995 (TRIAL: Track Impunity
Always, 2015). The WCC does not have a statute of limitations. They are able to sentence
individuals found guilty to a minimum period of ten years in jail. This incorporation of sexual
violence into the Bosnian Criminal Code is a positive aspect of the WCC which is often
overlooked when analyzing the WCC. The WCC is still in operation and is the primary court
responsible for war crime prosecution within Bosnia. At the end of 2011, there were still 50
pending trials at the WCC for individuals involved in war crimes (TRIAL: Track Impunity
Always, 2015).
ICTY and the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
The ICTY was established to prosecute major perpetrators liable for the serious crimes and
violations of humanitarian and human rights laws in cases labeled “highly sensitive” (Skjelsbæk
2011, 72-76; Subotić 2009, 143). In 1998, after the ad hoc tribunals for the ICTY and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had been established, the international
community created the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Banwell 2014,
45). The ICC is a permanent international body that investigates crimes against humanity, acts of
genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansings, as defined in Article 5 of the Rome Statute
(Skjelsbæk 2011, 75). The ICTY and ICTR directly influenced the foundation of this
international criminal and legal system. The ICC has investigated various claims of aggression
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and war crimes for various individuals in the DRC (Kaye 2011, 4).
The experience of the ICTY and ICTR helped to formulate the mandate and integration
of gender into the structure of the ICC. Expressly, the ICC has highlighted gender concerns in
four aspects of its mandate and scope for protecting individuals. First, the ICC “ensures that
victims of sexual and gender-based violence will be safe both physically and psychologically,
and that their dignity will be safe-guarded by being spared harassing and intimidating questions
in courts” (Skjelsbæk 2011, 75). While security of witnesses was incorporated into the ICTY
structure, many individuals were still intimidated and threatened. As a result, witnesses were
reluctant to participate in the trials. Ensuring witness protecting is an important step in
legitimizing these courts and rulings. Anonymity and security also need to be promoted. The
second condition is contingent on the fact that the witness/individual’s past sexual history is not
allowed to be discussed. The issue of consent is also emphasized in this clause. The definition of
consent for the ICC is taken directly out of the ICTY mandate. The international community
indicated the “coercive circumstances” associated with rape during conflict while defining
consent in regards to conflict and wartime rape (Bedont 2005, 93-98; Niarchos 2006, 292-300;
Skjelsbæk 2011, 75).
The third condition the ICC places is the need for full-time employment of legal advisors
that specialize in gender-based crimes. Furthermore, there must also be equal representation of
women and men engaged as judges, prosecutors, and registrars (Bedont 2005, 93-98; Skjelsbæk
2011, 75). This was another factor that has affected the failure of the ICTY in addressing gender
issues. Niarchos states that only two of the eleven judges are women, as well as the first and
second prosecutors (Niarchos 2006, 300). The Tribunal does not represent gender equality, as
there was/is not an equal representation of gender from the people employed, and therefore
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was/is hypocritical in the message it taught/teaches to the people of Bosnia. The final condition
that is incorporated into the gender integration of the ICC is the need to establish a safe place for
women’s voices to be heard when regular legal proceedings are not necessarily taking place
(Bedont 2005, 93-98; Skjelsbæk 2011, 75). As Skjelsbæk has outlined, these gendermainstreaming policies are devised after learning of the mistakes from the ICTY and ICTR in
their gender-blind approaches to crimes against humanity and prosecution of rape as a weapon of
war, despite the gendered component to this tactic. However, there are many limitations to the
ICC and its effectiveness. State sovereignty is the biggest obstacle towards prosecuting
individuals responsible for war crimes (Bedont 2005, 99-102)
One improvement the ICC made, after learning the limitations of the ICTY, was granting
the institution authority to provide reparations directly to the victims. The ICTY did not have this
mandate, and was a limitation, especially for victims and witnesses of conflict. Rule 105 of the
ICTY states victims could make a motion to recollect any property that was stolen during the
conflict. However, this can only be requested after a conviction (Stover 2005, 50). The authority
the ICC has in being able to reward reparations directly to a victim is an improvement in
realizing the hardships witnesses have had to overcome. Rewards can be in three different forms,
“restitution, compensation and rehabilitation” (Stover 2005, 149). The court appoints experts to
determine which form of reward and the extent of damage, loss and/or injury to the survivor, and
how to assist them (Stover 2005, 149).
Feminism and Gender-Centralization
Another issue seen in the situation in Bosnia is the lack of feminist voices. Anne Jenichen
highlights the importance of including feminist voices in peace-building and post-conflict reform
in Bosnia. She differentiates between incorporating women’s groups and feminist groups in
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Bosnia. It is important to incorporate feminist’s advocacy groups into the peace-building process
as it will ensure that women’s involvement in conflict situations will be equally addressed
(Jenichen 2010, 143-151). Women were left out of the peace discussions in Bosnia. Having a
gender-blind approach to conflicts such as Bosnia becomes insulting to the victims of the
conflict. As a result of its efforts to be gender-neutral, the reconstruction process actually became
gender-biased and disregarded the women. Not addressing issues of gender perpetuates gender
norms and power hierarchies. Despite women being targeting during the conflict, they were
overlooked during the peace process, resulting in a gender-biased reconstruction process
(Kaufman and Williams 2010, 110). Since the failed rebuilding of the state of Bosnia, the
international community has since then implemented United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (and later UNSCR 1820) which states that women must be present
during peace-time talks. While it is debated as to whether this is helpful, it is a step in the right
direction and something that was needed during the peace-talks in Bosnia.
The failure of the ICTY provided a space for civil society to speak up. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within Bosnia and outside Bosnia have started to raise
awareness for sexual violence and gender-based violence. As a result of feminist activism,
incorporating gender equality in various elements of the Bosnian state structure has started to
become a reality. After campaigning for gender equality in the parliament and government
structure, a quota system was implemented into the political system and representation (Jenichen
2010, 146-148). Another accomplishment was the adoption of a gender equality law and the
development of state institutions for gender equality, known as the National Action Plan.
Women have been striving for equality in societies, and the women in Bosnia want to increase
their agency, political and economic representation within society (Jenichen 2010, 143-151). The
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final achievement women’s groups have attained has been accessing reparations for victims of
sexual violence by the state. This triumph has been crucial in the development of global
precedence for victims of sexual violence. Through the campaign “For the Dignity of the
Survivors” women’s groups are once again addressing the issues of sexual violence in Bosnia
(Jenichen 2010, 148-150). These groups have understood the ramifications of sexual violence,
the effects of conflict, the personal suffering to growth, and development of the individual as
well as the community. By officially being recognized as war victims, this campaign and official
recognition has helped to de-stigmatize victims of rape, as well as the use of rape as a weapon of
war. This movement has helped with integration of individuals into Bosnia society, something
that was seriously lacking in the international involvement and the policies aimed at post-conflict
reconstruction.
Conclusion
The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was marred by exceptionally high rates of sexual
violence inflicted mostly on women, but also on men. Bodies were targeted in order to dilute the
ethnic composition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This chapter focused on the
post-conflict analysis of the reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts seen in Bosnia. The
international community declared Bosnia a protectorate and was in charge of establishing an
International Tribunal to investigate the crimes against humanity. The ICTY has completed one
hundred and sixty-one indictments, eighty sentences, ten cases are still outstanding on appeal,
four are ongoing on trial and thirteen have been transferred, ten of which have been transferred
back to Bosnia. There are over twenty-seven cases of individuals being held in contempt (United
Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2015). The ICTY has stated
that 78 out of 161 individuals accused have had sexual violence incorporated into their
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indictment. Of these individuals, 30 have been found guilty for being involved in sexual violence
as of February 2014 (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
2014). The War Crimes Chamber has completed a total of 250 cases since it became operational
in 2005. By the end of 2014, 33 cases had been completed within the year (Human Rights Watch
2015). While individuals are being held accountable for the crimes they have committed, these
cases are still being heard 20 years after the end of the war. There needs to be expedited response
time in prosecuting convicted perpetrators of wartime sexual violence. Furthermore, addressing
sexual violence outside of the legal system needs to be incorporated into post-conflict
reconstruction of states such as Bosnia. Many victims of sexual violence do not feel as though
the legal system is capable enough in providing justice. Legal proceedings are the only type of
justice addressed in the aftermath of the conflict in Bosnia. This perspective could contribute to
reasons as to the ICTY’s failure in providing reintegration and development of Bosnian society.
The conflict in Bosnia emphasized the need for international policies addressing human
security, specifically gender security, during conflict. Various UN Security Council Resolutions
have been established that now address the rights of women, violence against women and other
human security issues. These policies, along with other international policies addressing sexual
violence against individuals during conflict will be addressed in the next chapters. The
limitations and gaps in gender mainstreaming seen in Bosnia will be applied to understanding
what needs to be addressed to the context of the DRC. It is crucial for gender to be incorporated
and the needs of all individuals affected by conflict to future international tribunals in order to set
global precedence’s and norms. Violating an individual’s autonomy is never okay, especially
during times of conflict. Letting these abusers continue to contribute to civil society without
answering for the crimes they committed will not improve the overall human society and
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understanding of these crimes. People should have been held responsible after Bosnia. The
biggest take-away message from the conflict in Bosnia is the need to incorporate and actively
prosecute sexual violence claims in post-conflict society’s. The international community needs to
end the impunity of perpetrators of rape in DRC, and around the world.
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In recent years, the international community has enhanced the quantity and quality of the policies
directed at addressing gender discrimination. As a result of the “new wars” phenomenon, the
United Nations (UN) has actualized the urgency in creating documentation that reaffirms
women, children and civilian’s rights, ensuring they are protected during conflict. As a result, the
UN has passed numerous Security Council Resolutions focused on safeguarding that these rights
are promoted and protected. This chapter focuses on the policies that have been created for the
purpose of ensuring equality for women. This chapter addresses policies aimed at the
securitization of civilians during conflict, as well as the creation of an international justice
system. It highlights how rape as a weapon of war violates more than one’s personal autonomy.
Rape during conflict is a form of crime against humanity, which violates international human
rights law and international humanitarian law. A chart of policies and ratification status can be
found in Appendix C for a simplified layout of the information.
International Policies
Geneva Conventions: The backbone of international humanitarian law (IHL), the Geneva
Conventions provide explicit rules states must obey during conflict. There are four individual
conventions and three optional protocols (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010). The
concept of international humanitarian law is founded after The Hague Convention, along with
other international treaties regarding war, methods of warfare and weapons. Geneva Convention
I addresses the roles combatants must adhere to. Article 3 distinctively addresses civilian
involvement and the rights granted towards them. Article 3 states:
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In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples (United Nations 1949, Geneva Convention I).
Written in 1949, Article 3 of Geneva Convention I reaffirms the constant need to protect
civilians during armed conflict. As mentioned in Chapter 1, “new wars” have begun to disregard
the need to protect civilians and their security. This fundamental human right is being
overlooked. As such, new laws underscoring civilian protection and the promotion of these rights
need to be enacted.
Geneva Convention IV discusses the unequivocal protection granted towards civilians
during conflict and the roles civilians can occupy during conflict. In regards to sexual violence
and rape, Article 27 states:
Article 27: “Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and
their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be
protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and
public curiosity.
2 Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault” (United Nations
1949, Geneva Convention IV).
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Including rape and sexual violence within the Geneva Convention enshrines the international
community’s commitment towards maintain this human right. It demonstrates the obligation
states have at enforcing humanitarian laws. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) follows IHL during times of conflict. This NGO provides protection for people who have
been harmed as a result of conflict. ICRC has a mandate of guardianship created under the
Geneva Conventions which grants it the authority to promote its independence and neutrality in
providing protection for individuals during armed conflict and violence. One facet of the ICRC
mandate is its guarantee to focus on sexual violence during times of conflict (International
Committee of the Red Cross, 2014). As the Geneva Convention was written in 1949, the
inclusion of rape as a violation of IHL invalidates any claim that rape is an inevitable
consequence of conflict. Sexual violence’s incorporation into the Geneva Convention reaffirms
that women’s bodies have been targeted in all wars, despite only recent recognition of this
phenomenon.
Customary international humanitarian law is applicable to conflicts that cross
internationally recognized borders, as well as domestic conflicts. Rule 93 of customary
international humanitarian law addresses sexual violence, rape, and other forms of sexual assault.
It also discusses the states involvement in prohibiting rape and other forms of sexual violence.
Rule 93 enforces the states obligation towards providing security and promoting the protection of
an individuals’ sexual rights, guaranteeing that they are not violated. Rule 94 of customary
international humanitarian law address slavery, which incorporates sexual slavery. Rule 134
addresses an assorted set of needs that women require access to during conflict situations. These
needs include: protection of health and freedom of sexual violence (Tunamsifu 2015, 486). In the
context of the DRC, Rule 93, 94 and 134 are being violated. It is these customary international
82

Breaking the Legacy
humanitarian laws that the ICRC use to base their services on. When these rights are violated,
ICRC has the right to intervene in order to protect and promote human rights.
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW):
Adopted by the United Nations on December 18, 1979 and entered into force on September 3,
1981, CEDAW outlines the dire need to ensure women are not discriminated against in any
form. As an internationally legally binding document, states that have signed and ratified the
document can be held legally accountable for not enforcing equality between the sexes. States
that have signed and not ratified the document are not required to implement the laws to the
same extent as states signatories. CEDAW is one of the basic human rights documents
established by the United Nations. No article solely addresses the rights of women during
conflict and the need to protect women and children from forms of sexual violence. Overall, the
document aims at ensuring equality between the sexes. The prevalence of actively targeting
women’s bodies shows a states failure to adequately promote women’s rights. The preamble of
the convention reiterates distinct discriminations women face and the critical obligation states
face in safeguarding and enforcing equality. Paragraph ten of the preamble states:
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial
discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and
domination and interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full
enjoyment of the rights of men and women (United Nations General Assembly
1979, CEDAW).
The preamble continues:
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security, the relaxation
of international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective of their
social and economic systems, general and complete disarmament, in particular
nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, the
affirmation of the principles of justice, equality and mutual benefit in relations
among countries and the realization of the right of peoples under alien and
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colonial domination and foreign occupation to self-determination and
independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity,
will promote social progress and development and as a consequence will
contribute to the attainment of full equality between men and women (United
Nations General Assembly 1979, CEDAW).
These two excerpts show the realization on behalf of the international to include women in all
aspects of society. It underlines the importance of enshrining women’s issues into policies during
the transitional periods of government, such as post-colonization and peace-processes. The lack
of women’s complete incorporation in all elements of society is seen as a failure in striving to
achieve full equality between all human beings.
One significant limitation of CEDAW is the absence of a clause explicitly addressing the
presence of sexual violence during conflict and need to provide additional security for women.
While UNSCRs have been passed emphasizing the need to provide protection for sexual
violence during conflict, there is no international law outlining the same protections. If these
claims are incorporated into international law, UNSCRs might have improved legitimacy and
protection against sexual violence could be attainable. Furthermore, there are seven states that
have not ratified this core human rights treaty, the United States being one of them. The United
States claims CEDAW does not provide sufficient policies towards reducing discrimination
aimed at women. Moreover, similar to most UN Conventions, another limitation of CEDAW is
the lack of enforcing the policies outlined. This lack of enforcement is a result of state
sovereignty, an inherent political construct that states have absolute control over their actions and
people within their borders. The Optional Protocol to CEDAW allows for the establishment of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. When states prepare and
present the CEDAW Committee status reports, the UN has limited control over guaranteeing
women’s rights are actively being promoted and protected. The Optional Protocol was entered
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into force on December 22, 2000 (United Nations General Assembly 1999). The biggest critique
of CEDAW, along with all international treaties and human rights policies, is the lack of
jurisdiction and control due to state sovereignty. Therefore, there is a lack of effective
implementation and application of these policies. The international community does not have the
power to ensure these policies are being executed.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo signed CEDAW on July 17, 1980 and ratified the
document on October 17, 1986. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed CEDAW while still an entity of
Yugoslavia. It ratified the treaty on September 1, 1993 when it became an independent state. BiH
accepted the amendments to CEDAW as proposed on December 22, 1999. The DRC has not
accepted the amendment. However, the amendment has not entered into force as not enough UN
member states have agreed to them. BiH ratified the Optional Protocol to CEDAW on September
4, 2002. DRC has not signed or ratified this treaty (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2016b;
United Nations Treaty Collection, 2016; United Nations Treaty Collection, 2016d).
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): Adopted on September 2, 1990, CRC outlines the
vulnerability children face. It also provides a framework on how the state should treat children.
The Convention emphasizes children as human beings. As a result, children have the same
inalienable rights as other human beings. The CRC is “the most rapidly and widely ratified
international human rights treaty in history” (UNICEF, 2016). This statement demonstrations
member states realization towards making a commitment in advancing children’s rights. The
CRC includes rights granted to children during times of conflict. Article 38 states:
Article 38(1) States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of
international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are
relevant to the child.
(2) States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have
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not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.
(3) States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the
age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of
eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are
oldest.
(4) In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to
protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all
feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an
armed conflict (United Nations General Assembly 1989, CRC).
Article 38 outlines the states responsibilities in ensuring children are protected during conflict. It
also addresses the states obligation at ensuring children under the age of fifteen are not
involuntarily conscripted into armed conflict. This phenomenon, known colloquially as ‘child
soldiers,’ is principally prevalent in areas where children may forcibly be recruited into rebel
armies, or join the armies because there is no other alternative. The NSAG, the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) lead by Joseph Kony, is reported to be using forcible recruitment in an effort to
control land and invoke fear onto civilians. The LRA has recruited children from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. There are other NSAGs within DRC which have been reported to used
children as soldiers. Prior to the deconstruction of the CNDP in 2009, NGOs and the UN found
evidence supporting the claim that CNDP forcibly recruited boys and men from Goma’s IDP
camps (Amnesty International 2008, 15). Forcible recruitment is particularly common for IDPs;
another vulnerability they face. IDPs in DRC were discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.
Another essential human right the CRC promotes and protects is the right not to be
involved in sexual exploitation. Rape as a weapon of war is considered a form of sexual
exploitation, regardless of the individuals’ gender, age, ethnicity, etc. This inalienable right is
outlined in numerous articles and refers to sexual exploitation during times of peace as well as
times of conflict. Moreover, it affirms the need to incorporate legislation that will allow for a
sufficient amount of protection and promotion of this right. A lack of legislation and
86

Breaking the Legacy
enforcement highlights the state’s inability to protect children’s human security and basic human
rights.
Article 19(1). States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative,
social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or
mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
Article 34 States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular
take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: (a)
The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity;
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual
practices; (c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and
materials.
Article 37 States Parties shall ensure that: (a) No child shall be subjected to
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither
capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be
imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age;
Article 39 States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical
and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form
of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and
reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, selfrespect and dignity of the child” (United Nations General Assembly 1989, CRC).
The continual references to sexual exploitation and the need to protect children from
human rights violations portrays the importance in ensuring children are not exploited.
Sexual exploitation can be rampant during conflict. The states lack of promoting security
from this is another failure of the state and international community.
Furthermore, the health risks associated with rape, especially violent rapes as seen in
DRC, is a violation of CEDAW and CRC as adequate health services are not provided.
Article 3(3). States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities
responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards
established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in
the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision (United
Nations General Assembly 1989, CRC).
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This right is notably overlooked in the DRC, as there is a lack of access to healthcare,
which was addressed in more detail in Chapter 3. The lack of access to health care has
significant ramifications for those who experience trauma associated with their rape, or
have had complications as a result of pregnancy from rape.
In addition to the legally binding conventions, the international community authored two
Optional Protocols attached to the CRC. The first Optional Protocol is aimed at the rights of
children during armed conflict. This Protocol focuses almost exclusively on forced conscription
and is aimed at reducing the presence of ‘child soldiers’ (United Nations General Assembly
2000). The Optional Protocol does not address sexual violence children experience during
conflict. This is a major limitation of the Protocol. It is perpetuating the presence of gender blind
dialogues, instead of attempting to incorporate gender-mainstreaming and gender-centrality into
conversations on rape and sexual violence. In some ways, the Protocol also victimizes all
children involved in conflict. It does not address the structural inequalities that may lead children
to take up arms. Instead, it states all children involved in conflict have been forced to fight.
Allowing for the constant victimization of children during conflict does not add to the discourse
on conflict, security, peace, gender, etc. It perpetuates victimization of all actors, instead of
addressing reasons why individuals acted the way they did or why they took up arms.
The Second Optional Protocol attached to the CRC is in relation to the sale of
children, child prostitution and child pornography. This includes sexual exploitation seen
during conflict as often children will be involved in forced labor, or sold for profit. As
stated in the Protocol:
Article 3(1) Each State Party shall ensure that, as a minimum, the
following acts and activities are fully covered under its criminal or penal
law, whether these offences are committed domestically or transnationally
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or on an individual or organized basis:
(a) In the context of sale of children as defined in Article 2:
(i) The offering, delivering or accepting, by whatever means, a
child for the purpose of: a. Sexual exploitation of the child; b.
Transfer of organs of the child for profit; c. Engagement of the
child in forced labour;
(ii) Improperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the
adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal
instruments on adoption;
(b) Offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a child for child
prostitution, as defined in Article 2 (United Nations General Assembly
2001)
The Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
outlines the importance of protecting children from exploitation. It also addresses the need to
approach crimes committed against children cautiously. Furthermore, it outlines the need to
provide support, rehabilitation and assistance to victims in ensuring criminals are prosecuted to
the full extent of the law. It emphasizes the importance of successful community reintegration of
child victims of sexual violence. It obliges states to provide access to services to assist with
integration needs (United Nations General Assembly 2001).
Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child on September
1, 1993. The Democratic Republic of the Congo ratified the document on September 27, 1990.
The Optional Protocol on Conflict were signed by DRC and BiH on November 11, 2001 and
October 10, 2003, respectively. The Optional Protocol on the sale of children was ratified by
DRC on November 11, 1002 and Bosnia on September 4, 2002 (United Nations Treaty
Collection, 2016c; United Nations Treaty Collection, 2016e; United Nations Treaty Collection,
2016f). It is important to understand DRC’s positionality and status of the CRC as children are
involved in the conflict, and the state is failing at providing their protection and security.
Research could not be found that addresses children involved in the conflict in DRC, and
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their understanding of rape as a weapon of war. This is an area that should be researched more in
the future. It would be interesting to determine if there is a generational difference between
children and older combatants on the use and/or abuse of people’s security and rape as a weapon
of war. Furthermore, in attempting to understand the power hierarchies, and which men and
which women are involved as perpetrators or victims of sexual violence, it is important to also
address children’s positionality within the conflict and sexual violence. These aspects are not
included in this paper, but should be included within future research. Understanding Bosnia’s
ratification is not as important as DRC’s position on Child rights, but is still important to note.
Moreover, individuals have the right to justice. This right to justice is summarized in a
variety of international treaties. These treaties include: The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 (Article 2); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984 (Articles 4, 5, 7 and 12); and the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 2007
(Articles 3, 6 and 11) (Tunamsifu 2015, 488).

Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power: The United
Nations passed a declaration entitled the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crimes and Abuse of Power, adopted on November 29, 1985 (Stover 2005, 139). Within the
declaration, the international community defined what a victim of a crime is. A victim is a:
“persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical
and mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment
of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of
criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing
criminal abuse of power” (Stover 2005, 208).
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The international community formalized the basic principles of justice for victims of crime,
specifically the right these victims have to access information and the judicial process. Victims
are supposed to receive compensation for harm suffered. While reparations were lacking in
Bosnia, there is still time to improve access to reparations in DRC.
Consequently, a victim of sexual violence does not necessarily have to be abused
physically, but also mentally. Mental sexual violence during conflict is an area that is lacking
significant amounts of research. But until this aspect is addressed, understanding and stopping
conflict-induced sexual violence will not be attained. Victims, according to the definition, can
also be the community at large, which is often the case seen in DRC.
Moreover, this declaration also defines “victims of abuse of power” as a:
“persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical
or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of
their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that do not yet constitute
violations of national criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms
relating to human rights” (Stover 2005, 208).
Within the context of DRC, victims of wartime rape would not constitute “victims of abuse of
power” as rape has been incorporated into the national criminal law, as well as international
human rights law. While rape has been incorporated into these legal statures, the systematic
inequalities that has lead to these occurrence of sexual violence is not addressed within the
national criminal law. Therefore, one could make the argument that victims of sexual violence
are also victims of abuse of power.
Furthermore, the declaration states the needs of victims, especially during trial. These rights
include:
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(a) Informing victims of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the
proceedings and of the disposition of their cases, especially where serious crimes
are involved and where they have requested such information;
(b) Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at
appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected,
without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal
justice system;
(c) Providing proper assistance to victims throughout the legal process;
(d) Taking measures to minimize inconvenience to victims, protect their privacy,
when necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their families and
witnesses on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation;
(e) Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases and the execution of
orders or decrees granting awards to victims.
Disregarding the rights of victims might create a cycle of decreased cooperation of witnesses and
victims. It is imperative to ensure that victims are adequately educated as to the aspects of trial,
as well as the situation post-trial. This declaration was created in 1985, but the rights of victims
still applies. The declaration was not written in regards to victims of sexual violence, but it can
be extended to anyone who fits the description and definition of victim or victim of abuse of
power. It is important that the international community still enforces this declaration during the
international tribunals. These rights should also be emphasized within local and national court
cases within DRC, and other states as well. However, as this document is just a declaration, it is
not legally binding. Similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratification of
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power shows a
states commitment towards protecting and promoting victim’s involvement in justice and their
security.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325: Adopted on October 31, 2000, UNSCR 1325
addresses women, peace and security (United Nations Security Council 2000). 1325 addresses
the disproportionate impact war has on women. It emphasizes the need to incorporate women
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into the peacemaking process (United Nations Security Council 2000; United Nations
Peacekeeping 2016). The passing of the landmark international resolution 1325 is a direct
consequence of the lack of women seen in peacemaking from the former Yugoslavia, notably
Bosnia. As addressed in Chapter 4, women were distinctively targeted in Bosnia because of their
gender. But women were then excluded from the peace process (Kaufman and Williams 2010,
110). The four “pillars” of the resolution are: “Participation, Protection, Prevention and Relief
and Recover” (United States Institute of Peace 2016). It re-emphasizes the need to protect
women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence during conflict. It is imperative that
states address these four pillars and provide protection for men, women and children during
conflict. Until all four pillars are achieved, post-conflict negotiations will continue to be genderbiased and equality will never be reached.
Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo both launched National Action Plans
in 2010 aimed at ensuring UNSCR 1325 is being implemented. The NAPs are aimed at
identifying the priorities needed in how to implement 1325. They also address where the
responsibilities lie and what resources are needed (United States Institute of Peace 2016).
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1820: Adopted on June 19, 2008, UNSCR 1820
addresses sexual violence and protection (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2008).
1820 creates a zero-tolerance policy in regards to peacekeepers sexual exploiting the civilians
they are supposed to protecting. It acknowledges the increased use of sexual violence as a
weapon of war and the dire need to protect women and children from sexual exploitation during
conflict. It emphasizes the need to train peacekeepers to prevent and respond to incidences of
sexual violence. It addresses the importance of reporting cases of sexual violence (United
Nations Peacekeeping 2016; United States Institute of Peace 2016). One strength of 1820 is the
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use of precise gender language, which is exceptionally important in gender mainstreaming. It is
essential to use gender explicit language in future policies as it does not disregard the role and
involvement of women and children during conflict. While it is laudable that this language is
included, there is inadequate implementation of policies addressing women and children during
conflict. Rates of wartime violence are at an all time high. These policies are not effective in
ensuring the state will provide sufficient security and protection of the women. Additionally,
grouping all women and children as vulnerable victims of war does not allow for suitable
representation of the experiences women have during war. Not all women are victims of war,
some are active participants of conflict. There needs to be a shift in the discourse on women and
children’s involvement in war.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1888: Resolution 1888 reaffirms resolution 1820. It
was unanimously adopted on September 30, 2009. Once again, 1888 dictates the need for UN
peacekeepers to protect women and children during conflict from any form of sexual violence.
1888 invites the UN Secretary-General to create and appoint a special representative to a post
specializing on sexual violence during armed conflict. The person appointed to this position
would be located within the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Sexual Violence in Conflict (Security Council Report 2016; United Nations Peacekeeping 2016;
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009). The current Special Representative on Sexual
Violence in Conflict is Zainab Hawa Bangura of Sierra Leone (United Nations 2016a).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889: UNSCR 1889 was adopted on October 5,
2009. Reaffirming prior UNSCR 1325 and other resolutions as stated above, 1889 aims to reform
the role women play in the peace process. 1889 highlights the importance of empowering women
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to be involved in post-conflict reconstruction. It also restates the dire need at ensuring security of
women (United Nations Peacekeeping 2016; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1960: Resolution 1960 was adopted by the Security
Council on December 16, 2010. It aims to establish better mechanisms at monitoring, reporting
and analyzing sexual violence during conflict (Security Council Report 2016; United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2010).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2106: Resolution 2106 calls for an end of sexual
violence during armed conflict. Adopted on June 24, 2013, 2106 reaffirms the need for the ICC
to take sexual and gender-based crimes committed during conflict seriously. It stresses the need
for member states to assist in fighting impunity and prosecuting war criminals responsible for
human security violations. It additionally requests improved monitoring of these types of crimes
by the international community in order to ensure human rights are being promoted and
protected (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2013).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2122: UNSCR 2122 addresses the gap between
policies addressing women during peace and security dialogues with the implementation of these
policies. It was adopted on October 18, 2013 as a result of the Secretary-General’s report
highlighting these discrepancies (Security Council Report 2016; United Nations Meetings
Coverage and Press Releases 2013; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2013b).
African Union Policies
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa (African Women’s Protocol) enforces the need to protect women from all forms of
violence. The Protocol was drafted in March 1995 and entered into force on November 25, 2005
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(Women in Law and Development in Africa, 2003). There is a special emphasis on protecting
women from sexual and verbal violence. Article 3 of the Protocol states:
o “Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to
the recognition and protection of her human and legal rights;
o Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free
development of her personality;
o States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit any
exploitation or degradation of women;
o States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to ensure the
protection of every woman’s right to respect for her dignity and protection of
women from all forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence”
(African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 2003, Article 3)
The African Union’s inclusion of sexual violence reaffirms the protection and promotion of
women’s rights at the regional level. Article 4 of the Protocol continues to discuss the measures
needed to protect, enact and enforce laws regarding violence against women. Article 4 states:
1. Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her
person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment
shall be prohibited.
2. States Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures to:
a. enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against women including
unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes place in private or public;
b. adopt such other legislative, administrative, social and economic measures as may
be necessary to ensure the prevention, punishment and eradication of all forms of
violence against women;
c. identify the causes and consequences of violence against women and take
appropriate measures to prevent and eliminate such violence;
d. actively promote peace education through curricula and social communication in
order to eradicate elements in traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and
stereotypes which legitimise and exacerbate the persistence and tolerance of
violence against women;
e. punish the perpetrators of violence against women and implement programmes for
the rehabilitation of women victims;
f. establish mechanisms and accessible services for effective information,
rehabilitation and reparation for victims of violence against women;
g. prevent and condemn trafficking in women, prosecute the perpetrators of such
trafficking and protect those women most at risk;
i. prohibit all medical or scientific experiments on women without their
informed consent;
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ii. provide adequate budgetary and other resources for the implementation and
monitoring of actions aimed at preventing and eradicating violence against
women;
iii. ensure that, in those countries where the death penalty still exists, not to
carry out death sentences on pregnant or nursing women.
iv. ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights in terms of access to refugee
status, determination procedures and that women refugees are accorded the
full protection and benefits guaranteed under international refugee law,
including their own identity and other documents” (African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights 2003, Article 3)
The explicit inclusion of justice within this protocol underlines regional acknowledgment that
women are more vulnerable to sexual violence. Additionally, it supports the need for victims of
sexual violence in the DRC to seek justice from their perpetrators. It is imperative that these
rights are protected and promoted. The DRC has signed and ratified this convention (African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 2016).
International Justice, the ICC and the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute: On July 1, 2002, 60 countries ratified the Rome Statute and was officially
entered into force. the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created (International Criminal
Court 2016b). The ICC is an independent organization aimed at helping to prosecute perpetrators
of: genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansings and war crimes (a more in-depth
analysis of the ICC was given in Chapter 4 when discussing the creation of the international
criminal justice system due to the conflict in Bosnia). In addition to the creation of the ICC, the
Rome Statute also established global definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansings and war crimes. Furthermore, crimes against women, including rape, is included
within the ICC mandate (International Criminal Court 2016). This means that the ICC can
prosecute war criminals for sexual violence. Article 7 of the Statute addresses crimes against
humanity, within the jurisdiction of the court. Article 7 (1(g)) states that “[r]ape, sexual slavery,
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enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity” are considered crimes against humanity (United Nations
General Assembly 1998). Article 8 addresses war crimes and incorporates many elements of
sexual violence within the jurisdiction of war crimes. Within the mandate under Article 54(1),
the ICC also states that it will ensure it takes appropriate measures to apply gender analyses to all
crimes committed and presented to the court (United Nations General Assembly 1998).
One significant limitation of the ICC is only highest ranking officers can be investigated
for war crimes. Another limitation is the financial cost of running the court, and the lengthy time
in prosecuting individuals. It took ten years for the first sentence to be handed down. The first
sentence was towards Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was
indicted for recruiting child soldiers into his army. Many critics have condemned the verdict
issued by the ICC because sexual violence was missing from the list of crimes Lubanga was
prosecuted under (Amnesty International, 2012). The lack of including sexual violence shows the
politics of the international criminal justice system. As individuals have to be committed of
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, it can be hard to prosecute individuals for sex crimes.
Additionally, victims might be reluctant to come forward. There needs to be a paradigm shift in
how sex crimes are processed. It should not have to rely on the testimonies of the victims,
especially if they do not want to face their accuser in court or are worried about admitting to the
crimes.
Conclusion
As has been outlined in this chapter, a substantial number of international policies have been
established that address women’s rights. There are policies that endeavor to take into account,
address and reaffirm the need to protect women and children as civilians during conflict. These
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policies correspond towards what the government of DRC is doing in addressing the rates of
sexual violence. The next chapter outlines the domestic policies enacted by the government of
DRC. The objective of the chapter is to show the disparity between the official establishment of
policies and law, and the lack of enforcing them. Overall, the lack of policy enforcement is due,
in large part, to the absence of legitimacy that international institutions hold. This lack of validity
translates to the impunity gap seen, and the ineffective attempts at trying to establish an
international criminal justice system that prosecutes war criminals who have been complicit in
human rights violations.
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Transitional Justice Approach in Prosecuting Rape as a
Weapon of War and Sexual Violence during Conflict
This chapter addresses the policies relevant to domestic law in DRC. It looks at various relevant
court cases. These court cases emphasize the need for an ameliorated prosecution of sexual
violence claims as a result of conflict situations. While some adjustments have been made in
regards to the definition of rape, the Minova Rape case, as discussed in the end of the chapter,
highlights the substantial road ahead for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its attempts to
provide justice for victims of sexual violence.
Cultural Understanding of Rape in DRC
The status of women in DRC is not as equal as the status of men. Family law in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo dictates that women are seen as property of the men. If a woman plans to
take legal action against someone or something, she must have the prior approval of her husband.
If she does not have a husband, she must have the approval of another male in the family.
Furthermore, women need the permission of their male family member (husband or otherwise) to
perform certain activities (Diggs 2012,70). This possessive control over a person is a violation of
the woman’s human rights. Until women have control over their personal autonomy and actions,
equality will not be achieved in the DRC.
Correspondingly, women must get the approval of their husbands and/or family to
prosecute someone in the court of law. Requiring approval and acceptance from men in order to
prosecute one’s rapist will have significant ramifications on societal gender norms. Many men
abandon their wives upon the discovery that their wife has been raped. Women may be reluctant
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to ask for permission to prosecute their rapist. Additionally, rape carries shame to the
community. The husband or male figure might not want the entire community to become aware
of the rape as this could cause the family to be socially ostracized or ‘othered.’ Diggs states in
Congolese families, fathers teach their children that rape is a betrayal of your loyalty and trust
(Diggs 2012, 70-75). As such, when a woman admits to being raped, some would argue that she
has betrayed her family’s loyalty and trust. Chapter 3 touches on the mental health implications
associated with reluctance in labeling someone’s experience as rape. This is further complicated
when the victim is worried about society’s reaction to this human rights abuse.
The cultural perspective in admitting and prosecuting rape is slowly shifting, primarily
attributed to the widespread use of rape as a war tactic. Yet, an impunity gap still exists as a
result of the low reporting rates. A significant number of perpetrators are still not being held
liable for the crimes they have committed. Traditionally, within the context of the DRC,
perpetrators were not tried in court, but punished in a variety of ways, such as paying
compensation or through shaming (Baaz and Stern 2009, 500-503). With the increased presence
of rape and the slow shift in recognizing rape as a violation of one’s human security, these
traditional systems have begun to disintegrate. This dissolution of traditional approach, coupled
with a lack of legal prosecution, has generated a level of impunity for perpetrators. It is this gap
that needs to be addressed going forward in unpacking conflict, and the transitional justice period
after conflict has halted.
Penal Code and Military Code of Congo
In 2006, the Palais du Peuple (the Congolese Parliament) amended the 1940 Penal Code and the
1959 Penal Procedure Code to incorporate sexual violence amendments, prosecution procedures
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and legalize the violation of sexual violence and rape (Zongwe 2012, 40). Prior to the
amendments of the Penal Code and Penal Procedure Code, the justice system in DRC was
gendered-biased. Furthermore, preceding enacting the amendments to the constitution, the
crimes outlined in international law were not incorporated into the domestic policies in DRC
(Mattioli-Zeltner 2015, 77-79). Incorporating sexual violence into IHL strengthens the validity of
international humanitarian law. However, DRC is a monist country. This means once an
international treaty has been signed, ratified and entered into force, the treaty will have a higher
legal status than the national legislation and laws. These international laws will have become
domestic laws without explicit incorporation into the constitution or criminal codes. The national
courts can then apply these international laws. Some judges in DRC have applied the provisions
of the Rome Statute to relevant cases in collaboration with national legislation to effectively
prosecute war criminals (Mattioli-Zeltner 2015, 64-65).
During the 2003 Songo Mboyo trails, eight soldiers were accused of raping over thirteen
individuals. Among the victims was one male. During the trial, one of the defendant’s lawyers
tried to actively disregard the rape of the male victims. The accused’s lawyer claimed the male
victims had no validity in pressing criminal and civil charges. The lawyer stated Congolese law
was designed to protect women from rape, not men (Zongwe 2012, 44-45). Nonetheless, the
Military Tribunal in charge of this case contested the statement made by the lawyer and found
the individuals guilty of crimes against humanity. They stated that the ICC and Rome Statute has
a gender-neutral definition of crimes against humanity, and as such, men can also be victims of
mass rape as a form of crime against humanity. The recognition of this underlying gendered bias
in an individuals’ definition of rape is monumental. As has been emphasized throughout,
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equality will never be reached until men and women are treated equally. Until individuals realize
that men can be raped during conflict, equality will never be attained.
While the court made strides in improving equality by recognizing men can also be
raped, there were limitations seen in the trial. The soldier accused of raping the man was not
found guilty (Zongwe 2012, 44-45). Within the context of this trial, the judge ordered all rape
victims to testify against the defendants as to the nature of the crimes. This was because the
defense claimed the medical evidence was not enough to prove crimes against humanity
occurred through rape. Testifying can be humiliating to a victim, as they have to answer notably
personal questions and have to face their accuser(s). Male victims are less likely to testify as they
often become excluded in their communities. In this example, the male victim refused to testify
and so the accused rapist could not be held legally responsible (Zongwe 2012, 44-45). While the
judges approached these crimes through a gender-neutral lens, significant progress still needs to
be made. The government of the DRC realized the visible gaps in the legal system after
witnessing the failure of the justice system for the male victim. The government then amended
the Penal Code to provide a concrete definition of rape to be added to the Constitution.
The definition of rape and sexual violence preceding the amendments were exceptionally
vague. They never defined definitively what constituted rape. After the 2006 amendment, DRC
has been applauded with its extraordinarily detailed classification of rape, and its gender-neutral
legal characterization. Article 170 of the amended Penal Code states a person:
Shall have committed rape, either by aid of violence or grave threats or by coercion
against a person, directly or through a third person, or by surprise, psychological
pressure, or at the occasion of a coercive environment, or by abusing a person who due to
illness, alteration of faculties or any other accidental reason has lost the use of his/her
senses, or who has been deprived of them by artifice:
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a) any man, whatever his age, who has inserted his sexual organ, however
slight, into that of a woman, or any woman, whatever her age, who has forced a
man to insert, if only superficially, his sexual organ into hers;
b) any man who has penetrated, however slight, the anus, mouth or any other
orifice of the body of a woman or a man with a sexual organ, with any other
part of the body, or with any object whatsoever;
c) any person who has inserted, however slight, any other part of the body or
any object whatsoever into the vagina;
d) any person who has forced a man or a woman to penetrate, however slight,
his anus, mouth or any orifice of the body with a sexual organ, with any other
part of the body, or with any object whatsoever;
Whoever is found guilty of rape shall be punished with a penalty of penal
servitude between five and twenty years and a fine of not less than 100,000
Congolese francs (International Committee of the Red Cross 2016).
The amended definition of rape has been celebrated by the international community in a positive
light. The Congolese definition is more detailed then the definition previously set forth by the
Rome Statute, which is what the ICC uses to prosecute war criminals. Furthermore, this
definition is not gender-neutral and highlights how rape can be inflicted by any individual,
irrespective of gender, onto any individual regardless of gender (Zongwe 2012, 45-46). Prior to
the amendments, a legal definition of rape was not given, other than that rape was crime and
could be used with violence (Zongwe 2012, 47-50). Articles succeeding Article 170 in the Penal
Code outline legal justification for why a sentence might be doubled. Reasons addressed include,
but are not limited to: death, gang rape, the acts are committed by public agents who abused their
power, the victim’s health (physical or mental) is severely affected or if the acts were committed
as a form of weapon or threat (International Committee of the Red Cross 2016). The amendment
also states court cases are not to exceed three months (Tunamsifu 2015, 488; ITUC International
Trade Union Confederation 2011, 28). This is important when discussing transitional justice and
justice in general as it needs to be achieved in a timely fashion in order to provide closure.
Another important amendment to the Penal Code of DRC is the use of the word “to
introduce” rather than “to penetrate” (Zongwe 2012, 45-46). The use of the phrase “to introduce”
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removes the gendered connotation “to penetrate” has in regards to rape. As Zongwe states,
“[r]ape no longer solely means penetration of the victim’s sexual organ, but equally any orifice
of her or his body” (Zongwe 2012, 49). This societal shift in how rape is perceived is
fundamental to the development of the rape discourse, both during times of conflict and out of
conflict. If we can tackle the gendered perceptions of rape, emphasizing how rape can occur to
anyone, we can try to deconstruct the social stigma surrounding “rape.” Until this stigma is
unpacked, equality between the sexes will not be reached. Furthermore, successful prosecution
of perpetrators will not occur, as unrecognized gender biases and stereotypes exist within
everyone’s mind.
Article 169 of the Military Code reaffirms rape as a weapon of war within the Military
Code. While it criminalizes rape as a form of crime against humanity, it does not define what
rape is. Specifically, it states:
Article 169: Any of the following acts, perpetrated as part of a widespread or
systematic attack knowingly directed against the Republic or the civilian
population, equally constitutes a crime against humanity and is punished by death,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war:
7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity
(International Committee of the Red Cross 2016).
As one might notice, the Penal Code Amendment definition was not incorporated into the
Military Code. The Military Code’s definition of rape is still exorbitantly vague. As individuals
involved in war crimes are prosecuted based on the Military Code, there is an inconsistency
between legislation for sexual violence during peace and sexual violence during conflict. In
DRC, the military courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving crimes against
humanity (Article 161, Military Code). While one could relate the definition of rape seen in the
Penal Code to the Military Code, the definition has no legal binding within military courts
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(Zongwe 2012, 48). This is a major limitation in prosecuting individuals who have violated
international humanitarian law and committed crimes against humanity through the tactical use
of rape. This ambiguous definition will allow for gendered stereotypes to perpetuate.
Along with the amendment of the Penal Code, the Government of DRC created a
National Strategy to Combat Gender-Based Violence (GBV). This strategy works in
collaboration with the Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Gender-Based Violence operated by
MONUSCO. With assistance from five sub-UN agencies, the Comprehensive Strategy aims to
address five main goals. The five pillars include: 1. Protection and Prevention (UNHCR), 2.
Ending impunity for perpetrators (Joint Human Rights Office- MONUC/OHCHR), 3. Security
Sector reform (MONUC SSR), 4. Assistance for victims of sexual violence (UNICEF), 5. Data
and mapping (UNFPA) (MONUSCO, 2016). These UN departments provide compensation to
facilitate the overall mandate in combating GBV. The Government of DRC created a National
Strategy to Combat Gender-Based Violence to collaborate with the Comprehensive Strategy. The
mandate of this national strategy includes addressing reparations to survivors of rape (Zongwe
2012, 45). Funding for the national strategy is provided by the international community. The
Government works closely with the UN and the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children to
ensure that these pillars are met (MONUSCO 2016).
Mobile Courts
In collaboration with various non-governmental organizations, the Congolese
government has established mobile courts to assist with prosecutions. These mobile courts travel
around the rural areas of North and South Kivu in order to prosecute soldiers and civilians
involved in GBV crimes. Established in October 2009, the mobile courts are comprised entirely

106

Breaking the Legacy
of local judges and attorneys and with a mandate of enforcing the Congolese Constitution.
Within the first 20 months of their establishment, the courts heard 248 cases and issued 140
convictions for rape. There were 49 additional convictions for murder and theft. Forty-four
individuals were acquitted (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 69). The use of
Congolese lawyers in the mobile courts is immensely important in prosecuting individuals of
these crimes. One of the biggest critiques of the ICC and the ICTY is/was the use of international
judges and lawyers. People claimed individuals did not understand the culture, and therefore the
crimes committed were acceptable. Using Congolese lawyers to enforce and promote human
rights shows the community that human rights are universal, regardless of where they occur, and
under what conditions. Individuals are not able to disguise human rights abuses under the claim
of cultural relativity. As former UN Special Rapporteur on Sexual Violence in Conflict Margot
Wallström has stated, “rape is not cultural, but criminal” (ITUC International Trade Union
Confederation 2011, 30). Using local lawyers and judges provides an important cloud of validity
to these cases and the prosecutions. The courts, which have been applauded by the international
community, are professional, not biased and prompt in delivering their decisions (Klosterboer
and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 69). Some claim that the mobile courts have been the most
successful tool aimed at justice in DRC (ITUC International Trade Union Confederation 2011,
29).
The mobile courts have been commended for the timely prosecution of the New Year’s
Day case. On January 1, 2011, over 30 women were raped in Fizi, South Kivu (Banwell 2014,
49). The New Year’s Day case was an exceedingly speedy case, where the trial began one month
after the rapes occurred. The trial lasted eleven days (Zongwe 2012, 52). This case portrays the
feasibility to provide justice in a speedy manner. If enough effort is applied to the process in the
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future, all cases will be resolved quickly. This is beneficial for victims of the crimes, as they
might be able to have some form of closure if a verdict is reached in a speedy manner. This will
also be less costly to the government, or international community sponsoring the trial. The
mobile courts found Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutware of the FARDC guilty of committing crimes against
humanity when he ordered his troops to rape, beat and loot the people of Fizi (Banwell 2014,
53). He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment (Banwell 2014, 53). However, there is still
need for significant advancements in the structure of the mobile courts and an increase in
financial resources.
While the mobile courts have been successful in their initial prosecution of individuals,
there are still thousands of cases that have not been tried. Additional resources are needed to
address all claims of criminal misconduct by civilians and military members during conflict. The
successes of the mobile courts could be refined if the mandate of the mobile courts are expanded
and strengthened (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 68-73). It is equally important to
restructure the judicial system of DRC on the national level. While mobile courts have been
essential in providing justice to individuals in the rural areas of North and South Kivu, the
national justice system needs to be advanced within the Congolese context. Furthermore, there
needs to be an increase in the number of lawyers from DRC who are able to participate in these
cases. Training needs to revised in order to combat the high rates of claims and cases that are
being filed (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 68-73).
In August 2011, the Congolese Senate rejected the proposal for a mixed court initiative.
The mixed court initiative would provide the Congolese judicial system with assistance from the
international community. The senate rejected the proposal on the grounds of state sovereignty.
They did not want the international community to undermine its jurisdiction and authority. As
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Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud speculate, the rejection could also stem from the reluctance
to create a mixed court system. This mixed-court would allow the judicial branch the ability to
prosecute and investigate members of the government for war crimes, and other criminal acts
(Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 68-73). The rejection could be a political move to
protect high-level government officials.
As suggested, there are inherent disadvantages to creating a mixed court system, as
suggested. No international financial assistance is free. There would be conditions attached
indirectly attached to the money allocated towards justice in DRC. The question is what are the
ramifications of these ‘grants’ and who is going to be affected the most by them? Furthermore,
where is the money coming from? The mixed court system that was seen in Bosnia was not seen
as effective in addressing all types of crimes, at all levels (as addressed in detail in Chapter 4).
Only high ranking individuals were tried, and many victims of sexual violence were not able to
get closure for the crimes inflicted upon them. Twenty years after the conflict ended, the justice
system in Bosnia is still prosecuting individuals accused of participating in war crimes. The
length of these cases and the classification of Bosnia as an international protectorate has not
assisted in allowing the state to provide effective and acceptable post-conflict reconstruction and
reconciliation techniques. It is imperative that DRC prosecutes individuals for the crimes
committed but in a more effective way than was prosecuted in Bosnia.
As the conflict in eastern DRC is still ongoing, enforcing a justice system and
prosecuting human rights violators could substantially improve the validity of transitional justice
and rape as a weapon of war. Article 19 of the Constitution of the DRC (2006 and revised 2011)
emphasizes the right to justice. An individual, regardless of their gender, has the right to justice,
and the proper administration of equal and fair justice (Tunamsifu 2015, 488-489). Addressing
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the implications of conflict from a top-down approach can improve the incorporation justice will
have in a transitional sense into local, national and international laws in DRC. It will also ensure
all individuals human rights are being promoted and protected (Klosterboer and HartmannMahmud 2013, 73-75). Eighty percent of respondents in a study in the Ituri District of North and
South Kivu stated that “justice can be achieved” (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 73).
It is extremely important that justice and reconciliation is incorporated into the peacebuilding
process. The primary reason for finding peace in eastern DRC should not be to end conflict. It
should be to stop the violation occurring to civilian lives. It should also allow the opportunity for
individuals who have been victim of conflict, individuals who have been forced to flee their
homes and individuals whose livelihoods have been destroyed to find justice. This, coupled with
the legitimate desire for peace and stability, will ensure the cyclical reoccurrence of conflict does
not transpire. Furthermore, in conflicts similar to DRC where civilians are being directly
targeted, it is disrespectful to disregard the people’s voices during the later stages of
peacebuilding and reconstruction. Marginalized groups must be at the forefront of the transition
process. Forgetting the experiences of civilians during conflict will not allow for development of
the structural inequalities that have allowed for the conflict to be perpetuated.
The reason for including mobile courts within the paper is to contrast some of the
critiques present from Bosnia and the ICTY. Subotić claims that justice failed in Bosnia because
of the lack of national involvement in justice and reconciliation, and important prosecutions
occurred solely at the international level (Subotić 2009, 127-128). The mobile courts in DRC
provide evidence that the government is attempting to provide justice on the national level, and
not just internationally. While there are financial restraints to the mobile courts and therefore,
national justice, justice is being provided for sexual violence survivors to a certain degree. In
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order to test the efficiency of these mobile courts, they should be replicated in areas of DRC that
are more stable, and not facing conflicts, but where human rights abuses have occurred. These
mobile courts could provide justice for individuals that are survivors of conflict on a more
national and widespread scale. Streamlining of the mobile courts and the potential benefits and
limitations of this approach is outside of the paper, but provides additional areas for future
research. In order for justice to be reached in DRC, justice needs to be addressed in all aspects of
society, and throughout the country, not just the eastern regions.
Limitations of the Judicial System in Prosecuting Wartime Sexual Violence
While the incorporation of sexual violence into the Penal Code is admirable, the bigger question
is whether or not the laws are enforceable and if people are being held responsible for any crimes
being committed. In 2012, the government claimed two percent of the Congolese army
(FARDC) had been arrested for criminal misconduct. However, it is hard to determine how the
new legislation on sexual violence is being enforced. There is no correlation between the rate of
occurrence versus the rate of arrests. There appears to be a lack of arresting all individuals
involved. There needs to be an adjustment in the prosecution rates. There is also a lack of human
resources, such as prosecutors and judges who are able to adequately defend and judge the cases,
without biases (Zongwe 2012, 50). Furthermore, there is a lack of financial resources. Judicial
trials are financially costly to the state, as the trials need to provide protection and security to the
individuals accused of the crimes as well as the person testifying. There are also other expenses
associated with holding a trial. The state is supposed to cover the price of transportation for those
testifying. This can be expensive as the eastern region is very large and infrastructure is lacking.
Transportation disbursements are not sufficient and witnesses find it hard to travel to the courts
to testify.
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In 2011, only one percent of the budget for DRC went to the judicial system (Zongwe
2012, 51). This number is outstandingly low, especially considering the importance of holding
war criminals accountable for their actions trying to end the conflict. The remarkably low budget
for the judicial branch in DRC shows the politics involved in justice in DRC. In 2014,
Transparency International ranked DRC 154th out of 175 countries for corruption (Transparency
International 2016). This raises the question as to where the government is spending its money?
Who is benefiting (financially and personally) from the limited judicial budget? It is imperative
that corruption levels decrease. This will allow for better allocation of money, towards areas of
society, such as judicial processes, education and security of people. More money to the judicial
system will boost the prosecution rates, and human resource limitations. Furthermore, many of
the individuals involved in alleged acts of sexual violence either work for the government or
have connections to individuals in the government. If the state wants to follow its “zerotolerance” policy for sexual violence, corruption must be tackled. Individuals, regardless of
military or government rank, need to be held liable for any crimes they committee.
Another important limitation of the Congolese Judicial system in protecting victims of
sexual violence is the lack of awareness of or understanding the amended Penal Code by the
victims of sexual violence. With an adult literacy rate of 61.2 percent (2012) (UNICEF 2013),
many individuals in DRC might not completely understand the human rights that are inherent.
Women are statistically less literate than men, and as women are disproportionately affected by
sexual violence at a higher rate than men, as such women are continuously faced with
disadvantages and discrimination. Furthermore, individuals might not understand the judicial
process and their rights as citizens of DRC. As citizens, they have the right to prosecute human
rights violators. As Zongwe highlights, there is also a discrepancy between the published
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languages of the documentation and the language individuals speak and/or read. The government
needs to translate the amended Penal Codes into local languages in order to reaffirm accepted
dissemination and comprehension of these laws. The government must also actively advocate for
criminal prosecution of perpetrators rather than allowing impunity and not enforcing the laws
established to protect its citizens.
Minova Court Case
In April 2012, the M23 forces held a rebellion and fighting erupted between the Congolese army
and the rebel force. The M23 rebel group was formed by former CNDP members and led by
Bosco Ntaganda. By November 20, 2012, the M23 has seized control of Goma (Mattioli-Zeltner
2015, 14). More than 500,000 Congolese had to flee as a result of the bloodshed and insecurity
seen by the M23 (March 23) rebel movement. The violence that erupted in the eastern region
after a lull in fighting was extraordinarily gruesome and severe human rights violations occurred.
The M23 rebels are known for the extreme use of sexual violence towards women as a form of
intimidation and torture (Kitharidis 2015, 492). FARDC forces retreated after the M23 group
advanced in their territorial control. During the retreat, the FARDC moved to Minova. The
events that occurred in Minova between November 20-30, 2012 show the extent to which the
army uses their power over others. Over 76 women and girls were raped, homes were looted and
IDP camps were destroyed. The government forces were implicit in their involvement in sexual
violence towards women and girls. In December 2013, 14 officers and 25 rank-and file soldiers
were held accountable for their actions in Minova. Human Rights Watch has stated that the
events that transpired during the Minova Court Cases demonstrate the failure to provide justice
for all individuals who are victims of sexual violence. Only two low-ranking soldiers were each
convicted of having raped one individual. No one else was charged, and the high-ranking officers
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were not condemned for their participation. They were not held responsible for their lack of
action in stopping these crimes from being committed. International law dictates an individual
can be held equally liable for action, or inaction. This case shows the flaws in providing fair
impartial justice to the victims of conflict. The system failed and justice was not reached for 74
women and girls in Minova.
Conclusion
Article 19 of the Constitution of the DRC (2006) guarantees the right to justice.
Individuals are still struggling to be able to have this right reached (Tunamsifu 2015, 488). While
the mobile courts have done an impressive job in improving the rates of conviction for war
criminals, there are still gaps in the legislative framework and ensuring justice is reached for
everyone (Mattioli-Zeltner 2015, 71-76). Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
highlighted the failure of justice after witnessing the decisions of the Minova Court Case. While
there have been reforms in DRC, namely the incorporation of rape into the criminal code, the
creation of mobile courts, the gender-neutral definitions of rape and the New Year’s Day
decisions, there are still significant steps that need to be made in order for justice to be reached
for all involved. There are many political aspects that factor into deciding who gets tried for what
crime, and most of the responsibility gets placed on the low-ranking individuals rather than the
high-ranking officials. This perceived immunity affects the prosecution and fight to defend an
individual’s human rights.
The next chapter addresses where to go from here. It ties in the policies, international,
regional and domestic, and emphasizes the need to address sexual violence during conflict in
DRC. Constructing an effective transitional justice regime in DRC is imperative in order to set a
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legal precedence regarding sexual violence during conflict. There needs to be significant
enhancement made in prosecuting individuals on the domestic level for the crimes they commit.
Reliance on the ICC and international community will further support researchers claim that the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is a failed state. Unless women’s rights are addressed in the
post-conflict reconstruction and peace process, the human rights equality seen in DRC will be a
failure.

115

Chapter 7: Where to go from here?
The question remains, what can the DRC learn from Bosnia in how to prosecuted human rights
perpetrators and achieve lasting peace?
This chapter begins by providing information on the most important recommendations
and justification for reasons as to why the recommendations were given. A compiled list of all
recommendations is given at the end of the chapter.
International Criminal Justice
The mobile courts, as explained in the previous chapter, have been relatively successful
at providing legal justice and uncovering perpetrators of rape. However, the failure to convict
individuals during the Minova Cases highlights to the international and domestic community the
significant number of obstacles that need to be tackled. The justice system in DRC is severely
underfunded. Yet, Kabila rejected the proposal to create mixed courts with the help of the
international community. These mixed courts might have helped with the financial strain. After
an analysis of the mixed courts seen in Bosnia, one can see the limitations of international justice
and the application of international justice applied at the national level. The national trials in
DRC have discouraged victims from speaking out about the crimes that have been perpetrated.
The failure to hold individuals accountable for committing such crimes creates an air of
incompetence for the judicial system. The lack of a functioning judicial system and the impunity
gap further supports the claims that high level commanders can get away with their actions and
be involved in committing crimes against humanity. Trials need to be fair and impartial. Highranking officers who condoned crimes need to be prosecuted (Mattioli-Zeltner 2015, 1-4).
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International law stipulates that military and civilian supervisors can be held equally as
obliged for the crimes others commit when the supervisors do not take action to stop the crimes.
There is joint-criminal responsibility, and guilt by association in regards to widespread human
rights abuses is equally as important to prosecute as individuals actively involved in committing
the crimes. Human Rights Watch reports that many of the people who were arrested and
prosecuted for the Minova Case were low-ranking scapegoats that were singled out in an effort
to show some accountability (Mattioli-Zeltner 2015, 1-4). Incorporating the international justice
system into DRC is needed in order to ensure investigations of crimes against humanity and rape
as a weapon of war are not met with the same failed results as in the Minova Case. The
international justice system needs to be cautious of its implementation. Education and awareness
of the system needs to reach the people who have been affected the most by the conflict. The
mandates and other information should be translated into the local languages, and communitybased discussions need to be included into the transitional justice framework.
The international criminal justice system is inherently subject to political pressure.
Although, political incorporation into the justice system can be beneficial in the DRC. It is
imperative that high-ranking individuals are held culpable, and low-ranking soldiers are not the
sole individuals to take the blame. Naturally, it is equally important for lower-ranking
individuals to answer for the crimes they committed. While it might be hard to disobey direct or
indirect orders, soldiers who disregard international laws and the Geneva Conventions need to be
held liable for any human rights their actions might violate. In her article, Christine Bell
emphasizes the need to shift the focus of transitional justice from a primarily legal one towards a
system that incorporates many fields. She stressed the need to make it “multi-disciplinary” rather
than “inter-disciplinary” (Bell 2009). This multi-disciplinary shift would incorporate more voices
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from people affected by conflict, as well as fields such as anthropology, history, sociology, etc.
The incorporation of these disciplines is immensely important as transitional justice will then be
relevant to the context of DRC. It will take into account the history of the conflicts, the structural
inequalities and the needs of the people. These aspects are often overlooked when there is an
exclusive focus on the application of law and human rights law. Bell continues to state that
gender dynamics will be incorporated into transitional justice more effectively if this multidisciplinary shift occurs. This is because often times gender critiques are rooted in power
dynamics and the inclusion of women in dialogues, an aspect that is not necessarily prevalent
during prosecutions or discussions about human rights law (Bell 2009, 11-12). Creating this
“multi-disciplinary” approach to transitional justice rather than the “inter-disciplinary” approach
will further remove the politics from transitional justice. Rather than prosecuting individuals for
political gain, or to make political statements, incorporating other disciplines into the transitional
justice analysis re-emphasizes the need to listen to the people and their demands. Impunity will
be addressed from a personal perspective, rather than a political one.
Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration Process and Peacebuilding
The prior DDR attempts have failed, and conflicts keeps erupting. A different technique
for peacetime in DRC needs to be utilized. The qualified individuals who have been referenced
throughout are the individuals and organizations that need to be listened to when discussing
conflict resolution in DRC. They are the individuals who have done extensive research, spoken
to the civilians, conducted studies, written policy recommendations pressuring the government
and international community to enforce international human rights law, etc. These individuals
coupled with the civilians, rebel groups, national army, NGOs, etc. will be the best at achieving
long-last peace, something the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not had for a long time.
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The Government of DRC must emphasize the process of demobilizing, demilitarizing and
reintegrating (DDR) in any attempt at peace in the region. As Baaz and Stern note, in 2009, the
Government of DRC was attempting to integrate individuals into the FARDC. But, there was no
mechanism to distinguish between individuals who committed war crimes and ensure that they
were not incorporated into the national army (Baaz and Stern 2009, 501). Furthermore, there is a
failure to socially assimilate the individuals into the national army. Combatants tend to respect
their original commanders more than their new FARDC commander. They are not incorporated
into the command structures. Training is also inadequate. There needs to be an adequate process
in getting all weapons from civilians. Collecting and disarming combatants will reduce the
likelihood for conflict to reoccur. The lack of addressing these needs is critical to the
development of society as conflict is more likely to occur if civilians retained their arms and
have access to them. An effective DDR process needs to be applied in DRC. Mental health
needs, such as PTSD for combatants, as well as civilians, is needed. Health implications of war
extend to emotional health. It is imperative this is incorporated into the DDR mandate.
Addressing the needs of civilians is essential in the DDR process. Too often, combatants’
needs are the sole individuals addressed in DDR processes. In the conflict seen in DRC,
everyone is affected. Millions of people have been forced to flee their homes, and violence is
inflicted upon civilians in ways other than through sexual violence. Poverty rates are
exceptionally high. Not incorporating these structural inequalities into the DDR process will
most likely result in an eruption of conflict again as people will see no other alternative in
maintaining their livelihood. Furthermore, many soldiers who suffer from mental health trauma
are seen returning to combat roles as a result of society lacking a successful reintegration
process. This coupled with the access to arms as a lack of disarmament, continues to fuel the

119

Chapter 7: Where to go from here?
conflict. The relapse rate in regards to active/inactive combatants contributes to the rates of
sexual violence seen. Baaz and Stern aim to understand the structural inequalities that have
allowed for sexual violence to occur in DRC and emphasize the need to address these structural
inequalities when discussing conflict and post-conflict resolution. Solely focusing on instances of
sexual violence will limit the success of peace (Baaz and Stern 2010). Moreover, it is critically
important to address the reintegration of children who were forcibly conscripted into armed
service (Leatherman 2011, 169-170). MONUSCO currently has a DDRRR mandate
(Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement) of foreign armed
groups. However, only troops originating outside DRC are incorporated into this mandate. It is
crucial that the same services that are made available to foreign soldiers are also accessible to
indigenous DRC combatants, and the services of these kinds are funded and made available
throughout the nation.
The lack of addressing human rights abuses from the two previous conflicts contributes
to the sense of urgency in addressing these crimes. Signing of the Pretoria Accord, which
brought an end to the Second Congolese War, created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC). This TRC attempted to provide truth and closure for crimes committed. The commission
did not conduct any investigations and the TRC was seen as “cosmetic at best” (Klosterboer and
Hartmann-Mahumd 2013, 58). Be that as it may, individuals still want to find out the truth of the
crimes that were committed during these conflicts. The non-governmental organization (NGO)
the Enough Project has proposed for the establishment of community-based TRC aimed at
reconciliation and fostering community dialogue on the crimes committed. When civilians in
eastern DRC were polled, 88 percent of them stated their desire to know more the events that
transpired during the wars (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahumd 2013, 68).
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The creation of a community-based TRC could be beneficial to provide closure for
victims of certain crimes, or at least allow for a public understanding as to why certain
individuals acted in a distinct way during the conflicts. In any event, community-based TRC’s
should not be the sole way of prosecuting individuals involved in rape and sexual violence. The
failure of the TRC following the Second Congolese War leads to the current recommendation
that this method of transitional justice is not to be employed for the current conflict. TRC are
aimed at providing a space for non-judgmental dialogue. While dialogue is important at
understanding why events transpired and who was involved in the events, it is still imperative
that the community (international and domestic) focus on the prosecution of grave human rights
violations. Amnesties passed in May 2009 pardons crimes committed in North and South Kivu
since June 2003. These amnesties were granted in the hope that non-judgmental dialogue would
occur in the future. Soldiers would, theoretically, be able to acknowledge the truth and would not
have to fear arrest of conviction for crimes committed (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahumd
2013, 68-69). The amnesties excluded crimes of war, crimes against humanity and acts of
genocide. These crimes should still be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
Combating Sexual Violence During Conflict
Sexual violence during conflict has still not been addressed. As Baaz and Stern reported,
gender-based violence has become normalized in DRC as a result of the conflicts. Furthermore,
their study showed that civilians are becoming increasingly involved in gender-based violence
and crimes towards women. Baaz and Stern state that this normalization of rape by civilians is
rooted in society’s perception of men’s natural urges, thereby justifying the occurrence of these
rapes. The community reinforces the patriarchy and male dominance (Baaz and Stern 2009).
This normalization of GBV emphasizes the importance of addressing sexual violence during
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conflict within the context of DRC. If military leaders and insurgent group members are held
accountable for the crimes they commit (regardless of the degree of the crime), then civilians
will realize their actions are also subject to prosecution. As such, violence committed by civilians
towards other civilians will be seen as unlawful and punishable by the judicial system.
In 2014, President Kabila appointed a representative to actively combat sexual violence
and the recruitment of child soldiers. An office was established in order to facilitate in providing
education to prevent sexual violence. This office also assists victims in reporting crimes of
sexual violence. Furthermore, the FARDC adopted a national action plan aimed at reducing
sexual violence in conflict in September 2014. The Congress is in the process of drafting a law
that will create a trust fund for reparations for victims of sexual violence (Mattioli-Zeltner 2015,
60-64). Allowing victims to receive repartitions is important when attempting to construct
reconciliation and a post-conflict society.
Improvements for the Congolese Judicial System
One significant limitation of the Congolese judicial system that needs to be advanced is
the lack of transfer of information between the civilians and government officials. There is no
compiled public record of judgments the national courts reach. Thus, it is hard to determine
exactly how many trials and convictions have been reached for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Human Rights Watch estimates there to be about only 30 trials in total from the past
ten years. This is excluding the convictions received through the mobile courts (Mattioli-Zeltner
2015, 2). Most of these trails involved members of FARDC, but some civilians and members of
various insurgent groups have also been tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Access to information and policies regarding sexual violence and judicial protection is a human
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right the state must guarantee. Incorporating and educating people of this right is imperative in
ensuring civilian involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. Awareness of the crimes and cases
are also important in order to ensure that individuals know what happened during the conflicts,
and justice was reached. Similar to the need to translate mandates into local languages, public
records should be available in local languages. This ensures that certain groups will not continue
to be systematically marginalized.
It is recommended that sexual violence and gender-based violence be incorporated into
the school curriculum to ensure understanding of the rights guaranteed to an individual. If you
can teach children about the ramifications and implications of rape and sexual violence during
times of conflict and peace, then you could see a change in societal perspectives of rape. This is
critical in DRC because of how widespread rape is. Furthermore, it could help to destigmatize
rape on a national level, as well as an international level. It is also important to address the
gender dynamics within society and highlight the fact that sexual violence is not exclusive to
women. Addressing gender is important in order to achieve gender equality and reform the
overall situation of women within society.
Limitations from Bosnia- What the DRC Should Improve Upon
The biggest limitation of the Bosnian post-conflict restorative justice process was the
disregard of women’s voices and involvement in conflict and peace. In both conflicts, women
were specifically targeted as a weapons tactic. The lack of addressing their experiences will
prevent further development within the communities. Civilians are affected by conflict in
different ways than soldiers are. In the future, during the post-conflict reconstruction of DRC,
women need to be present. Local NGOs should send representatives to the conference in order to
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provide another voice. The peace talks should occur in DRC, or somewhere close to DRC. Far
too many peace talks occur in other countries, which makes attending the peace talks financially
straining. This will impact the civilians who are going to ensure their voices are heard and their
demands are met. As Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud states, “[n]ational and international
mechanisms will have little impact on local populations unless marginalized groups are included
at the forefront of transitional processes” (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 74).
Another limitation seen in Bosnia was the primary focus on prosecuting high-ranking
individuals who authorized large-scale crimes. While prosecuting the high ranking commanders
for the crimes that were committed is desirable, the international community and national
community must apply the same force and prosecution techniques to the low-ranking
commanders. The low-ranking commanders of Bosnia were almost unilaterally pushed aside in
terms of prosecution, and the national courts were in charge of prosecuting these individuals. It is
imperative that the mixed-court system in DRC does not take on the same fate as Bosnia. The
courts in DRC that will prosecute the low-ranking individuals need to ensure that their cases are
publicized in the same way and justice is received for all individuals.
One important critique of the ICTY and the post-conflict reconstruction situation in
Bosnia is in regards to how witnesses/survivors were treated after they had testified at the ICTY.
In Stover’s book The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague, many
witnesses were disheartened by the fact that the prosecutors and the court did not keep in contact
with them after their testimony. Some of the witnesses received thank you notes in the mail, but
other than that there was limited/no follow up to ensure they understood the court process and
the decision that was made. Furthermore, there was no assistance in reassuring they were
welcomed back into their community after their involvement in testifying in The Hague. The
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prosecutors did not follow up with the witnesses after verdicts had been reached, which could
affect the societies overall perception of the ICTY and its efficiency (Stover 2007). The question
of justice for whom needs to be asked when discussing the ICTY’s success or failure. The ICTY
might be perceived as have reached justice in international standards, but it failed to address
other aspects of justice. There was a narrow scope on focusing on the legality of war crimes, and
holding individuals liable for their actions under Western concepts of justice. It is this legal focus
on transitional justice that Bell has emphasized needs to be “de-colonized.” This de-colonization,
Bell states, is needed in order to apply transitional justice through other aspects of society, such
as looking at the history, culture and needs of the people, rather than a focus on the law (Bell
2009).
Transitional justice and reconstruction in Bosnia were solely focused on legal justice for
victims/survivors of conflict and holding perpetrators accountable. There was no aspects of
reconstruction and justice outside of law that occurred in Bosnia, by the people or the
international community. Since the international community labeled Bosnia an international
protectorate post-DPA, it was up to the international community to address justice and
reconciliation in all aspects of society. The failure to address non-legal aspects of transitional
justice shows the failure of the international community in providing complete justice for all
individuals in Bosnia. This is an aspect that must not be repeated within the context of the DRC.
If individuals are involved in testifying for the crimes they have witnessed, participated in, or
been victims to, the international community must realize their importance and courage. The
value added by witnesses to trials is important, and thinking their involvement with justice ends
after testifying is naïve. The prosecutors, international community, etc. needs to certify that
witnesses were reintegrated into society successfully after testifying. Furthermore, they need to
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reach out to the witnesses after the final verdict has been reached, to safeguard that the witnesses
understand the verdict. They must ensure through all means possible that re-traumatization does
not occur after their involvement with the court. It can be stressful to relive events through
testifying to provide evidence, and disregarding the lived experiences of survivors might make
individuals less willing to participate in justice through legal actions. While a witness’s
involvement with court cases might end after testimony, their experience with the conflict and
abuse is something they will have to live out through the rest of their life.
ICC Investigations in DRC
The International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to open an investigation into the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 23, 2004. The ICC is investigating grave crimes
committed since July 1, 2002 with an “interest of justice” for the victims of the conflict
(International Criminal Court 2004). On March 12, 2012, the ICC found Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
guilty of war crimes and conscripting child soldiers. He was sentenced to 14 years of
imprisonment (International Criminal Court 2016h). Sexual violence was excluded from the
conviction. The ICC found Germain Katanga guilt of being an accessory to one count of a crime
against humanity (murder) and four counts of war crimes (murder, attacking a civilian
population, destruction of property and pillaging). Germain Katanga was sentenced to 12 years
of imprisonment, but the court counted his imprisonment during trial as part of his time served.
His sentence was set to be completed on January 18, 2016 (International Criminal Court 2016e).
Once again, sexual violence was excluded from the conviction. The failure to prosecute high
ranking war criminals of sexual violence is perpetuating the impunity for rapists. It sends a
message to others, that commanders and soldier can continue to use rape as a weapon tactic of
war.
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The ICC is currently prosecuting Bosco Ntaganda for: “13 counts of war crimes (murder
and attempted murder; attacking civilians; rape; sexual slavery of civilians; pillaging;
displacement of civilians; attacking protected objects; destroying the enemy's property; and rape,
sexual slavery, enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years and
using them to participate actively in hostilities) and 5 counts of crimes against humanity (murder
and attempted murder; rape; sexual slavery; persecution; forcible transfer of population)”
(International Criminal Court 2016c). The trial is ongoing.
Callixte Mbarushimana was investigated for five counts of crimes against humanity
(murder, torture, rape, inhumane acts and persecution) and eight counts of war crimes (attacks
against the civilian population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman treatment, destruction
of property and pillaging). However, on December 16, 2011, the ICC released Mbarushimana
from custody as they declined to confirm the charges against him (International Criminal Court
2016d). Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was prosecuted by the ICC for committing three crimes against
humanity (murder; sexual slavery and rape) and seven war crimes (forced conscription of
children; deliberately directing an attack on a civilian population as such or against individual
civilians or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities under article; willful
killing; destruction of property; pillaging; sexual slavery and rape). Chui was acquitted on
December 18, 2012 for all his charges (International Criminal Court, 2016f). Once again, justice
was not reached for the crimes Mbarushimana and Chui committed and peace was not given to
the victims of their crimes. A warrant has been issued for the arrest of Sylvestre Mudacumura.
He is allegedly responsible for: nine counts of war crimes (attacking civilians, murder,
mutilation, cruel treatment, rape, torture, destruction of property, pillaging and outrages against
personal dignity) (International Criminal Court 2016g). He is still at large.
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The Structure of the Court and Witness Involvement in Prosecution
The ICTY was constructed as the first international criminal tribunal since the
Nuremburg Trials. Since it was the first time the international community convened, they were
still trying to figure out how to structure the court. The result was that the judicial structure of the
ICTY was a mix between common law and civil law. Adversarial law, also known as common
law, is common in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and other former colonies
of the British Empire. This type of legal system occurs between the prosecutorial team and the
defense team, where the judge acts as a referee and the jury reaches the verdict. Within this type
of law, prosecutors and defense attorneys are supposed to prepare the witnesses for their
testimony, which can be used to support evidence. Not assisting in preparing the witness can
result in misconduct of the lawyer. Inquisitorial law, also known as civil law, is used as a way to
determine facts, rather than interpretation of events. Examples of countries using civil law
include France, Germany, and most other European states. In the civil law system, the judge
takes a more active role in conducting investigations and asking questions during the trail. There
is no jury, and the decision is up to the interpretation of the judge or judges. Civil law is based on
written legal constitutions and laws and the disputes are grounded in interpretation of the laws.
Within the civil law, attorneys are not allowed to prepare the witnesses for their testimony. This
would be considered leading a witness, and can result in a mistrial. The common law approach is
used more frequently, but civil law has its presence. However, because the ICTY had not
established a specific type of law to practice, the court would use both at different times. This
constant shift in the legal system affects a witness’s testimony ability, as they might not be
adequately prepped for testimony, or not allowed to get ready for their testimony (Stover 2005,
33-50). While the ICC also employs this mixed approach to prosecution, it is important that the
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domestic courts of DRC only apply one constant judicial perspective. This will allow for
uniformed trial preparation and testimonies for victims of sexual violence. The DRC mostly
employs civil law, but also uses customary and traditional law (CIA World Factbook 2016). The
use of three approaches to the legal system will only further cloud individual’s perspectives on
the success of transitional justice and justice outside the legal context.
Testimony for victims or witnesses of sexual violence (or any crime) can be difficult to
navigate. As mentioned previously, testifying can have a great emotional impact on someone as
they will have to relive their trauma. But there are more obstacles towards testifying, other than
the potential emotional trauma the witness/victim/survivor might experience. Individuals
testifying might be considered, unreliable if they appear too traumatized and are unable to
answer the questions posed to them in court. However, individuals might also be deemed erratic
if they are too composed and recite their experience of the event rehearsed and unemotional.
There is a double-bind that contradicts a witness in providing information of events that occurred
(Stover 2005, 137-138).
Moreover, as prosecutors try to show grave crimes have been committed, they tend to
select witnesses that show extreme crimes, rather than the more “normalized” crimes. They will
ask individuals who will be able to testify as to the gruesomeness of the crimes, the systemic,
and the widespread intent of these crimes, rather than the crimes that might occur more
frequently but are not necessarily as gruesome. While it is important to show the widespread and
systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, the tactical use of only using witnesses that show this
crime delegitimizes individuals who have been victims of crimes that are not “systematic and
widespread.” It is imperative for all victims/survivors to be treated with the same respect, and for
their experiences to be approached with equal representation.
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The Call to Incorporate Sexual Violence Crimes in all Prosecutions
It is imperative that crimes involving sexual violence, rape, sexual slavery, etc. are
prosecuted by the international community. Only two of the six individuals prosecuted by the
ICC have been convicted for rape and sexual violence. Impunity needs to be dismantled and all
individuals, implicit or otherwise, need to be convicted of the crimes they have committed. There
is an urgent call on the international community and national Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to address this human rights and human security violation. Justice needs
to be achieved for all.
As a result of politics in the construction of the international criminal justice system, plea
deals are utilized to ensure successful prosecution of crimes. Similarly, unless the prosecutor is
able to effectively provide evidence that a crime has been committed, they might exclude that
specific crime from the indictment. This aspect was seen in the Germain Katanga case. Katanga
was only prosecuted for forcible recruitment of children. The prosecutor had enough evidence to
convict Katanga of this charge, but not for acts of sexual violence and rape. Rape and other acts
of sexual violence can be hard to provide sufficient evidence to support the victims claims these
human rights violations occurred. The international community must reconsider how it deals
with individuals who have been allegedly involved in sexual violence. Prevalence rates of rape in
DRC provide evidence for itself and witnesses should not be used to provide the sole evidence of
the abuse, but act as supplemental evidence to ensure conviction. The studies conducted by Baaz
and Stern, along with other anthropologists, support the claim that rape has become normalizedboth in and out of the conflict. Rather than relying on the victims and/or witnesses, the courts
should reference studies conducted as it will not have the same ramifications on the individual
whose rights were violated. This shift might even allow for a more accurate statistic on the extent
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to which rape is seen in eastern DRC. People might not be as worried to report their crimes if
they do not fear the emotional stress associated with testifying, or being seen as an unreliable
witness.
Furthermore, while plea deals can be beneficial in understanding what events transpired,
often times plea deals do not include sexual violence crimes. There needs to be a demand in
incorporating these crimes into the plea deals. The court system needs to shift its perspectives on
the victim for testimony. While DRC and the ICC have changed the procedural rules addressed
as victim testimony, we should not expect an individual to be able to confront their perpetrator.
This act might increase possibilities of PTSD, or other mental health obstacles. Furthermore,
victims might be intimidated upon their return to the communities because of their involvement
in the judicial system. These consequences of testimony have the ability to be destigmatized with
the expansion of sexual violence proceedings. Until this occurs, it is essential that the
international community and domestic community realize witnesses and victims need to be given
additional support (physical and mental).
Recommendations
Included below is a complied list of additional recommendations towards the
international community and Government of DRC. The recommendations mentioned above are
also included below, but were discussed in greater detail above to outline the importance of
implementing policies to provide protection for survivors of sexual violence in the DRC. The
suggestions below range from realistic to less realistic and again to utopian. Some
recommendations are unlikely to be implemented, but are suggested in the hopes that some day
they will be achieved. Furthermore, all recommendations to DRC can be applied to the entire
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international community to aid in ensuring sexual abuse and rape as a weapon of war is not seen
in other contexts.

To the International Community
•

The ICC needs to improve its investigations into violations of humanitarian laws in DRC.

•

Improve the legitimacy of CEDAW. The Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women must pressure states to submit their status reports on the
situation of women. Providing these reports will give a more general understanding of the
status of women throughout the world, including Bosnia and DRC. These reports can
then be used as a baseline in understanding what actions can be taken to further improve
the status of women.

•

The creation of an additional Optional Protocol under CEDAW is recommended. This
optional protocol should specifically address sexual violence during conflict, and the
actions a state is obliged to follow in order to ensure protection for its civilians. Creating
a legally binding Protocol will also improve the efficiency of UN Security Council
Resolutions aimed at improving the security and protection of women and children
during conflict.

•

While it is commendable that two Optional Protocols exist on the rights of the child, an
additional Option Protocol specifically outlining sexual violence towards children during
conflict should be enacted. This will reduce confusion and ensure that states are aware of
the rights of children, and the right not to be sexually violated during conflict. The
Protocol should also outline steps the state will take to ensure additional protection is
provided during conflict aimed directly at children.
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•

The international community needs to improve monitoring of resource extraction from
Central Africa. Records need to be kept to ensure minerals are not illegally exploited
from DRC and sold on the market. More effect ways at monitoring resource and
commodity chains need to be implemented. Resource extraction aids the conflict, and
until this role is addressed and taken extremely seriously, conflict will most likely
continue. It is recommended that the international community put sanctions on countries
and corporations that buy and sell resources illegally extracted from the DRC.

•

UN peacekeepers must be held accountable for their involvement in human rights abuses
and sexual violations. Relocation of the peacekeeping troops is not the answer.
Accountability needs to be seen for the survivors of sexual violence. Furthermore, better
training needs to be provided for peacekeeping troops in how to report and provide
protection for survivors of sexual violence.

•

The community of Bosnia and the international community needs to start addressing rape
during the Bosnian conflict. It needs to be taught in schools, in order to teach individuals
of the consequences of violating human rights, in attempts to deter these crimes from
happening again. It is never too late to address crimes, to learn from the crimes, and to
demand accountability.

•

The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia needs to actively prosecute individuals. While they
demonstrate a large capacity to prosecute alleged war criminals, many have yet to be
prosecuted. Pressure needs to be applied to the War Crimes Chamber to ensure these
cases are tried to the fullest extent possible.
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•

Improve education on all aspects of the Bosnian conflict, within Bosnia. This is necessary
in order to deter future conflicts from erupting due to the ethnic divides still present
within the society.

To the Government of The Democratic Republic of the Congo
•

It is imperative that the discourse shift to consider all individuals as survivors, rather than
victims.

•

The needs of IDPs must be addressed. IDPs are some of the most vulnerable individuals
during conflict, and their protection and security needs to be emphasized. Sexual violence
rates may decrease if displaced persons are given protection and shelter.

•

It is imperative that the DRC reaffirms its commitment to children and the CRC. The use
of children as combatants and victims of conflict during combat is widespread within the
DRC, representing another violation of children’s human rights. This further adds to the
presence of sexual violence as already exploited children are increasingly vulnerable due
to the lack of security.

•

Reparations for victims of sexual violence need to be established in DRC. While there
has been discussion about the creation of a trust for survivors, action needs to be take to
create this trust.

•

Psychological support needs to be provided for all individuals of conflict. This will assist
in de-stigmatizing the topic of mental health for everyone and will benefit survivors of
sexual violence.

•

There needs to be improved access to healthcare, specifically hospitals. More hospitals
need to be opened, especially in the rural areas of eastern DRC. Furthermore, additional
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doctors need to be trained in how to operate on and treat women who have suffered
trauma as a result of sexual violence.
•

Infrastructure needs to be improved throughout the state. This is especially important in
regards to improving access to healthcare and roads to hospitals. This will reduce the
time it takes to receive medical help for physical implications of violent abuses.

•

Transportation to and from trials and testimonies need to be improved for witnesses.
Their security and anonymity needs to be protected.

•

Citizens of the DRC need to be educated regarding policies and laws that could assist in
finding justice for crimes committed against them. Improving education and access to
these policies will increase the likelihood alleged war criminals will be held accountable
for their actions.

•

Education on sexual violence needs to be incorporated into schools. This will change the
generational understanding of sexual violence and the implications it has within society.

•

Formal and informal education needs to address rape. “Evil rape” and “lust rape” need to
be deconstructed and shown that there is no difference between these types of rape. Rape
is rape, and a violation of one’s autonomy and human right. There is no excuse or
justification for this form of human rights violation.

•

There needs to be an increase in specialized lawyers for Mobile Court Cases.
Furthermore, an increase in lawyers, judges, registrars, etc. needs to occur for court cases
outside the Mobile Courts to be as affective and efficient as possible in providing justice
in all aspects of society.

•

The timing and importance of expeditious court cases needs to be implemented into all
proceedings. Cases should adhere to having all testimonies and verdicts reached within
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three months of the start date, coupled with a timely manner in starting the trials.
Providing a speedy trial is helpful to the defense and witness(es) as it has the potential to
reduce trauma and be less emotionally exhaustive. This will aid in reducing the cost of
trials.
•

During trials, there needs to be active communication between witnesses and lawyers.
This includes communication in all phases of the trial, especially post-decision. It is
imperative that witnesses understand the decisions that have been handed down. A
position should be created that relays, informs and communicates important information
between the lawyers and witnesses. This is particularly important after verdicts have been
reached to ensure that witnesses understand the implications of the verdict, and how it
may or may not affect them.

•

Witnesses need to be educated on all aspects of their participation in trials. The use of
plea deals needs to be explained to individuals interested in testifying, so the same
misinterpretations seen in Bosnia are not seen in DRC.

•

If plea deals are arranged for the defendant, it is imperative that sexual violence crimes
are not removed from the charges. Sexual violence needs to be seen with the same weight
as all other human rights violations.

•

It is suggested that the mobile courts be applied to more stable regions of the state in
order to provide justice outside the eastern regions. This will streamline justice in
attempts to hold all individuals accountable for crimes against humanity and sexual
violence, not just individuals that are presently involved in conflict.

•

Increase funding for Mobile Courts in order to improve their effectiveness.
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•

FARDC needs to be investigated for allowing and perpetrating human rights violations.
Holding the government and national forces accountable for human rights violations will
act as a deterrent to ensure other individuals do not abuse human rights.

•

Corruption within the state needs to be addressed. The budget of the judicial system
needs to be increased to more than 1% of the entire state budget. Addressing corruption
will also lead to a better understanding of what may be fueling the conflict and who is
benefiting from the ongoing conflict.

•

All records need to provided for the public. These records should include, but are not
limited to, court records and records of attacks that have been reported. The proceedings
should be translated into all local languages. This will help to deconstruct and
destigmatize sexual violence if communities understand the widespread reoccurrence of
this tactic.

•

Peace talks need to be revisited. While this process may be complex, the NSAGs and the
Government of the DRC need to come to an agreement regarding what needs to occur
within the state of DRC to ensure peace is achieved and conflict ends.

•

Gender must be at the center of the peace process. Disregarding gender will not provide
for improvements in the discourse of rape as a weapon of war. Women should not be
‘added into the conversation’ but should actively participate in the conversations and be
actively involved in the decision making.

•

The DDR procedures need to emphasize demobilization to ensure that arms and weapons
are collected. Financial assistance can be provided to ensure people give up their
weapons. Conflict will likely erupt if people retain their weapons. Reconciliation and
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reintegration of combatants into society is important as it will ensure that combatants feel
comfortable returning, and do not feel the need to return to fighting.
•

The reintegration of survivors of sexual violence into society is also exceptionally
important to address within the DDR mandate. Ensuring sexual violence victims are not
‘othered’ by the community will assist in deconstructing the stigma on rape.

•

Addressing the mental health of civilians and combatants needs to be incorporated into
society, and the DDR process.

•

When discussing how the peace process and transitional justice structure of DRC should
look, experts from all fields, domestic and international, should be consulted, not just
policy makers or UN officials. Receiving perspectives from various fields will ensure that
transitional justice and peace will be achieved in the most productive and efficient
manner. This will help to guarantee as many aspects of society as possible are included.

•

Civil society organizations need to be incorporated into the peace talks and peace
processes. Training and collaboration between organizations should be seen in order to
unite on common themes to ensure incorporation into reconstruction and the overall postconflict society.

•

When peace talks do occur, they need to occur close to DRC. This will ensure that all
civil society organizations and individuals have a greater chance of participating.
Additionally, when peace talks do occur, the government should provide financial
assistance to ensure that anyone who wants to participate can, without fear of financial
constraints. The peace talks must also be publicized to ensure equal access.

•

Legal justice should occur close to the DRC. Similar to the need to have peace talks close
to DRC, holding trials within the Congolese society will ensure that people who cannot
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afford to attend the trials or participate as witnesses are not excluded. This will also
improve the understanding of ongoing events during trial, as it could be easier to relay
information to more rural areas if the events are occurring relatively close geographically.
•

When transitional justice is implemented within the Congolese society, there must be a
regulated form of common or customary law approach. Fluidity and lack of a concrete
legal approach will affect the witness and their testimony the most, due to different
approaches on witness involvement between customary and common law. The defendant
will not be directly affected to the same extent as the witness, however the trial itself will
take different forms without a common approach.

•

Human rights violations and sexual violence needs to be addressed beyond the legal
context. While the paper emphasizes prosecutions, it also emphasizes the need to devictimize, deconstruct and change perspectives of rape as a weapon of war in DRC.
Changing society’s perspective on sexual violence will only come from an increase in the
conversations of sexual violence and realizing that people that have survived attacks are
human.

•

Sexual violence must be incorporated into all aspects of peace, justice, forgiveness,
reconciliation, healing, and truth, and all aspects of the transitional justice approach that
taken during the reconstruction process.

Areas for further research
•

Hegemonic masculinity and gender relationships in DRC needs further research. Who are
the assailants? Who are the victims? Which men? Which women? What is the gender of
the victims? Which men are the assailants and which men are the victims- in regards to
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male to male sexual violence? What is the power hierarchy and traits that have allowed
for the assailants to perpetuate abuse and their dominance?
•

What are children’s positions within the conflict? Are children involved in sexual
violence? Which children? What are some reasons children might voluntarily take up
arms?

•

What are the roles women take in active conflict? What are their rankings within formal
fighting groups? Which women? How did they get there? Are they involved in aspects of
sexual violence, as either the perpetrator or victim?

•

What are the roles men take in active conflict? What roles do men take in civil society
organizations? Do men actively try to destigmatize and raise awareness of sexual
violence? Do they involve themselves in rape? Which men? Why?

•

The de-stigmatization of mental health and rape is an area where additional research
needs to be seen. How can this topic be approached? What tactic can be employed to rehumanize victims and survivors of conflict?

•

The structural inequalities that have lead to violence and sexual abuse also need to be
researched. Understanding these inequalities will make achieving peace and maintaining
peace more likely to occur.

Conclusion
While there are still significant reforms that need to be made in justice in DRC, it is
important to applaud the country for its efforts in attempting to address human rights violations
and sexual violence as a result of conflict. Similar to the need to unpack the victimization
discourse on survivors of sexual violence, it is imperative to deconstruct the perception of DRC
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as a failed state. Impunity is not a characteristic solely seen in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In 2015, the most popular book at the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld library in New
York was Immunity of Heads of State and State Officials for International Crimes by Ramona
Pedretti (Flood 2016). This shows the international communities complacency in immunity of
crimes. Hopefully, after a successful post-conflict transitional justice period aimed at prosecuting
all individuals of sexual violence, the DRC should be used as a model for future states and
conflicts. No one should be given immunity for violating someone else’s human rights.
There are countless international treaties solidifying women’s rights and children’s rights.
The state has a responsibility to protect these rights, and when the state fails, the international
community must step in. While state sovereignty is important within international relations, the
international community also has a “right to protect,” an aspect of the UN mandate that is not
being enforced within the DRC. International laws and UNSCR’s aimed at civilians in conflict
will continue to have no legitimacy if they are not enforced. The DRC is the perfect context to
start effectively applying these mandates and laws.
In the construction of the transitional justice system in DRC, it is hard to speculate what
judicial proceeding layout will be most effective. A hybrid court could prove beneficial, despite
its drawbacks. A TRC could also be effective at finding truth. Whichever form transitional
justice prosecutions take; sexual violence needs to be incorporated. The voices of civilians
affected by the conflict need to be incorporated. It is exceptionally crucial to actively involve
women in peace conferences, and peacebuilding processes. There needs to be explicit gender
language. Without it, women will be undoubtedly excluded. Furthermore, the transitional justice
system in DRC needs to incorporate disciplines outside of law. This will allow for a more
encompassing understanding of the implications of conflict and justice on the people.
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As was mentioned in Chapter 3, we need to deconstruct the victimization stereotype.
Perpetuating “victimization” of crimes will not positively contribute to the discourse of rape
during conflict. The incidents experienced by individuals during conflict need to be
acknowledged and publicized in order to decrease stigmatization of violence during conflict and
resulting vulnerability. Until more accurate numbers of rape are published, it is impossible to
determine how many individuals are not being held responsible for violating an individual’s
human rights and human security. In the meantime, conflict will be eternalized as a result of the
implications of rape within the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Rape is a violation of one’s fundamental human rights, in times of conflict and times of
peace. This human right needs to be actively protected and promoted for all: men, women and
children. In the future, one can hope this issue is no longer relevant. Until that day occurs,
awareness must be raised and perpetrators must be held accountable. The Democratic Republic
of the Congo needs to realize the importance of human security, and the autonomy of a person,
within the greater context of human rights and conflict. The country needs to continue to
prosecute cases similar to the New Year’s Day case where war criminals and human rights
violators were held accountable for their actions. Gender needs to be a central topic in regards to
creating policies and achieving equality. A responsibility of the international community is to
amplify the voice of the grassroots organizations to ensure human rights violations are not
overlooked. In order for change to be most effective, it needs to continue to come from the
grassroots level, as this represents the needs and desires of the people.
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Figure 1: Map of Democratic Republic of the Congo

Source: United Nations. 2011. Department of Field Support Cartographic Section- Democratic
Republic of the Congo Map.
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Figure 2: Map of East-Central Democratic Republic of the Congo

Source: United Nations. 1998. Department of Field Support Cartographic SectionEast-Central Democratic Republic of the Congo Map.
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Figure 3: Map of Internally Displaced Persons in DRC and Returnees

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Map: DR
Congo - Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees." In Humanitarian Response.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
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Who’s Who in the Conflict in DRC
FARDC:

Congolese Armed Forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du
Congo): National army of DRC.

CNDP:

National Congress for the Defense of the People (Congrès national pour la
défense du peuple): led by Laurent Nkunda and is the driving force behind the
Kivu Conflicts. Mandate has been to defend the Banyamulenge (ethnic groups,
also referred to as Tutsi Congolese) in eastern DRC. Demobilized in 2009.

FDLR:

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de
liberation du Rwanda): Rwandan based insurgent group including Rwandan
Genocidaires. Demobilized after passing of UNSCR in March 2008. Soldiers
were forced to return to Rwanda. However, still active in DRC.

Mai Mai:

Also known as Mayi-Mayi or Mayï-Mayï. These groups are community-based
militia groups formed to defend their territories.

PARECO:

Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (Coalition des patriotes résistants
congolais): Emerged March 2007 to fight against CNDP

AFDL:

Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo: Led LaurentDesire Kabila. Main objective was to overthrow Mobutu regime. When Kabila
became president AFDL became FARDC.

APR:

Rwandan Patriotic Army

MLC:

Movement for the Liberation of Congo: Rebel group active during Second
Congolese War

RCD:

Rally for the Congolese Democracy: Rebel force during Second Congolese War.
Assisted by support from the Government of Rwanda.

M23:

March 23 Movement. Former CNDP members. Led by Bosco Ntaganda. Seized
control over Goma in 2012, which led FARDC to control Minova. Led to Minova
Court Case

Note: This list is not an exhaustive list of active forces in the conflict. At any given time, there
can be over 60 armed insurgent groups. This list is just in reference to forces addressed
throughout that have had important roles in the creation of these conflicts and/or use of rape as a
weapon of war.
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Appendix D
Chart of Policies, Ratification Status and State Signatories
Policy
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1949)
International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination
(1965)
International Covenant on
Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966)
International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
(1966)
Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against
Women (1979)
Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1984)
International Convention on
Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families
(1990)
Convention on the Rights of
the Child (1989)
Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against
Women: Amendment Article
20(1)(1995)
Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against
Women Optional Protocol
(1999)

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Status

Democratic
Republic of
Congo
----

Status

----

----

----

16 Jul 1993

Succession

21 Apr 1976

Accession

1 Sept 1993

Succession

1 Nov 1976

Accession

1 Sept 1993

Succession

1 Nov 1976

Accession

1 Sept 1993

Succession

17 Oct 1986

Ratification

1 Sept 1993

Succession

18 Mar 1996

Accession

13 Dec 1996

Ratification

----

----

1 Sept 1993

Succession

27 Sep 1990

Ratification

10 May 2012

Acceptance

----

----

2 Sep 2002

Ratification

----

----
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Convention on the Rights of
the Child Optional
Protocol: Children in
Armed Conflict (2000)
Convention on the Rights of
the Child Optional
Protocol: Sale of Children
(2000)
Rome Statute
African Union Protocol to
the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Rights of Women in
Africa (1995)

10 Oct 2003

Ratification

11 Nov 2001

Ratification

4 Sept 2002

Ratification

11 Nov 2001

Accession

11 Apr 2002

----

Ratification 11 Apr 2002

----

9 Jun 2008

Ratification

Ratification

Sources: African Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, 2016; United Nations Treaty Collection, 2016;
“Ratification defines the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a
treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act” (United Nations 2015)
“‘Accession’ is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a
treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as ratification.
Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force” (United Nations 2015)
Succession: The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeds to treaties signed by the
Socialist Federation Republic of Yugoslavia prior to 6 March 1992 (United Nations Treaty
Collection, 2016).
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Chart of Important ICC and ICTY Cases

Case

Bosco
Ntaganda

Callixte
Mbarushimana

Germain
Katanga

Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui

ICC/
ICTY

ICC

ICC

ICC

ICC

Crime
13 counts
of war
crimes and
5 counts of
crimes
against
humanity

5 counts of
crimes
against
humanity
and 8
counts of
war crimes
25(3)(d) of
the Rome
Statute: 1
count of
crime
against
humanity
and 4
counts of
war crimes
3 counts of
crimes
against
humanity
and 7
counts of
war crimes

Status

Verdict

Sentence

Notes:

On trial as
of 2
September
2015

Charged for 5
war crimes:
rape, sexual
slavery of
civilians and
children and
----two counts of
crimes
against
humanity for
rape and
sexual
slavery
Declined to Released
Included: one
confirm
from custody
count of rape
charges 16 23 December
as a crime
December 2011
against
--2011
humanity.
One count of
rape as a war
crime
Verdict
Guilty, as an 12 years of
Sexual
reached 7 accessory, of imprisonment. violence
March 2014 one count
Transferred to excluded
crime against DRC on 19
from crimes
humanity and December
four counts 2015 to serve
war crimes
sentence

Acquitted
of all
charges

Ordered
immediate
release 18
December
2012

---

Included: 1
count of rape
as a crime
against
humanity and
1 count of
rape and
sexual
slavery as
war crime
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Case
Sylvestre
Mudacumura

Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo

Anto
Furundžija

Dragoljub
Kunarac

ICC/
ICTY

Crime

9 counts of
war crimes
8(2)(e)(vii)
of the
Rome
Statute:
Enlisting
and
ICC conscriptin
g of
children
under the
age of 15
years into
the FPLC
One count
of grave
breach of
1949
Geneva
convention
ICTY
and two
counts of
violation of
law or
customs of
war
One count
of crime
against
humanity
and one
count of
violation of
ICTY the laws or
customs of
war
ICC

Status
AT LARGE

Verdict

Sentence

Notes:

Crimes
include: rape
Verdict
Guilty of
14 years of
Sexual
reached 14 committed, as imprisonment. Violence was
March 2012 coTransferred to excluded
perpetrator of DRC 19
from the list
war crimes
December
of crimes
2015 to serve
sentence
---

---

Verdict
Guilty of
reached 10 being a coDecember conspirator
1998

20 years of
imprisonment.
Granted early
release 29 July
2004 (served 7
years)

First case to
focus
explicitly on
sexual
violence.
Reaffirmed
rape may be
used as a tool
of genocide

Verdict
reached 22
February
2001

28 years of
imprisonment.
Still serving
sentence.

Sexual
enslavement
and rape as a
crime against
humanity.
Played
prominent
roles in
establishment
of rape
camps.
Comprised
Kunarac et al.

Guilty of one
count of
crimes
against
humanity and
violation of
laws or
customs of
war and one
count of
enslavement
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Case

Duško Tadić

Esad Landžo

Hazim Delic

ICC/
ICTY

Crime

Charged
with crimes
against
humanity,
breaches of
1949
ICTY Geneva
Convention
and
violations
of law or
customs of
war
Charged
with grave
breaches of
1949
Geneva
ICTY Convention
and
violations
of law or
customs of
war
Charged
with grave
breaches of
1949
Geneva
ICTY Convention
and
violation of
law or
customs of
war

Status

Verdict

Sentence

Notes:

Verdict
reached
May 1997

Guilty of
violation of
laws and
customs of
war and
crimes
against
humanity

20 years of
imprisonment.
January 2000.
Granted early
release 17 July
2008 (served
14 years)

First trial
where sexual
violence
against men
was included
as a crime

Verdict
reached 16
November
1998

Guilty of
grave
breaches of
the Geneva
convention

15 years of
imprisonment.
Granted early
release 14
April 2006
(served 10
years)

Recognized
rape as a
form of
torture.
Comprised
Mucić et al.

Verdict
reached 16
November
1998

Guilty of
grave
breaches of
the Geneva
Convention

18 years of
imprisonment.
Granted early
release 24 June
2008 (served
12 years)

Recognized
rape as a
form of
torture.
Comprised
Mucić et al.
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Case

Radislav Krstić

Radomir
Kovać

Zdravko Mucić

ICC/
ICTY

Crime

One count
of
genocide,
one count
of
complicity
to commit
genocide,
five counts
ICTY
of crimes
against
humanity,
and four
counts of
violations
of the laws
or customs
of war
One count
of crime
against
humanity
and one
count of
violation of
ICTY the laws or
customs of
war

Status

Verdict

Sentence

Notes:

Verdict
Guilty of
reached 1 aiding and
April 2001 abetting
genocide,
aiding and
abetting
murder,
extermination
and
persecution,
and murder

35 years of
imprisonment.
Still serving
sentence

Established
the clear link
between rape
and ethnic
cleansing

Verdict
reached 22
February
2001

20 years of
imprisonment.
Granted early
release 27
March 2014
(served 14
years)

Sexual
enslavement
and rape as a
crime against
humanity.
Played
prominent
roles in
establishment
of rape
camps.
Comprised
Kunarac et al.

9 years of
imprisonment.
Granted early
release 18 July
2003 (served 7
years)

Recognized
rape as a
form of
torture.
Comprised
Mucić et al.

Guilty of one
count of
enslavement,
one count of
rape as a
crime against
humanity and
violation of
laws or
customs of
war and one
count of
outrage upon
personal
dignity
Grave
Verdict
Guilty of
breaches of reached 16 grave
1949
November breaches of
Geneva
1998
the Geneva
Convention
Convention
ICTY
and
violations
of law or
customs of
war
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Case

Zejnil Delalić

Zoran Vuković

ICC/
ICTY

Crime

Grave
breaches of
1949
Geneva
Convention
ICTY
and
violations
of law or
customs of
war
One count
of violation
of laws or
customs of
war
ICTY

Status

Verdict

Sentence

Verdict
Not guilty
reached 16
November
1998

Notes:
Comprised
Mucić et al.

---

Verdict
reached 22
February
2001

Guilty of
torture and
rape as a
crime against
humanity and
violation of
laws or
customs of
war

12 years of
imprisonment.
Granted early
release 11
March 2008
(served 8
years)

Sexual
enslavement
and rape as a
crime against
humanity.
Played
prominent
roles in
establishment
of rape
camps.
Comprised
Kunarac et al.
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Abbreviations
AFDL

Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

AI

Amnesty International

APR

Rwandan Patriotic Army

AU

African Union

BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

CAT

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women

CNDP

National Congress for the Defense of the People

CRC

Convention on the Rights of the Child

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DOCS

Doctors on Call for Service

DPA

Dayton Peace Accords

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

FARDC

Congolese Armed Forces

FBiH

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

FDLR

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

GBV

Gender-based Violence

HRW

Human Rights Watch

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICCPR

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICERD

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination

ICESCR

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICMRW

International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families

ICRC

International Committee for the Red Cross

ICTJ

International Center for Transitional Justice

ICTR

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
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ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IDMC

International Displacement Monitoring Centre

IHL

International Humanitarian Law

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IRC

International Rescue Committee

LPA

Lusaka Peace Accords

LRA

Lord’s Resistance Army

M23

March 23 Movement

MLC

Movement for the Liberation of Congo

MONUC

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MONUSCO

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHR

United Nations Office of High Representative

PARECO

Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance

PTSD

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

RCD

Rally for the Congolese Democracy

RS

Republika Srpska

SAP

Structural Adjustment Policies

SGBV

Sexual and Gender-based Violence

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN

United Nations

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNSCR

United Nations Security Council Resolution

WCC

War Crimes Chamber
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